

Report of the Independent Commission on the Voting System: Volume 2

Submissions from representative / campaigning groups

Electoral Reform Society

copy

Towards A Fairer Vote

**The Submission of the
Electoral Reform Society
to the Independent Commission
on Voting Systems**

March 1998

**ELECTORAL
REFORM
SOCIETY**



Preface

To members of the Commission on Voting Systems:

You have been given a task of critical importance to the future of British democracy. While the Government has taken a welcome step in promising a referendum on voting systems for Westminster, both the outcome of the referendum and the effect of any change which it brings about will depend on the choice of alternative system. Some voting systems may entrench the tendencies in present day politics which alienate voters from those who claim to represent them, while others can open up the democratic process and ensure that politics becomes the art of improving our society.

We understand that you have been asked to recommend one system which will be put to the electorate as an alternative to First-Past-the-Post. We are disappointed that the electorate will not be given a wider choice. However, we appreciate that you must work to the remit you have been given and we sympathise with you in being restricted to recommending just one system.

In recommending a system we believe that the interests of the electorate should be of paramount importance. We are aware that many politicians already have their favoured options for which they will be campaigning. It is quite legitimate for them to do so and their voices need to be heard, but how the voters choose their representatives is a matter for the electorate to decide. Moreover, it would be quite counter-productive if the referendum offered a system approved by existing politicians but unlikely to be acceptable to the electorate.

Our submission does, however, consider the main options which, we believe, you will need to examine (there is, of course, almost no end to the number of systems which might be devised, but we do caution against the use of new and untried systems in Westminster elections). That we end by recommending strong support for one particular system is a consequence of the Society's examination, over more than a century, of many different systems and variants of them. If a better system than that which we advocate had emerged we would certainly now be recommending it.

Finally, we assure you of our full support for your work. If there are issues not adequately covered in this submission and its accompanying papers, we will be pleased to do further work and present additional evidence to you. We will also be pleased to make available to you and your secretariat the facilities of our library which has the largest collection of materials on electoral systems in the country.

Yours sincerely,

Joan Davies
Chairman

Executive Summary

Conclusions:

On proportionality:

- AV is not a proportional system and does not meet the Commission's criteria.
- AMS, list systems and STV are broadly proportional systems when party proportionality is considered.
- STV, unlike AMS and list systems, has the additional capacity to produce proportionality in a wider sense by making possible the representation of significant points of view, other than those represented by political parties.

On stable government:

- There is ample evidence from other countries to demonstrate that proportional representation does not lead to unstable governments.
- Broad proportionality removes some of the instability which arises from governments pursuing controversial policies when they do not have majority support within the electorate.
- Transferable voting, which is a feature of AV and STV, assists parties in the development of coalitions and partnerships. In order to attract second and lower preference votes, parties must stress their similarities with, as well as differences from, other parties.
- STV can strengthen parties by broadening their appeal through being able to offer voters a choice of candidates. The layout of the ballot paper can also be used to preserve party identities.

On voter choice:

- In the constituency section of AMS, voters have no more choice than they do under FPTP. Many voters will still need to vote tactically to prevent their votes being wasted.
- In closed list systems, and in the list section of AMS, voters cannot choose the candidates they want to represent them – only the parties.
- STV provides more voter choice than any other electoral system.
- Survey evidence indicates that voters like being able to express preferences amongst the candidates.

Maintenance of constituency links:

- AMS has a serious defect in that it creates two types of MPs. Up to half of the MPs have no constituency links, and at least half will need to serve new constituencies much larger than existing constituencies.
- STV strengthens the links between MPs and their constituents: in moderately-sized, multi-member constituencies voters make more use of MPs as they can choose an MP likely to be sympathetic to their opinions and problems.
- Multi-member constituencies can lead to more meaningful boundaries, recognising that many counties and cities are natural, organic constituencies.

Practical points in the introduction of STV:

- Britain already has experience in running public elections using STV.
- Very many British voters already use STV in elections within trade unions, pension funds, professional associations, churches, etc.

Recommendations:

- **STV is recommended as it meets the Commission's criteria better than any other alternative voting system.**
- Legislation should be passed to ensure the introduction of STV as soon as possible, preferably in time for the next general election.
- A boundary commission should be charged with responsibility for drawing up boundaries for meaningful constituencies (if necessary this could initially be done relatively quickly by amalgamating existing constituency boundaries). Most constituencies should have between 4 and 6 seats, although smaller constituencies could be considered in sparsely populated areas.
- If the Referendum were to lead to a change in the voting system, the new system should be reviewed after two general elections.

Part I : Introduction

1. The Electoral Reform Society

The Electoral Reform Society (ERS) welcomes the Referendum and is looking forward to putting its case to the electors. With its record of 114 years of campaigning, the Society is by far the longest established pro-democracy non-governmental organisation (NGO) of its type in the world. It has members from all parties and from none.

In addition to its advocacy of preferential voting it has built up a reputation for neutrality and independence in the actual conduct of elections and its Ballot Services division currently handles about 20 *million* votes each year.

Its International Service division extends its help and advice to countries throughout Eastern Europe and the developing world. In recent years it has given service in 44 countries in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and the Middle East.

The Society's reputation has been marked by recognition by the Economic and Social Council of the UN - the only NGO in the electoral field so recognised.

2. The Society's submission

Our submission is in three parts:

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| I | Introduction |
| II | The Commission's terms of reference and types of voting system |
| III | Recommendations |

In addition to this submission we are providing the Commission with working papers in which we present more detailed evidence. The working papers consider:

1. The history of electoral reform in Britain
2. Proportionality
3. Stable government and electoral reform
4. Voter choice and electoral reform
5. Constituency links
6. The use of STV in Britain

Part II : The Commission's Terms of Reference and Types of Voting System

3. Approach to our analysis

Although the number of voting systems is almost limitless, we have focused our attention on four main types of system:

- the Alternative Vote (AV)
- List systems
- the Additional Member System (AMS)
- the Single Transferable Vote (STV).

We examine each of these system types against the terms of reference given to the Commission and then make our recommendation in the light of this analysis.

In our analysis we also give some attention to some of the variants of these types of system which the Commission might wish to consider, e.g. the Supplementary Vote (SV) as a variant of AV, open and closed list systems, single and dual vote versions of AMS, and 'AV plus' and a hybrid of AV and AMS.

4. Broad proportionality

4.1 Firstly we will examine alternative systems in terms of party proportionality - the extent to which the proportion of seats won by a party reflects its relative popularity amongst the electorate. (It should be noted, however, that proportionality is not such a simple concept as it might appear in that (a) where tactical voting occurs¹, votes cast do not accurately measure relative popularity, and (b) relative popularity should not be measured in terms of voters' first preferences alone.)

Secondly we look at proportionality in a broader context by considering the extent to which significant social or interest groups can secure representation.

4.2 AV

AV is not a proportional system. To give an extreme example, if Party A were to win 51% of the vote in every constituency it would win 100% of the seats, and Party B with 49% of the vote would not be represented. In this respect AV is no better than FPTP.

Indeed, according to some research, if AV had been used in recent British general elections it would have produced even more disproportional outcomes than FPTP². It appears that where there was a swing in favour of one party (as there was towards Labour in 1997) the swing would also have affected second and lower preferences, thereby exaggerating the majority of seats won. However, the impact of AV is quite unpredictable: in Australia, where AV is used for lower house elections, in 1954 and 1990 the parties with the most first-preference votes (50.3% in one case) actually lost the election.

4.3 List systems

With list systems the degree of proportionality depends on the number of seats in the region to which the list is applied. If national lists were to be used then almost pure party proportionality could be achieved, but as that would destroy any constituency links it is not an option which meets the Commission's terms of reference. The Commission's criterion is, wisely, 'broad proportionality'.

Under a regional list system in an 8-seat region, a party would expect to need 12.5% of the vote (1/8th) to win a seat, and a party with 25% of the vote would expect 2 seats, etc. Expectations are not so clear, however, if a party were to win 20% of the vote (do they win 1 or 2 seats?). The method used for

allocating seats seems at first glance to be straightforward, but is in fact much more complicated than it appears. The choice of system is a political choice, and is likely to have a considerable effect, particularly on the representation of smaller parties.

List systems also produced disproportionality in elections to the Northern Ireland Forum in 1996. In Foyle, the Unionist parties received 25% of the votes, but the Unionist vote was split between a number of Unionist parties, none of which on its own received sufficient votes to win representation³. While the result could be considered proportional in party terms, it clearly did not reflect the spread of opinion within the constituency. Only preferential voting, as offered by STV, would have overcome this difficulty.

4.4 AMS

With AMS the degree of proportionality will depend on (a) the size of lists (and hence regions), and (b) the ratio of 'additional' MPs to those elected in FPTP contests - the more additional seats there are, the more proportional the outcome is likely to be. For example, if parties A, B and C were to receive 40%, 30% and 30% of the vote in an election with a relatively even spread of the vote (so that A would win all FPTP contests), the outcomes could be as follows:

	<u>Party</u>		
	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>
Percentage of the vote	40	30	30
Percentage of seats if FPTP/top-up seats = 50/50	50	25	25
Percentage of seats if FPTP/top-up seats = 75/25	75	12.5	12.5

Surveys have, however, suggested that AMS might achieve greater proportionality than the above rather simple example indicates⁴, but that is a result of the different geographic spreads of parties' votes rather than of any intrinsic property of AMS.⁵

4.5 STV

STV ensures that any significant group of voters choosing candidates by the same criteria will secure representation roughly in proportion to their size within the electorate. If, for example, in a 6 member constituency 14% of voters were to choose candidates of party A as their leading preferences (in whatever order each voter chooses), then at least one candidate of party A would be elected. If 28% were to give their leading preferences to candidates of party B, then at least 2 candidates of that party would be elected, and so on. (As with list systems, there is a trade off between the number of seats in constituencies and the proportionality likely to be achieved: results will be more proportional in constituencies returning 5 or 6 members than in those returning 2 or 3.)

Considering party proportionality, in an analysis of Northern Ireland Assembly elections STV was found to be more proportional than list systems on the same constituencies using d'Hondt divisors⁶. In the Republic of Ireland STV has produced an average deviation from proportionality of only 3.4% since 1948.

However, STV is much more sophisticated than list systems in that it can produce proportionality by whatever criterion voters choose to prioritise, e.g. gender, age, ethnicity, commitment to the environment, etc. As most voters choose to vote along party lines, STV produces results which are broadly party proportional, but if they were to vote by ethnic group we would get proportionality by ethnic group and similarly for other criteria.

Because STV allows voters to express their preferences for candidates both within and across parties, and because voters will use criteria in addition to party in making their choices, STV results will tend towards proportionality by whatever other criteria significant numbers of voters prioritise.

STV outcomes may differ slightly from those of AMS and list system elections run on the same boundaries because a small minority may prioritise some criterion other than party. However, this does not mean that STV results are 'wrong' - they give a more refined reflection of the choices voters make.

5. Stable government

5.1 The Commission has been asked to recommend a system that promotes stable government.

Here we recognise the concern that the voting system should not contribute to a situation in which governments can be undermined by frequent challenges to their authority to govern.

However, we do not believe that long-term stability is necessarily achieved through systems which allow single parties to govern with a large majority of seats when they do not enjoy majority support within the electorate.⁷ The electoral system should lead to stability arising from democratic processes. If governments are free to pursue controversial, or even extreme, policies which have little support within the electorate then there is a greater discontinuity when governments change, making it difficult for government and businesses to plan ahead.

When no party has an absolute majority, stability is promoted by voting systems which encourage parties and politicians to co-operate.

5.2 **AV**

AV, like FPTP, can produce what may be a false and undemocratic stability produced by awarding a majority of seats to parties with a minority of votes. Like FPTP, it can suffer from an instability of outcome in that in marginal seats a change in the votes of a small minority of electors can produce a completely different result.

5.3 **AMS, list systems and STV**

Inevitably the introduction of any electoral system which produces 'broad proportionality' is less likely to produce a government which has an absolute majority in parliament (although there have been instances where this has been the case under broadly proportional systems). Therefore the existing parties will, unlike now, have to be prepared for this possibility as opposed to having it thrust upon them as happened under FPTP in 1923, 1929 and 1974.

There is, however, no empirical evidence that governments elected under proportional systems such as AMS, regional lists and STV are intrinsically less stable or less effective than those elected under FPTP. Countries such as Austria, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland have all enjoyed stable government with proportional representation.

There is of course the example of Israel in which the particular type of proportional system (a national list) encourages the formation of small parties which can hold a disproportionate share of power. However, with AMS and list systems which operate at regional level and STV the size of regions or multi-member constituencies ensures that there is a threshold of support which parties must pass if they are to win representation: for example, in a 6 member constituency a party would generally need to win 14% of the vote to be sure of winning a seat.

Proportional systems may, but do not necessarily, lead to coalition government, but they are more likely to promote co-operation between parties on particular policy issues. It should be noted that coalition and co-operation between parties is already widespread and working effectively in local government⁸. Moreover, survey results show that voters want to see greater co-operation between parties⁹. Britain is regarded as having one of the most adversarial political systems, and there is nothing to suggest that countries in which inter-party co-operation is more common have governments which are less stable or less effective.

5.4 **STV**

Because, unlike AMS and list systems, STV permits the elector to express preferences for candidates of other parties without harming those of his or her favourite party, it encourages the parties to emphasise their similarities as well as their differences in order to attract lower preference votes. STV may thus provide a more consensual and stable basis for government. Rather than deals being struck between

parties after elections, raising the concern that voters cannot predict the outcome of voting for particular parties, parties need to consider possible alliances before elections.¹⁰

In addition, because under STV, unlike AMS and list systems - and for that matter FPTP - the transfer of votes from candidate to candidate is on record, the parties are better able to assess, if necessary, which partner or partners best fits the views of their supporters. This contributes to democracy and the stability of government.

As stated in 5.3 above, STV makes it difficult for small parties with few first preference votes to gain seats. However, under STV small parties which enjoy wide support, even if not among voters first preferences, have a much better chance of winning seats than small extremist parties whose support is confined to a small minority of electors.¹¹ This effect of STV will tend to enhance government stability.

Finally, we believe that the maintenance and stability of the party system contributes to the stability of government. STV can enhance the position of parties in a number of ways:

- by offering voters a choice of candidates from the same party, voters need not shift their votes from their preferred party of government because they are unhappy with a particular candidate offered by the party;
- because votes are transferable, votes cast for fringe parties are transferred to those parties which command significant support;
- STV ballot papers can be designed to show lists of candidates from the same party;
- by allowing only a single election agent, with control over the production of election materials, the danger of candidates campaigning against their party colleagues rather than against opposing parties is minimised;
- By allowing voters to influence the make-up of parties in Parliament over time will help to foster people's faith in the party political system.

6. The extension of voter choice

6.1 An electoral system should, as far as it possible, seek to enable voters to express their political preferences through the ballot paper. Clearly an electoral system cannot provide a voter with unlimited options, but the Commission has been asked to recommend a system which extends the choices open to voters.

Voter choice arises in a number of ways:

- Voters can be allowed to vote for their favourite candidates rather than just for their favoured party;
- Voters can be allowed to make choices across parties and not just within a party's list;
- Voters can be given a choice of candidates within parties;
- Voters can be allowed to rank their preferences among candidates rather than just making single choice.

Linked to voter choice is the concept of the 'wasted' vote, i.e. a vote which does not contribute to the election of a candidate. The more votes likely to be wasted in this sense, the less incentive there will be electors to cast their votes and turn-outs will suffer. Increasing voter choice, on the other hand, will allow more votes to count and will encourage higher turn-outs.

6.2 AV

AV extends the choice over FPTP in that voters can give second and lower-level preferences. It ensures that the MP elected has the support of over 50% of the electorate, even if the MP is not the first-choice candidate of more than 50% of voters. The number of wasted votes will decrease, but could still remain up to half of the voters.

However, the choice under AV is limited to party-candidate combinations: if a party-motivated voter does not like the candidate of his favoured party, then he must either vote for a candidate he does not want or for a party he does not want.

6.3 List systems

Closed lists offer voters very little choice - they can choose a party but not their favourite candidate (unless they vote for an independent outside the lists).

Choice is improved in list systems in which voters can vote either for parties or for individual candidates (as in Belgium). However, experience from other countries indicates that the enhancement of choice is limited in that it is generally party votes and the ordering of party lists which determine which candidates are elected and that individual candidate votes rarely affect outcomes.¹²

Amongst list systems completely open lists give greatest choice. In Finland, for example, electors vote for the candidate of their choice (in most cases taking account of party affiliations) and this vote is regarded as a vote for the party. Seats are allocated by party, and then within party according to the number of votes received by each candidate.

However, because list systems do not allow for the transfer of votes, any votes for candidates of parties which do not gain any seats will be wasted in the sense that they do not contribute to the outcome.

6.4 AMS

In the constituency contests under AMS voter choice is no better than under FPTP. In electing additional members the choice before voters is even more limited: voters can vote only for parties, but they have no choice whatsoever over which list candidates fill any seats allocated to a party.

Voter choice is greater in dual-vote versions of AMS (i.e. versions in which electors vote separately for the constituency candidate and the party, rather than the candidate vote being taken as a party vote). This allows voters to support a local candidate while voting for different a party (with this system in New Zealand in 1996, 37% of voters split their support in this way).

With AMS it is possible – indeed likely – that some parties will propose lists composed of candidates who are also contesting constituency seats. In this way a candidate who is rejected by voters in a constituency contest can still become an MP as an additional member. It also leads to some constituencies appearing to have two or more MPs. This would appear to contradict voter choice and could lead to voter cynicism over the system.

Similar problems would arise if the ‘best loser’ variant of AMS were to be used.¹³ Here top-up MPs for a party are those candidates who received the largest percentage votes in constituency contests. However, we could easily have a situation in which a candidate narrowly losing in a constituency is not elected as a top-up MP because his or her party is sufficiently represented, but in which the third-placed candidate in the same constituency is elected – not something which all voters would easily accept.

Voter choice under AMS can be considerably improved in two ways. AV can be used in the constituencies and, secondly, open lists can be used for additional members. This hybrid is considered further in 8.2 below.

6.5 STV

That STV provides far more voter choice than any other electoral system is perhaps the strongest point in its favour. STV gives electors the opportunity to rank their preferences between candidates of the same party and candidates of other parties. Moreover, with preferential voting, voters can express their real preferences without fear their votes being ‘wasted’, either on candidates with little chance of being elected or on candidates likely to have many more votes than needed to ensure election. With STV it is not therefore necessary for voters to vote tactically.¹⁴

That only a small minority of votes are ‘wasted’, is likely to provide people with a greater incentive to vote, thereby leading to higher turn-outs at elections.

STV therefore encourages voters to think positively about their personal list of preferences. This in turn requires the political parties to respond constructively to the demands of the electoral system, recognising that they must campaign for the subsequent preferences of supporters of other parties.

Political parties may, in practice if not in theory, not be unduly keen on this extension of voter choice as it allows for competition between candidates of the same party. Nevertheless, it is surely an issue to be put to the electors at the Referendum rather than being kept out of the arena. It can, however, be argued that this choice is of benefit to parties: if an elector is unhappy with a candidate of his or her party, a vote can be given for another candidate of the same party rather than the voter switching allegiance to another party (here the general election result in Tatton is a useful example). It is therefore in the interests of parties to offer choice within their lists (e.g. on the basis of gender, age, ethnicity) in order to maximise the attractiveness of the party to the electorate.

Moreover, the risk of candidates of the same party competing against each other can be minimised by requiring each party to have only one agent, with control over the production of election materials, in each constituency. Experience from other countries indicates that this should not be a cause of difficulty. In any case, it is likely that, with the relatively disciplined party structure that has characterised the British system, party loyalty and identification will still be highly significant in influencing voting habits.

7. Maintenance of a link between MPs and geographic constituencies

7.1 We believe that the accountability of MPs to their electors is an important democratic principle and we therefore welcome the inclusion of this criterion in the Commission's terms of reference.

However, constituencies need not be single-member constituencies as under FPTP. Indeed, any proportional system will involve the use of multi-member constituencies (or regions in list terminology). In a single-seat constituency only one party can win and others will be without representation. The more seats in the constituency, the greater the proportionality which can be achieved. A balance must therefore be struck between proportionality and constituency size.

The use of multi-member constituencies, however, need not lead to any diminution of accountability to electors. For voters, having constituency MPs from more than one party will encourage them to seek help from MPs and lobby them more than they do now, given that surveys show a significant number of electors do not currently approach an MP they expect is likely to be out of sympathy with the action or help they are requesting. Experience in Ireland suggests that multi-member constituencies increase rather than decrease accountability.¹⁵

Multi-member constituencies can have an additional advantage in that many boundaries which divide areas of common concerns can be eliminated. In a major city which has several MPs at present, many of the issues will be common to the city and not to particular districts within it. Voters belonging to a city-wide interest group cannot at present look to a single MP to address their concerns. This problem can be overcome if the city is regarded as one multi-member constituency.

Moreover, the concept of the multi-member constituency would not be an entirely new one for many voters. Multi-member wards are common in local government where they are accepted and understood by the electorate.¹⁶

7.2 AV

AV, like FPTP, is based on single-member constituencies. It may improve the degree of accountability over FPTP in that a candidate will need to win at least the support of 50% of the electorate to gain the seat. However, AV singularly fails to meet the criterion of proportionality.

7.3 AMS

The constituency section of AMS elections is similar to FPTP, although accountability is likely to decrease as constituency sizes must be increased. To provide reasonable assurances of party

proportionality would require half of the MPs to be ‘additional’ and this would double the size of the constituencies for those directly elected (unless there is a substantial increase in the number of MPs, which we do not consider to be a realistic option). This could greatly increase the workloads of MPs elected in the constituencies.

The election of additional members takes place on a regional or national basis. Here there is a serious concern that additional members will be imposed by parties: their link of accountability will not be to the electorate but to the party organs responsible for selecting and ranking the lists. We believe that to be a major defect of AMS. The additional members either have no need to involve themselves in constituency work at all, or can ‘interfere’ in any constituency targeted with a view to gaining it for their party at a forthcoming election.

7.4 List systems

In regional list systems MPs are associated with multi-member regions, but closed lists suffer from the same defects as additional members in AMS, but with closed lists none of those elected is linked to voters through having received personal votes. Making lists completely open will partly overcome this problem.

7.5 STV

STV requires geographic constituencies, and because electors can vote for candidates within parties, the link between MPs and their constituencies is maintained. Indeed, given that neglect of constituency responsibilities could well result in a candidate slipping down the list of voters’ preferences, the link is likely to be enhanced.¹⁷ STV is therefore the only proportional system that fully maintains a link between all MPs and geographical constituencies. We believe that all MPs should be constituency MPs directly elected by the voters.

We believe that constituencies electing between 4 and 6 MPs would be a satisfactory compromise between proportionality and the maintenance of a constituency link. We recognise, however, that in rural areas with very sparse populations this would lead to geographically large constituencies. In these cases we would consider it acceptable to have constituencies electing less than 4 members.

8. Analysis

8.1 Below we summarise our examination of the systems considered against the Commission’s terms of reference.

This analysis strongly affirms that STV far out-performs other systems in meeting the criteria of the Commission.

8.2 Other possible alternatives

Supplementary Vote (SV)

SV is a variant of AV and suffers from all the defects of AV. However, it does not offer all the advantages of AV. It does not ensure that those elected will have support from at least 50% of voters and it does not eliminate the likelihood of tactical voting.

AMS plus

Here we refer to AMS with either (a) AV used in the constituency section (also referred to as ‘AV plus’), or (b) open lists for the election of additional members, or (c) AMS with both (a) and (b). Certainly ‘AMS+’ greatly increases voter choice over normal forms of AMS. It does not, however, overcome the difficulty that it will lead to two categories of MPs, and it certainly does not achieve the degree of voter choice offered by STV.

STV with party lists

In the standard form of STV the ballot paper shows the list of candidates, either in alphabetic or random order. Candidates' party affiliations are shown, but this does not affect the ordering of the names on the ballot paper.

STV ballot papers can also be designed, however, to show more clearly the lists of candidates proposed by the parties. This can be done in a single column, or in one column for each party. For example, if A1, A2 and A3 are the candidates of Party A, and similarly for B and C, the ballot paper can present the candidates as either:

(Examples of these ballot papers are given in our Working Paper on Voter Choice.)

Option (1) is used in Malta, while (2) is used in Tasmania. Voters complete the ballot paper as if it were a conventional STV election, and the outcome of the election is still counted as a standard STV election (ie only votes for candidates are counted and not votes for parties). However, voters loyal to their parties and with no strong candidate preferences are likely to mark the ballot papers 1,2,3.. down their parties' lists. Lists may or may not, at the discretion of the parties, be ranked in the parties' orders of preference.

Of these two options we believe that (1) has merit in that it preserves the voter's freedom of choice while indicating to voters the recommendations of the parties.

Although option (2) is used in a number of countries (particularly in list systems rather than STV elections), survey work done in Britain suggests that voters find it more complex.¹⁸ Our preference is therefore Option (1).

A further variant of STV is used in Senate elections in Australia. There the ballot paper is as option (2) above, but voters have the option of putting a cross in a box at the top of each list (as in the Belgian list system), and ballot papers so marked are considered to have been marked 1,2,3... down the party's list of candidates. We do not, however, favour this system as it does not encourage voters to exercise their choice and it therefore puts more power into the hands of party hierarchies.

Other systems

It is possible that quite different systems will be proposed to the Commission. Often these arise as a result of spurious criticisms of existing systems.¹⁹ We do, however, caution against the use of untested systems, the defects of which may only become apparent on implementation. Our Society would be happy to research and provide comments on whatever other systems the Commission might want to consider.

8.3 Conclusion

In the light of the above analysis it is clear that STV is the system which best meets the criteria of the Commission and which offers the best prospects for the renewal of our democracy.

We believe, however, that any change in the electoral system must be tried and tested and its appropriateness for the British political system evaluated. The experience of a single election and term of government, however, is not likely to provide sufficient evidence for this evaluation. We therefore recommend that the working of whatever system is introduced following the Referendum should be reviewed after two general elections.

Part III : Recommendations

9. The Case for STV

9.1 The Electoral Reform Society recommends that STV should be selected as the alternative to FPTP in the coming referendum.

In addressing the terms of reference given to the Commission we have already outlined how STV meets the criteria of 'broad proportionality'; 'stable government'; 'the extension of voter choice'; and 'maintenance of a link between MPs and geographic constituencies.'

Under each of these criteria, from the point of view of those represented, STV is better than any other system. There are, however, other advantages that accrue from having a smaller number of larger but moderately-sized multi-member constituencies in each of which the voter has the elective power of a still single but transferable vote.

STV is a sophisticated system that has been used successfully in Ireland (since 1922), in the Australian Senate (since 1949), Malta (since 1921), and Tasmania (since 1907). It was used for the University seats in Britain from 1918 to 1948. It was also used in Northern Ireland from 1921 to 1929, for elections to the Assembly in 1973 and to the Convention in 1975. In the Republic of Ireland there have been two attempts to end the use of STV but they were both defeated in referendums in 1959 and 1968. The system is widely used in the United Kingdom by a variety of organisations. Since the first direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979, with all-party agreement at Westminster, MEPs from the Northern Ireland part of the United Kingdom have been elected by STV, and STV has also been used for local government elections in Northern Ireland for the past 25 years. One of the advantages of STV, which is very much the PR system of the English-speaking world, is its familiarity to millions.

- The system has the great advantage of minimising the 'wasted' vote.
- The voter has the opportunity of expressing preferences within as well as between and across - and even beyond - party boundaries.
- The system ends safe seats for any individual.
- It renders tactical voting redundant.

Some of these advantages may not appeal to MPs elected by the present system but as John Smith, the late leader of the Labour Party, indicated when pledging the party to the Referendum in question, MPs elected by System A are the last people who should decide whether MPs should be elected by System A or System B.

There is compelling evidence that when the Hansard Society Commission on Electoral Reform in 1976 came down marginally in favour of AMS²⁰ rather than STV, they did so because they had perceived that MPs elected by the present system would not be prepared to vote for the abolition of single-member constituencies. That reluctance should not be a relevant factor in a matter now to be determined by Referendum.

Such is the enthusiasm for STV by those who have actually studied the subject, that it is described as the 'Super-Vote'.²¹ They indicate, as British government leaflets distributed in Northern Ireland in 1973 did, that STV is 'as easy as 1,2,3.'

Under the present system at every general election about half those who vote²² fail to elect an MP and many of those who do feel no empathy with the successful candidate chosen by the party beforehand. With STV virtually all voters will be able to identify with at least one of the MPs they will have helped to elect.

As the distinguished academic Vernon Bogdanor has pointed out, the single transferable vote is likely to reflect the wishes of electors more accurately than any other system. The Commission is charged

with putting forward a proportional alternative to first-past-the post. Whatever that proportional alternative is, it will be labelled 'PR'. Yet the legislation that follows a vote in favour of that proportional alternative will be entitled 'Representation of the People Act.' It behoves everyone concerned with a reform, at the heart of which is the crucial concept of democracy, to remember that in the end 'RP is more important than PR.'

Therefore Proportional Representation alone is not enough. We must have a system that gives elective power to the voter. STV is that system.

10. Practical Aspects of the introduction of STV

10.1 Experience of STV in Britain

STV, unlike AMS and list systems, is not new in Britain. As noted in section 9 above, it has been used for public elections in the UK for eighty years. Moreover, STV is already familiar to very many people in Britain in that it is used for many elections within trade unions, professional associations, pension funds, churches and voluntary organisations. All of these bodies use STV because they recognise its merits.

Britain has therefore the systems and experience for the conduct and counting of such elections.

10.2 The use of STV and other electoral systems

ERS has expressed its disapproval of the different hybrid electoral systems proposed for the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly, and the list system being proposed in England, Scotland and Wales for elections to the European Parliament. Even so, it is clear that it is still acceptable to have two very different system used for UK elections to the European Parliament. There is therefore no argument that the use of other systems is in any way an obstacle to the use of STV for Westminster elections.

In Northern Ireland there is no evidence that voters find STV difficult to use - indeed voters manage to use STV in some elections and 'X' voting in others without problems. It cannot therefore be argued that STV would cause voter confusion in mainland Britain.

10.3 Constituency boundaries

STV would, like other proportional systems, require the redrawing of constituency boundaries. This, however, is likely be easier for STV than for AMS in that constituencies could be formed by the amalgamation of existing constituencies (unless AMS with a 50:50 split between constituency and list seats is used, more fundamental boundary changes would be needed).

We recommend that multi-member constituencies be created which recognise natural areas, such as major towns, rural areas with similar characteristics, etc. In order to achieve a balance between broad proportionality and the maintenance of constituency links, we recommend that most constituencies should have between 4 and 6 seats. To maintain the balance in rural areas of very sparse population, however, it would be acceptable to have constituencies with less than 4 seats.

If the task of adjusting boundaries is such that it would be difficult to introduce STV in time for the next general election, legislation to introduce STV should nevertheless be enacted as soon as possible.

10.4 By-elections

By-elections have served a useful purpose in enabling voters to make a protest about the state of Government as they see it at a particular moment. Consequently they have become an important feature of political life in the UK. Clearly they should be allowed to continue. The Society therefore recommends the use of AV in such cases. That will at least ensure that the successful candidate ultimately has the support of a majority of those who vote.

Footnotes

¹ By 'tactical voting' we mean voting for other than one's first-choice candidate (when he or she is not considered likely to win a seat) in order to help achieve an outcome considered more attainable and acceptable even if not the voter's most preferred option.

² Dunleavy, Margetts, O'Duffy and Weir, *Making Votes Count*, Democratic Audit (1997).

³ Large majorities were also excluded from representation in Lagan and West Belfast.

⁴ Dunleavy et al, op cit.

⁵ Our Working Paper on Proportionality gives a more detailed examination of the proportionality of AMS.

- ⁶ Further details of these analyses of results from Northern Ireland are given in our Working Paper on Proportionality.
- ⁷ This issue is considered in more detail in our Working Paper on Stable Government.
- ⁸ See Michael Temple, *Coalitions and Co-Operation in Local Government*, Electoral Reform Society (1996).
- ⁹ State of the Nation polls, MORI, 1991 and 1995
- ¹⁰ It can be argued that had New Zealand chosen STV rather than AMS, then the risk of parties forming a coalition against the wishes of many of their supporters would have been reduced.
- ¹¹ For example, a party such as the Green Party might have a chance of gaining representation through the transfer of voters' second and subsequent preferences, but a party such as the BNP which few voters would rank highly in their preferences would be unlikely to win seats.
- ¹² *Elections under Regional Lists*, The Constitution Unit (1998).
- ¹³ As proposed in 1976 by the Hansard Society.
- ¹⁴ STV has been criticised for not being monotonic in certain circumstances. This, however, is a theoretical rather than a practical difficulty. It has been shown that the in UK elections non-monotonicity would only occur once every century. Moreover, non-monotonicity has never been demonstrated in any STV election (Allard, *Lack of Monotonicity - Revisted*, and Bradley, *STV and Monotonicity: A Hands-on Assessment*, both in *Representation*, Vol 33, No. 2, 1995
- ¹⁵ "Should parliamentarians be allowed to become aloof from their constituents, less accountable to the people who elect them? The day to day contact which PR-STV forces on Irish TDs ensures that their constituents' interests are in their minds when they are legislating and acting on their behalf" (James McBride, *Positive Aspects of PR-STV for the Irish Political system*, in *Representation*, Vol. 23, No. 1, Winter 1996/7).
- ¹⁶ Additionally, new electoral systems proposed for the European Parliament, the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly all involve the concept of a multi-member constituency or 'region'.
- ¹⁷ See footnote 16
- ¹⁸ Survey work by NOP on behalf of McDougall Trust, 1998
- ¹⁹ For example, see footnote 14.
- ²⁰ Lady Seear, a former President of the Electoral Reform Society, was a notable exception to the preferment.
- ²¹ Joe Rogaly, *Parliament for the People*, Maurice Temple Smith, 1976.
- ²² In the general elections on 28 February 1974 and in 1983 over half of those who voted failed to elect an MP.

A Brief History of Electoral Reform in the United Kingdom

The Submission of the
Electoral Reform Society
to the
Independent Commission on the Voting System

March 1998

**ELECTORAL
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A brief history of electoral reform in the United Kingdom

This paper sketches the history of electoral reform in the UK over the past 150 years. It notes that:

- *For a century and a half there has been recognition that the voting systems in use have left significant sections of the electorate unrepresented;*
- *Although voting systems have been debated in parliament on numerous occasions, these debates have not resulted in significant reforms and the electorate has never been consulted on the issues;*
- *STV is neither a new nor a radical system: it was developed last century as a response to the inadequacies of the electoral system; it was used to elect MPs in university seats in Britain until 1945 and it is still used, although not in Westminster elections, in Northern Ireland.*

The issue of electoral reform, or more specifically, proportional representation, is not new. The debate has remained largely unchanged since 1884 when the simple, majority first-past-the-post system in single-member seats was adopted for House of Commons elections.

Before 1884 two-member seats had been the norm. Single-member seats accounted for only 16% of the seats in the House of Commons before 1832, just over 23% before 1868 and just under 30% before 1885. A small number of three- and four-member constituencies had also existed before 1885. From 1885 (not counting the university seats) only 24 constituencies continued to elect two members, and 15 constituencies returned two members up to 1950.

Even in 1884 electoral reform was not a new issue. Voting theory had been discussed by French philosophers in the late eighteenth century. Some of their ideas may have influenced Thomas Wright Hill who conceptualised the single transferable vote system of proportional representation in his writings as early as the 1820s. Hill's son Rowland, the inventor of the penny post, implemented some of his father's ideas on voting in Australia, where they had some lasting influence.

During this period the question of concern was not proportional representation of party, but 'minority' representation. Attempts were made to safeguard minorities by altering the existing system for parliamentary elections in some constituencies. The limited vote (two votes for three seats) was applied to elections in 3-member constituencies from 1867 to 1884. A more radical electoral experiment at local government level involved applying the crudely proportional cumulative vote to elect school boards in England and Wales from 1870 to 1902 (1872-1919 in Scotland). Both systems were vulnerable to vote management tactics, though the cumulative vote did produce tolerably fair results.

However, a far more radical plan for electing the House of Commons was published as a pamphlet, *The Machinery of Representation*, in 1857 by barrister,

Thomas Hare. Hare is credited with inventing (albeit in a rudimentary form) the single transferable vote system of proportional representation. His aim was to secure the representation in the House of Commons of all significant opinions, the election of the 'best' candidates, to encourage electoral participation and to improve the quality of the House of Commons' membership. John Stuart Mill picked up and popularised Hare's idea. Subsequent discussions on proportional representation in Britain centred on versions of the Hare scheme.

Stimulated by the franchise reform bill of 1884, electoral reformers came together as a group and founded the Proportional Representation Society, predecessor of the Electoral Reform Society. Their stated aim was to secure the adoption of the principle of proportional representation for public elections. They examined the known alternative electoral systems for one that could be applied to all public elections and which did not restrict the voter's choice of candidate. They adopted a refined model of Hare's single transferable vote scheme, more or less the one we know today, as their preferred system. Their aims in doing so were much the same as Hare's, although by 1884 the study of electoral methods had become more sophisticated and proportional representation of party was given more weight than before.

However, the reformers missed their opportunity to press the case for proportional representation in 1884, and another did not arise until the establishment of the Royal Commission on Systems of Election in 1908. The commission studied in great detail all the available evidence on alternative voting systems, both actual and theoretical. When the Commission reported in 1910, it stated that STV was its preferred PR system: however, it felt unable to recommend the use of STV at that time and therefore recommended the non-proportional Alternative Vote system for House of Commons elections. Nevertheless, four years later, in the 1914 Government of Ireland Act, Parliament legislated for the first time for the use of STV for elections to the Irish Senate and for a minority of members of the Irish House of Commons.

The next serious opportunity for reform of the House of Commons' voting system came with the Speaker's Conference of 1916-7. The Conference recommended the election of about one-third of mainly urban seats by STV in 3 to 5 member constituencies, with the remainder elected by the Alternative Vote in single-member seats. The issue became the subject of protracted wrangling between the Commons, which preferred AV, and the Lords which preferred STV. (Many reformers sat in the Lords at that time.) The issue was now really one of majority versus proportional elections, single-member seats versus multi-member ones. The dispute was never resolved and first-past-the-post in single-member seats won by default (except for four multi-member university constituencies, electing 9 MPs in total, where STV was implemented).

In the period immediately after the end of the first world war, there was some success for electoral reformers. Elections to ad hoc Scottish school boards switched from the cumulative vote to STV in 1919 and elections were held without difficulty using the system in the 1920s. More importantly, after the successful use of STV to elect a new corporation in Sligo in January 1919 (in which only 1% of voting papers were spoilt although 10% of the electorate was illiterate), the British government included STV in the Local Government (Ireland) Act. In the following year, the British Government included STV in the 1920 Government of Ireland Act for the election of both houses of parliament in the devolved parliaments of Southern Ireland and Northern Ireland. The motivation was two-fold: to protect the

minorities in both parties of Ireland on the one hand, and to avoid crushing first-past-the-post induced majorities on the other.

The Ulster Unionists disliked PR and abolished the system in favour of first-past-the-post for both local government and local parliamentary elections at the earliest opportunity. In Southern Ireland public election by STV was ultimately written into the constitution of the Republic.

Supporters, although not always reliable ones, of proportional representation during this early period included well-known political figures from all parties: Balfour, Snowden, Lubbock, Courtney, Amery, F.E. Smith, Parmour, Alfred Mond and Churchill. Outside parliament PR received support from a number of journalists and intellectuals including John Stuart Mill, C.L. Dodgson (Lewis Carroll), C.P. Scott (editor of the *Manchester Guardian*), H.G. Wells, J.A. Hobson and L.T. Hobhouse.

In the early 1920s there were a number of failed attempts to promote PR for both parliamentary and local elections. For example, a PR bill for the House of Commons was defeated in 1924 by the parliament elected in the very inconclusive 1923 general election. The issue, by then, had become polarised along party lines for and against PR: the Conservatives were largely hostile to change; from 1926 Labour was officially opposed to PR, and the Liberals were mainly in favour, but from a position of weakness.

The last serious opportunity for reform before the outbreak of the second world war arose out of the inconclusive 1929 general election. Following an abortive Speaker's conference, the minority Labour government presented an Alternative Vote bill. (In fact the bill originally provided for the expression of two preferences only, now known as the Supplementary Vote. This was later amended during the passage of the bill to allow a full list of preferences.) The bill passed the Commons, but was held up by the Lords who, again, preferred the proportional STV system. The bill fell with the collapse of the Labour government and was never revived. Thereafter electoral reform became a much discussed, but otherwise politically dead, issue until the early 1970s when events conspired to make it live again.

With the UK government taking direct responsibility for the government of Northern Ireland in 1972, the new Northern Ireland Secretary decided to restore STV as an experiment for elections to the new district councils. Second, the old Stormont parliament was replaced by a new Assembly to be elected by STV. Local and Assembly elections under the system took place in 1973. The question of fair representation to the political representatives of both the majority and minority communities was crucial. Co-incidentally the 'Kilbrandon' Royal Commission on the Constitution also recommended STV for regional assembly elections later that year. The STV system was made a permanent feature of Northern Ireland local elections in the mid 1980s and has operated with some success ever since, facilitating power-sharing at local level.

In the wider UK context, the indecisive nature of the general election of February 1974, coupled with a substantial Liberal vote, followed by a second close election in October 1974, sparked widespread interest. A new argument for PR also emerged during this period. This was that the economic health of the country was suffering from violent changes of policy due to swing of the electoral pendulum, resulting in alternating governments which reversed each other's economic and industrial measures. It was argued that better representation of the electorate's views in Parliament would lead to less adversarial politics and more stable consensus-

based government. This thesis was argued in the influential book, *Adversary Politics and Electoral Reform*, published in 1975¹.

As a result of the increasing debate, a commission, sponsored by the Hansard Society, was established under the chairmanship Lord Blake. The commission's report, published in 1976, recommended a single-vote variant of the German Additional Member System. The perceived economic success of that country was, no doubt, influential in helping the commission to conclude in favour of AMS. Similar considerations have influenced the debate on electoral reform and proportional representation in Britain and elsewhere (e.g. New Zealand) ever since.

Other opportunities for consideration of voting systems came in the latest 1970s with electoral systems for the devolved assemblies in Scotland and Wales and the voting system for direct European Assembly elections being debated in Parliament. In the debates on Scotland and Wales voting systems similar to the Hansard Society proposal were suggested, but the initiative was too politically advanced for them to accept. On the other hand the Labour government did recommend using an 'open' list system for European Assembly elections, but it was rejected by Parliament. The government did, however, slip STV into the European elections legislation to ensure that one of Northern Ireland's three Euro-MPs represented the minority nationalist community.

Thereafter practical progress on electoral reform outside Northern Ireland came to a halt with the election of Margaret Thatcher's administration. However, two factors conspired to keep the issue alive. First was the formation of the SDP and the substantial numbers of votes polled (to little effect) by the Liberal/SDP Alliance in the 1983 and 1987 elections. A second factor was size of the Conservative majorities. The 100-seat plus majorities won by the Conservatives on roughly 42% of the vote, coupled with Mrs Thatcher's style of government, worried a wide cross-section of influential public opinion, including many members of the Labour Party.

The frailty of the checks and balances of the Westminster system of government were exposed. Accepted conventions were seen to be vulnerable to a decisive government with an overall majority in the Commons, even if not in the country. Consequently, the issue of electoral reform did not die away in the late 1980s as it did in the late 1880s and 1920s. Instead it became a constitutional issue of increasing significance and debate in the context of elections to both houses of Parliament, the European Parliament, devolved assemblies and within some of the main parties themselves.

Looking back, many of the issues have remained the same: the conflicting questions and priorities involving voter-choice, local representation and proportional representation of parties. The issue of the representation of minority opinion has, however, widened in recent years to include the questions of gender-balance and the representation of ethnic minorities.

While the argument raised in the 1970s linking economic success to constitutional structures has become harder to sustain, the newer argument that the traditional British parliamentary system can be hijacked by ideological governments, often out of touch with public opinion, is hard to refute. This was realised by reformers in the 1880s. However, the dangers posed by executive dominance in the modern state are, perhaps, more real than they were then. This issue alone will ensure that questions of electoral reform and proportional representation will not fade away.

Footnote:

ⁱ S E Finer (ed), *Adversary Politics and Electoral Reform* (collected essays), Anthony Wigram, 1975.

Working Paper Number Two

Achieving Proportionality in Electoral Systems

The Submission of the
Electoral Reform Society
to the
Independent Commission on the Voting System

April 1998

**ELECTORAL
REFORM
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Achieving proportionality in electoral systems

This paper examines the extent to which the main types of voting systems produce proportional results.

Proportionality is often regarded narrowly as party proportionality - the relationship between the votes cast for the candidates of a party and the number of seats won by the party. Here we also consider the extent to which voting systems can produce proportionality by other criteria which voters may use in deciding how to use their votes. It is concluded that:

- *AV is not a proportional system and does not therefore meet the Commission's terms of reference;*
- *AMS with a sufficient number of top-up seats can produce broad party proportionality;*
- *STV produces broad proportionality by party and can also achieve some proportionality by whatever other criteria significant numbers of voters consider important.*

Contents:

1. *Introduction*
 2. *What is meant by 'proportionality'*
 3. *The alternative vote*
 4. *List systems*
 5. *The Additional Member System*
 6. *The Single Transferable Vote*
 7. *AMS and STV in action*
 8. *Summary and conclusions*
- Footnotes and references*
Annex: Constituency size and seat allocation formulae

1 Introduction

- 1.1 In its terms of reference, the Commission is instructed to 'observe the requirement for broad proportionality, the need for stable government, an extension of voter choice and the maintenance of a link between MPs and geographical constituencies'.
- 1.2 The Electoral Reform Society's contribution to the Commission's deliberations consists of a main submission, examining in broad terms how different types of electoral system meet the Commission's criteria, and a number of supplementary papers dealing with particular aspects of voting systems. This paper deals with the question of how well the electoral systems under consideration deal with proportionality.
- 1.3 The number of electoral systems which might be considered is limited only by one's imagination. However, it is expected that only a small number of

systems (together with possible variations and combinations thereof) will be considered. We will look at the following systems in detail: the alternative vote (AV), list systems, the additional member system (AMS) and the single transferable vote (STV). The effect of the supplementary vote (SV) on proportionality is virtually identical to that of AV; for the purposes of this paper, all comments on AV may be assumed to apply equally to SV.

- 1.4 During this paper we will frequently refer to the recent Democratic Audit report 'Making Votes Count' by Patrick Dunleavy et al¹ (hereafter referred to as 'Dunleavy'). It is the most comprehensive examination to date of how well each of the systems might achieve party proportionality in a British context. While it contains much useful background information, some of the results are highly suspect. In particular, Dunleavy's results are virtually useless for comparing the likely outcomes of AMS and STV. A critique is given in a separate paper submitted to the Commission.
- 1.5 This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 takes a look at the meaning of proportionality. Sections 3 to 6 then consider AV, list systems, AMS and STV in turn to see how they measure up to the requirement for broad proportionality. Section 7 compares the recent performance of STV and AMS in other countries, and conclusions are drawn in section 8. The effects on proportionality of constituency size and different seat allocation methods are analysed in annex A.

2 What is meant by 'proportionality'?

- 2.1 Lack of proportionality under first-past-the-post (FPTP) is by far the commonest reason given for reform of the voting system. Most people tend to equate electoral reform with proportional representation (PR). And the first requirement listed in the Commission's terms of reference is for 'broad proportionality'.
- 2.2 Yet despite the emphasis on proportionality, there has been virtually no discussion of what it means. There seems to be an implicit assumption by many that 'proportionality' equates to 'proportionality of outcome by party'. But if that were the only requirement then we would introduce a simple system giving each party leader a block vote in Parliament according to the number of votes gained at the election.
- 2.3 Of course that would be ridiculous. Let us consider why. Clearly any system must provide for geographical representation, hence the need for lots of MPs spread across the country. But it's about more than that. There is a need for a variety of MPs within each party, for example in terms of gender balance or experience or even variation of political opinion (within the limitations of party manifestos). And ideally this variety should reflect in some way the variety of opinions held by people in the UK as a whole.
- 2.4 This leads us away from the narrow proportionality of parties towards the idea of broad proportionality of people. Under this definition, Parliament would represent all significant opinions in society, whether relating to

choice of party or to any other criteria chosen by voters. Such criteria might include:

- position within a party (left or right);
- opinion on a cross-party issue such as Europe or the environment;
- gender or ethnicity;
- a candidate's local connections.

In short, proportionality (of opinion) should be considered in several dimensions, not just one.

- 2.5 After all, there is no reason why political parties should be the only measure of proportionality. While in continental European countries parties are entrenched in the constitution and are effectively part of the state, the British tradition has been to put much more emphasis on Parliament as a body of individual MPs. Recognition of political parties in electoral law is a new development in the UK (and is not without its problems, e.g. the extraordinary measures used to define parties for elections to the Northern Ireland Peace Forum.). The word 'party' does not appear anywhere in the Commission's terms of reference.
- 2.6 When people cast their votes, party tends to be the most important criterion in terms of representing their political opinions. Given the choice, most people focus on parties first and then consider other factors when choosing individual candidates to support. A small number of voters pay more attention to non-party factors (particularly where party identity may be a poor indicator of a candidate's position on an issue, such as the EU, considered important by the voter). The Commission should consider the wishes of all voters when choosing an electoral system.
- 2.7 Therefore when assessing electoral systems against the requirement for broad proportionality we must consider opinion on several dimensions, with political party being the most important but not the only one. In the next four sections we will consider AV, regional lists, AMS and STV in these terms:
- proportional representation of the people according to their choice of political party;
 - proportional representation of the people according to other dimensions of opinion.

3 The alternative vote

- 3.1 AV is designed to elect a single officer or representative. A candidate must gain at least half the vote to be elected, in contrast to FPTP where only a plurality is required. It allows the votes of those who support a minority candidate to count towards the result, whereas FPTP simply ignores them. Thus it may be said to produce a fairer result in each individual constituency, on the grounds that all MPs must have majority support

(typically only around half of the MPs elected in the UK under FPTP are supported by a majority).

- 3.2 However it is a nonsense to describe the result in a single constituency as proportional. While representing the opinions of the majority is the best that can be done in a single-member constituency, it still leaves the opinions of the minority unrepresented. Because the results from individual constituencies are not proportional, there is no guarantee that when they are combined the overall result will be proportional. Typically AV will produce a highly disproportional result.

Party proportionality

- 3.3 First, consider party proportionality under AV. Compared to FPTP, AV will tend in general to reward parties in the centre slightly more, and parties on the left or the right slightly less. Thus in the 70's and 80's it would have benefited the Liberals (and SDP) who were penalised under FPTP, producing a slightly more proportional result.
- 3.4 In contrast in the 97 election both Labour and the Liberal Democrats occupied positions on the centre-left. Under AV, both would have benefited at the expense of the Conservatives, producing a slightly less proportional result, according to Dunleavy. Thus AV may produce either better or worse party proportionality than FPTP, depending on the circumstances. The difference in either direction will be pretty small.
- 3.5 Elections to the Australian House of Representatives provide a demonstration of AV in action. In 1990 and 1993 the Australian Labor Party gained an overall majority of seats with less than 50% of the vote. In many previous general elections, however, AV worked to Labor's disadvantage, keeping Labor out of office in 1954 and 1961. The number of seats a party will win in these elections under AV depends not just on the total votes received by the party, but also on how they are distributed. As with FPTP, a party which accumulates large majorities in safe seats can lose to a party with a smaller total vote which wins more seats but on smaller majorities.²

Non-party proportionality

- 3.6 If we look at proportionality in terms of non-party issues, for example representation of women or attitudes to the EU, there is no reason to think that AV will do any better than FPTP. In both cases, the results will depend on selection of the candidate by the majority party in each constituency. The result under AV will be just as arbitrary as it is under FPTP.
- 3.7 There is no evidence or reason to suggest that AV will produce a more proportional result than FPTP, either in terms of party or in terms of other criteria. The belief by some that AV is in any sense a proportional system (or even a broadly proportional system) is clearly based on a lack of understanding. AV fails the proportionality test and should be not be considered for proposal to the people in a referendum.

4 List systems

- 4.1 List systems are designed to produce party proportionality based on multi-member regional constituencies. The Country is split up into regions. Within each region, each party presents a single ordered list of candidates. Voters cast their vote for a party, and seats are allocated to each party in proportion to the votes received according to one of a number of possible formulae (see annex A for a discussion of the effects of different formulae on proportionality). Within each party, seats are allocated to the candidates at the top of the list.

Party proportionality

- 4.2 In principle this would produce party proportionality as close to perfect as is possible, However there are a number of reasons why the results can and do vary from true proportionality.
- a Region size. As the number of seats per constituency decreases, so does the degree of proportionality. The requirement for a constituency link means that regions must be moderately sized, thus reducing the proportionality available under a list system. The effect of region/constituency size is discussed in annex A.
 - b The seat allocation method. There are a variety of methods available, and these are described in annex A. Each system has a slight tendency to favour some parties over others (for example d'Hondt favours larger parties to a greater degree than Sainte-Lague).
 - c Regional effects. The allocation of regional seats may not be proportional to the population, or there may be differential turnout. Of course, this factor applies to all electoral systems except straight national party lists (as in Israel).

Non-party proportionality

- 4.3 Now we consider whether list systems produce proportionality along other dimensions of opinion. Under a closed list system voters cannot choose who is elected other than by their party, so other dimensions of opinion cannot even be measured, let alone represented in proportion. So it is entirely down to the selection of candidates by the parties as to how proportional the outcome is in terms of non-party factors.
- 4.4 It is possible for parties to engineer outcomes which are representative in terms of easily identifiable factors, such as gender and possibly ethnicity. Indeed it is likely that some parties would seek to do this (for example the Liberal Democrats are using 'zipping' in the 1999 Euro-elections). Note that such an outcome is 'representative' only in a narrow statistical sense, and may or may not be proportional to the opinions of voters on these factors.
- 4.5 However, when it comes to the positions of candidates within a party, in terms of left-right or other issues such as Europe, closed list systems completely fail the proportionality test. It would in theory be possible for parties to provide a 'balanced' list, but they would have to second-guess the voters, both on the choice of which dimensions of opinion were important, and on the distribution of opinion along those dimensions. It

would be a 'one-way conversation', giving the voters no way of indicating their true opinions on non-party issues.

- 4.6 And even if they got the balance right, it would still provide a dilemma for the voter. This arises because seats are allocated to candidates from the top of the list down. Take the case of a pro-European Conservative voter. Given a Conservative list including pro- and anti- Europeans, he or she would have no way of knowing which particular candidate his or her vote would be helping to elect.
- 4.7 In reality, it is more likely that parties will tend to fill the top places in their list with candidates who support a single party line on all issues (even those which do not appear in the party's manifesto). The result, in terms of all the non-party and cross-party issues, will be much less proportional even than FPTP. This is the inevitable consequence of defining party proportionality as the only type of proportionality that matters.
- 4.8 Some variations on party lists allow voters to indicate their support for individual candidates within a list (see the paper on voter choice for details). In principle this could make the result more proportional of non-party factors, but experience from other countries indicates that, except with completely open lists (as in Finland), the effect of votes cast for individual candidates is limited and they rarely affect the outcome. Even using open lists, where the order in which candidates are elected from a list is entirely determined by individual votes, proportionality of non-party factors will be little better than under FPTP.

5 The additional member system

- 5.1 AMS is a hybrid system which is designed to produce party proportionality while retaining single member constituencies. Under AMS, some MPs are elected from single member constituencies while the remaining 'additional' members are elected from party lists. Here we will consider the usual form of AMS in which each voter casts two votes. The first vote counts towards an individual candidate in their constituency. The second counts towards a party. The two votes do not need to be cast for the same party. (There are single-vote versions of AMS in which votes for constituency candidates are counted as votes for the parties of these candidates, but as single-vote versions of AMS do not improve on proportionality over the dual-vote versions, we do not consider them in this paper.)
- 5.2 There are several variations of AMS. Different ratios of constituency members to additional members can be used: 50:50 (Germany); 65:55 (New Zealand); 57:43 (Scottish Parliament); 66:33 (Welsh Assembly); 75:25 (1976 Hansard Society Proposal). Constituency members can be elected by FPTP, AV or SV. Additional members can be elected from national or regional lists, with or without a threshold.
- 5.3 We will examine in detail the current German model, under which half the MPs are elected by FPTP in single member constituencies and the other half are elected from regional party lists with a 5% threshold. However it

should be recognised that larger constituency:list ratios tend to produce less party proportional results

Party proportionality

- 5.4 On their own, the constituency elections in AMS do not produce a proportional outcome. Indeed, because it involves half as many double-sized constituencies, they will generally result in a less proportional outcome than FPTP. AMS achieves party proportionality by using candidates from the party lists to top up Parliament so that the total number of MPs of each party in each region reflects as closely as possible the number of votes cast for that party's list.
- 5.5 At best, AMS can produce results which are as proportional in party terms as those for list systems. However there are additional reasons for deviation from party proportionality.
 - a The 5% threshold. A party which gains less than 5% of the vote in a region does not qualify for any additional members in that region. The MPs which they would otherwise have been allocated are shared among the parties which do qualify, giving them a bonus in seats.
 - b Overhang seats. It is possible for a party to win more constituency seats than would be justified by their share of the vote. For example, a party with 40% of the votes could win 90% of the constituency seats, giving them 45% of the total seats. Even with no additional members, the party would still be over-represented by 5%. The chances of overhang seats increase rather than national lists are used, and when larger constituency:list ratios are used.
 - c Split voting. Voters are allowed to vote for a candidate of one party and the list of another. Taking the example in c) above, a party might win 90% of constituency seats with 40% of the constituency votes, but gain only 30% of the list votes. With 45% of seats overall, they would be over-represented by 15%.
 - d The constituency system. The system used to elect constituency members can affect the result in an unpredictable way. As we have already seen, AV (and by implication SV) may produce either better or worse party proportionality than FPTP, depending on the circumstances.
- 5.6 It should also be noted that parties could collude to improve their result by taking advantage of the quirks of AMS described in b) and c). The idea of a Labour-Co-operative split has been mooted for the Scottish Parliament elections using AMS. This would involve standing only Labour candidates in the constituency elections and only Co-op lists in the regional party poll. They would then gain extra MSPs: Labour would keep all their constituency MSPs despite not gaining a single party vote; the Co-op would receive their full share of seats from the list, and would not be disadvantaged by any Labour seats already won. We understand that

neither Scottish nor Welsh Office has been able to find an answer to this problem.

- 5.7 We have considered a version of AMS in which half of the MPs are elected from party lists. This tends to produce a parliament which is closely proportional by party (although it is not guaranteed to do so). Other versions of AMS have fewer party list MPs, which inevitably results in a less party proportional outcome. For example, Dunleavy estimates that a ratio of 75:25 between constituency and list MPs would produce party disproportionality roughly half-way between that of 50:50 AMS and FPTP (which may be thought of as a 100:0 system).

Non-party proportionality

- 5.8 Now we consider whether AMS produces proportionality along other axes of opinion. Looking at the constituency votes first, the same conclusion applies as for party proportionality: with double-sized constituencies the result is in general less proportional than under FPTP. But does the party list element of the election do any better?
- 5.9 Well, it does automatically produce one form of variety: that between the constituency MPs and the list MPs. Such variety may be considered good or bad, but either way it cannot possibly reflect people's opinions. Under AMS, the ratio of the two types of MP is fixed - and there is no way that voters can change this.
- 5.10 The problem is that the top-up element in AMS with closed lists is based on the primacy of the political party, to the exclusion of all other considerations. Therefore, AMS will suffer from the same problems as list systems and will represent other dimensions of opinion as poorly as or worse than the existing FPTP system.
- 5.11 This problem can be partially overcome by using completely open lists for the top-up element, i.e. allowing voters to determine which list candidates are elected. Votes for individuals on a 'flexible' list (i.e. one which allows voters to cast a vote for a party as an alternative to voting for an individual candidate) rarely make a difference and at best the results will be no more proportional of non-party factors than the existing FPTP system.

6 The single transferable vote

- 6.1 STV aims to obtain, as far as practicable, proportional representation of whatever views, opinions and judgements motivate voters. It is designed to ascertain the voters' wishes and, as far as possible, to give effect to them. It uses preference voting in moderately sized multi-member constituencies (most proposals for the UK envisage 4 or 5 members per constituency on average).
- 6.2 STV uses a quota-preferential counting system to achieve proportionality (see annex A for details). Any candidate who receives sufficient first preference votes to reach the quota is elected. From then on, the second

and subsequent preferences of the voters are used to determine who is elected to the remaining seats (if any). If a vote can no longer help the first preference candidate (either because he has already reached the quota or because he has too few votes to have any chance of election) then that vote is transferred to the elector's second preference candidate, and so on. This process ensures that representation of the voters in a constituency is, as far as practicable, proportional of the voters' opinions.

Party proportionality

- 6.3 Consider the specific question of party proportionality. STV is designed to achieve proportionality of electors' opinions rather than proportionality of parties per se. However, to the extent that people vote on the basis of party, STV will produce a result that is broadly proportional by party. Under STV, the main parties will usually stand two or more candidates. And we have already observed that most people, given the choice, will vote primarily on that basis, giving their top preferences to all the candidates of one party, before giving lower preferences to other candidates. Indeed, STV often produces results which are more party proportional than some systems designed on the basis of party proportionality.³
- 6.4 Clearly there are a number of reasons why STV results can vary from party proportionality.
- a Differential transfers. Transfer patterns between parties are not random. Inter-party transfers are more likely to happen between parties which are close on the political spectrum or which have similar policies on a range of issues. This will tend to benefit likely coalition partners; provided the voters approve of a coalition, they will tend to transfer more between those parties.
 - b Constituency size. In a typical 5-member constituency, the result can only be proportional to the nearest 20%. So in that constituency some parties will do better and some worse than their level of support. But this effect is not systematic, so the gains and losses will tend to even out across the UK. A deviation from proportionality of (20% at constituency level will result in an expected deviation of only 2% at national level).
 - c The effective threshold. In a 5-member constituency, the quota is 16.7%. A candidate who gets 10% or more of first preferences will often receive enough second preferences to be elected. Parties which get 10% or more of the UK vote (or 10% of the vote in a particular part of the UK such as Scotland or Wales) will tend to achieve a proportional result. Parties getting less than 10% will sometimes get enough support in a particular constituency to elect an MP. Parties getting less than about 2% will get few or no MPs. Thus the STV threshold gradually cuts in between 2% and 10%, in contrast to the all-or-nothing 5% threshold in AMS.
 - d Non-party voting. STV allows people to put the candidates in any order, so some people will choose not to vote along party lines. This will tend to reduce the extent to which results are party-proportional, although the gains and losses will again tend to even

out. This effect is directly related to the strength of voter support for a party and to public confidence in the political party as an institution. The greater the strength of support and the higher the confidence, the more people will tend to vote along party lines.

- e Regional effects. As with any electoral system, the allocation of seats in different regions may not be proportional to the population, or there may be differential turnout.
- 6.5 Because STV is a preferential system, there is no unique definition of how to measure party proportionality. The usual method is to treat first preferences as votes for a party, but this ignores the fact that all votes under STV are cast for candidates. Therefore any estimates of deviation from proportionality under STV must be treated with caution. Moreover, because STV is based on a more sophisticated concept of proportionality, a result that is in fact more party proportional may appear to be less proportional when measured using a simplistic formula.
 - 6.6 This 'problem' is illustrated in a) above. Consider, for example, the effect of differential transfers. If parties are treated as discrete entities (as in a party-based proportional system), then this effect will appear to produce a less proportional result. However, if the relationship between parties is taken into account, the result might turn out to be more proportional. A perfect coalition of two parties (meaning that each receives all of the other's inter-party transfers) will under STV achieve the same result as if they were a single party; this is not true of any other system.
 - 6.7 For example, in the Northern Ireland Peace Forum elections of 1996, 24% of votes in Foyle were cast for unionist parties. The problem was they were split between three parties and, because a party list formula was used, the unionists won none of the five seats. Had STV been used, unionist voters could have transferred their votes between the parties to enable one of them to win a seat. It is common sense that the STV result is more proportional because it allows similar parties to be identified as such, while a party-based formula fails to register that similarity.
 - 6.8 In fact, differential transfers are the main reason why STV produces such good party proportionality despite the fact that the constituencies used are typically quite small, as noted in b) above. At 3-5 members each, the constituencies used in the Republic of Ireland are much smaller than those typically used in AMS or party list systems. Yet, as we shall see in the next section, party proportionality in Ireland compares favourably with that in other countries.
 - 6.9 The gradual threshold explained in c) has additional advantages over the all-or-nothing type of threshold used in AMS. Small parties which do not gain a quota must rely on transfers from other parties to gain a seat. Under these circumstances, differential transfers discriminate in favour of moderate parties and against extreme parties. The experience of the Greens is instructive here (while Green policies are fairly radical compared to the mainstream, they appeal to a broad group of voters, often as a second choice).

- 6.10 Under AMS in Germany, cited by many British Greens as their preferred system, the Greens won no seats in the Bundestag until they reached the 5% threshold in 1990. Under STV, Greens have been represented with much smaller national votes. The Australian Senate, elected by STV, has 2 Green senators out of 76 - based on 3% of the vote. In Ireland, the Greens have gained representation in the Dail on as little as 1% of the national vote - in marked comparison with Sinn Fein who needed 3% before electing their first TD for 40 years in 1997.
- 6.11 As d) above notes, STV does not constrain the voters to voting for a party list, so they are free to make up their own personal 'list', reflecting the political party they support, their favoured coalition partner(s), or other criteria of their choice. Measured against the collection of personal lists chosen by the voters, the STV counting system produces the most proportional result possible.

Non-party proportionality

- 6.12 If we consider how STV produces proportionality of opinion in other dimensions, we see that the principles are exactly the same as for party proportionality. To the extent that people vote on the basis of a criterion (for example, attitude to the EU), STV will produce a result that is broadly proportional according to that criterion. And the mechanism is the same: the personal 'list' of candidates chosen by each voter according to their preferences. The opinions of the voters will be reflected by how they order candidates on issues within parties, or across party boundaries.
- 6.13 Thus in principle STV can produce a result which is broadly proportional on the dimensions of opinion thought to be important by most of the electorate. In practice, close proportionality will be limited to no more than two or three dimensions. There are a number of reasons for this limitation.
- a Limits on multi-dimensional proportionality. Electorates are limited in the extent to which they can achieve proportional representation of all their opinions, both by the size of constituency and by the number of candidates standing. For most voters there will not be a candidate who represents all their opinions. They will have to come to a compromise by weighing up the various attributes of the candidates (party, gender, views on specific issues, etc.).
 - b Party control of nominations. Most candidates will, as now, be nominated by a political party. The nomination process will be under two conflicting pressures. Parties will want to field similar candidates to preserve party unity. On the other hand, they will want to offer as broad a choice as they can to maximise their overall vote. It is likely that they will try to offer slates which are balanced by gender and which reflect the local ethnic make-up. The availability of intra-party choice on other factors may be more limited.
- 6.14 So there are limits to STV's ability to produce proportionality on multiple dimensions of opinion. But this is no criticism of STV. STV is the only voting system which even attempts to achieve anything more than simple party proportionality. In doing so, it inevitably reaches the bounds which

apply to all social choice mechanisms. And given those limits, STV achieves proportionality on as many issues as possible, taking account of voters' preferences both on which issues are the most important and in terms of the balance of voter opinions on the issues themselves.

7 AMS and STV in action

- 7.1 We have examined four systems on the basis of proportionality. AV can be rejected on this basis, as it is not by any stretch of the imagination a proportional system. List systems, AMS and STV are proportional systems, and ought to produce results which are broadly proportional by party. STV should also produce results which are broadly proportional on other axes of opinion.
- 7.2 We understand that AMS and STV (or their variants) are likely to be the main 'contenders' for recommendation by the Commission. Therefore in this section we focus on how these two systems perform in practice.

Party proportionality

- 7.3 We start by looking at party proportionality. There are two possible approaches. One is to look at how the systems fare in the countries where they are used. The other is to use data from mock elections (effectively opinion polls) using these systems in the UK.
- 7.4 Dunleavy represents the most detailed example of the latter. It attempts to simulate the results of the 1992 and 1997 General Elections on the basis of post election surveys. However, the method used suffers from two major problems. The models used to simulate the system were seriously flawed. But more importantly the survey data was affected by the political climate at the time: a campaign fought under FPTP, and tactical voting on an unprecedented scale - ironically in response to the inadequacies of FPTP.
- 7.5 For these reasons, the results of Dunleavy are highly suspect, and are virtually useless for comparing the likely outcomes of AMS and STV. (Dunleavy is discussed in greater depth in a separate paper.) Therefore we must turn to real results from other countries. The disadvantage of this is that every country has special factors which can affect the proportionality of results. Therefore these results should be treated with some caution.
- 7.6 There are a number of methods for assessing deviation from party proportionality, all of which produce very similar results. We will use Gallagher's least-squares index, which is calculated by squaring the vote-seat differences for each party (ignoring 'others'), summing them, dividing by 2 and then taking the square root. The result is expressed as a percentage disproportionality; so the smaller the index, the more party proportional the result.⁴
- 7.7 For this purpose, the percentage of votes is based on party list votes in the case of AMS and first preference votes for STV. Having already observed

that first preferences are only part of the story in STV, we merely note that this method may if anything be biased against STV.

- 7.8 We will consider the examples usually quoted for each system: AMS in Germany and STV in the Irish Republic. In addition, we will look at New Zealand where a version of AMS has recently been introduced and Australia where a form of STV is used for elections to the Senate.

AMS in Germany

- 7.9 Germany has used an additional member system for elections to the Bundestag since the end of WW2. Under the current system, half the 656 members are elected in single member constituencies. The rest are elected from party lists in each of the Lander, using the Neimeyer quota (essentially the Hare quota with largest remainder). Only parties with 5% of the national vote or 3 constituency seats are entitled to receive additional members.
- 7.10 Table 7-1 gives the disproportionality index (DI) for general elections in the Federal Republic of Germany since 1970. The figures are given to the nearest 1%.^{5, 6, 7}
- 7.11 We see that there is considerable variation, with disproportionality between 1% and 5%. The reason for this becomes clear when we look at the proportion of votes cast for 'others' (independents and parties receiving less than the 5% threshold, who usually receive no seats in the Bundestag), which are included in table 7-1. Broadly speaking, AMS penalises the 'others', whose seats go to the parties which get more than 5%. This explains almost all of the divergence from party proportionality observed in the German elections.

Year	DI	% votes for 'others'
1972	1	1
1976	1	1
1980	2	2
1983	1	1
1987	1	1
1990	5	12
1994	3	8

Table 7-1: proportionality under AMS in Germany

Note: Only in 1990 and 1994 are there differences between the disproportionality index and votes cast for 'others'. In 1990 this arose from a special post-unification provision which meant that the 5% threshold was applied separately to East and West. In 1994, the PDS received only 4.4% of the vote, but won 4 constituency seats, entitling them to additional members under the 3-seat rule.

STV in Ireland

- 7.12 The Republic of Ireland has used the single transferable vote since independence in 1922. 166 TDs are elected from 41 constituencies, with between 3 and 5 seats each. Table 7-2 gives the DI and the percentage of votes cast for 'others' for general elections in the Republic of Ireland since 1970. The figures are given to the nearest 1%.^{5, 8, 9}

Year	DI	% votes for 'others'
1973	2	5
1977	5	7
1981	3	8
1982 (Feb.)	1	6
1982 (Nov.)	3	6
1987	5	11
1989	3	11
1992	3	17
1997	6	22

Table 7-2: proportionality under STV in Ireland

- 7.13 The DI varies between 1% and 6%, and is on average a little higher than in the Republic of Germany. The reason for this is clear. Votes cast for 'others' is much higher in Ireland than in Germany. And the DI is always substantially less than the votes for 'others'. This reflects the fact that STV allows parties with just under 5% to gain some seats, and that a few independents also get elected. (The differential transfer effect means that small moderate parties find it much easier to get elected than small extreme parties.)
- 7.14 The fact that results in Ireland are slightly less party proportional than in Germany has nothing to do with the particular form of PR used and everything to do with the greater diversity of parties in Ireland. One reason for this difference is that under STV allows voters to cast their first preference for small parties or independents safe in the knowledge that if their first choice candidate has no chance of election, their vote will be transferred to their second choice. Under AMS, electors know that votes for such candidates will be wasted, so most restrict themselves to voting for one of the main parties.
- 7.15 To make a fair comparison, we should take into account non-system factors:
- a the Dail is one quarter the size of the Bundestag;
 - b Irish constituencies (many of which return only 3 TDs) are generally considered to be on the small size; the ERS recommends that most constituencies should have 4-6 seats.

- 7.16 Both of these factors tend to make the Dail less proportional, with constituency size being the more important of the two (see annex A for further discussion). When these, together with the higher number of votes for 'others' are taken into account, STV performs as well as if not better than AMS in terms of party proportionality.

The experience of New Zealand and Australia

- 7.17 Further evidence is provided by examples in two other countries with a political heritage related to the UK's, namely Australia and New Zealand. Following a referendum to introduce PR, New Zealand held its first Parliamentary election under the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system in 1996. MMP is a form of AMS under which 65 members are elected in single member constituencies and 55 are elected from national party lists according to the Saint-Lague divisors. Only parties with 5% of the national vote or 1 constituency seat are entitled to receive additional members from the party list.
- 7.18 In Australia STV is used for elections to the upper house, the Senate. Each of the six states returns 12 Senators, elected by halves (6 seats come up for election every 3 years). Each of the two territories returns 2 Senators, all of whom are elected at 3 year intervals. Each state or territory is treated as a single multi-member constituency. There is very considerable disparity of representation between regions; for example, New South Wales has over eleven times the population of Tasmania, yet the two states have equal representation.
- 7.19 The 1996 New Zealand election proportionality results are given in table 7-3.¹⁰ The same data for Australian Senate results since 1990 are given in table 7-4.^{11, 12}

Year	DI	% votes for 'others'
1996	3	8

Table 7-3: proportionality under MMP in New Zealand

Year	DI	% votes for 'others'
1990	4	7
1993	3	8
1996	4	9

Table 7-4: proportionality under STV in Australia

- 7.20 These results confirm the conclusion from the results in Ireland and Germany: that there is little to choose between AMS and STV in terms of party proportionality. Indeed, given the large regional disproportionality built in to the Australian system and the small size of the election (only 40 seats), STV's performance on party proportionality is remarkably good.
- 7.21 So we see that STV, a system not specifically designed to produce party proportionality, is at least as party proportional as AMS, a system designed only to produce party proportionality.

Non-party proportionality

- 7.22 Turning to proportionality of opinion along other dimensions, we first note that STV has a mechanism for producing some proportionality of this type; AMS has no such mechanism.
- 7.23 Unfortunately, useful data on other forms of proportionality are almost non-existent. Where categorisation is straightforward (on gender and ethnicity), any results from another country will be so strongly related to national culture that they will provide no evidence on the impact of alternative electoral systems in the UK. On other factors, categorisation is much harder and the only evidence is anecdotal. Nevertheless, such evidence may throw some light on the question of broader proportionality. We consider two examples.
- 7.24 In 1992 the then President of the Federal Republic of Germany criticised the dominance of political parties over all the constitutional institutions of state¹³: 'The main feature of the profession of politician in Germany consists of supporting what the party wants, so that it will nominate you - preferably high up on the list'. He referred specifically to the need of the electorate to have 'greater influence on the choice of candidates on the list' and for having 'a critical review of the list system'. This criticism suggests that the effect of AMS in Germany is an increasing uniformity of opinion within parties. Such an effect must severely restrict the potential for proportionality along any axis of opinion other than the political party.
- 7.25 In 1977, members of the Australian Labor Party in supporting the use of STV in Tasmania argued, 'under the present system the majority of people feel free to vote for the Labor candidate who has either helped them personally or most closely represents their own opinions. This freedom of choice, and wide range of choice, is what keeps the Labor Government in power'¹⁴. This illustrates the fact that STV encourages intra-party choice, and in doing so allows 'broad church' parties to stay united instead of splitting, a likely consequence of most other PR systems.
- 7.26 So we have seen how both AMS and STV provide broadly similar levels of party proportionality, and that STV produces some degree of proportionality along other axes of opinion, where AMS produces none. All these factors relate to how the people vote. But can the parties affect the result more directly; can they tip the balance in their favour by 'working the system'.

Party manipulation

- 7.27 One test of a good electoral system is that it should be robust against parties' attempts - quite legitimately - to use the quirks of the system to their advantage, and against the interests of the voters. In other words, can parties adopt tactics which result in them receiving a greater share of MPs than their votes would otherwise justify?
- 7.28 The best known technique is gerrymandering - the fixing of constituency boundaries to favour one party over another. But the use of an independent boundary commission to draw the boundaries prevents this. So we must look to the intrinsic features of a system which may cause the

result to deviate from proportionality. Can a party reliably gain by persuading its supporters to vote in a particular tactical way?

- 7.29 Looking first at AMS, the two features which parties may be able to take advantage of are the possibility of bonus seats and split voting. We have already noted that two allied parties can collude to improve their result by one party standing only in the constituencies and the other standing only in the lists. Such a barefaced attempt to manipulate the system has never been tried, but a more subtle version was tried recently, and succeeded spectacularly.
- 7.30 In the 1994 election in Germany, it looked like Chancellor Kohl's CDU/CSU/FDP coalition would fall short of a majority. As a deliberate tactic to increase the coalition's overall number of seats, Kohl campaigned in some Lander for his supporters to cast their first (constituency) vote for the CDU and their second (party list) vote for the FDP. The results were dramatic. The CDU received 12 bonus seats (twice the previous record) and the FDP were helped over the 5% threshold. Probable defeat was turned into an overall majority of 10 in the Bundestag.¹⁵
- 7.31 It is incredibly difficult for parties to manipulate STV. There have been a number of attempts in all kinds of election, and they almost always backfire. We can see why by looking at the two relevant factors for STV: non-party voting and differential transfers. Clearly the minority of voters who choose not to vote on the basis of party are unlikely to be manipulated by any party. And the only way a party can benefit from differential transfers is by inspiring loyalty among its supporters (so that they transfer their votes to all candidates in the party) - hardly a case of manipulation. (Incidentally, in the 1997 Irish election, Fianna Fail gained a few extra seats under STV because its supporters were more loyal than those of other parties.)
- 7.32 Manipulation of electoral systems by parties (or by anyone else) is all too frequently overlooked. Yet it can have highly destructive effects, causing people to lose faith with the political system as a whole. Such manipulation tends to emerge over time as parties adapt their tactics to suit the new system (split voting in Germany has significantly increased). Any system where tactical voting is rewarded can be manipulated, and this is particularly true of hybrid systems such as AMS. (The Commission on Electoral Systems would do well to consider this point and think twice before inventing any new hybrid system.) STV is one of very few systems which defeats tactical voting, making it virtually immune to manipulation.

8 Summary and Conclusions

- 8.1 There is no evidence or reason to suggest that AV will produce a more proportional result than FPTP, either in terms of party or in terms of other criteria. The belief by some that AV is in any sense a proportional system (or even a broadly proportional system) is clearly based on a lack of

understanding. AV fails the proportionality test and should be not be considered for proposal to the people in a referendum.

- 8.2 AMS with a 50:50 split between constituency and list members produces results which are broadly proportional in terms of representation of political parties. The main reason for deviation from proportionality is the 5% threshold which excludes small parties from any entitlement to top-up seats from the party list. However, the party proportionality of AMS decreases as the proportion of list members goes down. 75:25 AMS results in a substantial deviation from party proportionality.
- 8.3 AMS has no mechanism to generate proportionality along other axes of opinion. Indeed, the increased control which it gives to parties may result in a reduction of variety of opinion within parties. AMS is open to manipulation by parties.
- 8.4 STV produces results which are broadly proportional in terms of parties. This is true even for fairly small constituencies, such as the 3-5 member constituencies in the Republic of Ireland, in which the results are about as proportional as 50:50 AMS. The main reason for deviation from proportionality is the effective threshold (which gradually cuts in between 2% and 10%).
- 8.5 STV is designed to produce proportionality along whatever axes of opinion the voters think are important. So in addition to good party proportionality, STV produces some proportionality of other opinions in society. STV is virtually immune to manipulation by parties or by anyone else.
- 8.6 If the you believe that the only form of proportionality that matters is party proportionality, then either AMS or STV would do. Both meet the criterion of broad proportionality, and there is little to choose between the two. If however you believe, as does the Electoral Reform Society, that proportionality goes beyond parties, then STV is clearly superior to AMS. STV provides proportional representation of the people, and not just proportional representation of the parties.
- 8.7 Of course, proportionality is only one aspect of choosing an electoral system. The Commission has also been asked to consider voter choice, constituency links and table government. In other papers, the ERS will show that when these factors and others are taken into account STV is by far the best system on offer.¹⁶

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Annex:**Constituency size and seat allocation formulae**

- A.1 This annex looks at the effect of constituency size and different seat allocation formulae on proportionality. For convenience the discussion is framed in terms of the effect on party proportionality, although it applies equally to any other dimension of opinion. We will start with constituency size, which tends to have the greater effect.

Constituency size

- A.2 The main effect of constituency size on proportionality is to restrict the accuracy with which it is possible for a party's votes to be translated into seats in a constituency. We look first at the individual constituency, and then see the effect on proportionality at an aggregate level when the results from many constituencies are combined. The aim is to provide a very simple theoretical model which shows how constituency affects proportionality, and comment briefly on some of the more complex effects observed.
- A.3 At the individual constituency level, the effect of constituency size may best be described in terms of 'rounding errors'. In a single member constituency (as used for FPTP, AV and SV), a party can either win (receive 100% of the seats) or lose (0% of the seats). This means there is a maximum rounding error of (100%; in other words a party can receive a proportion of the seats which is up to 100% different from what it 'deserves' according to its proportion of votes.
- A.4 In a 2-member constituency, the possible results for a party are: no seats (0%); one seat (50%); or two seats (100%). So the rounding error is (50%. In a 3-member constituency, the rounding error is (33%, in a 4-member constituency, (25%, and so on. In each case we are assuming that a party whose proportion of votes puts it between two possible outcomes will always achieve one of those outcomes. So in a 4-member constituency, a party with 35% of the vote will only ever win one (25%) or two (50%) seats.
- A.5 So we see that the rounding error goes down, and hence the proportionality improves, as the constituency size goes up. So what happens when we combine the constituency results to produce a parliament; what is the effect of constituency size on proportionality at an aggregate level? If the rounding errors are not systematic (in other words if the system is not biased in favour of or against any party), then an estimate of overall disproportionality may be found by dividing the constituency rounding error by the square root of the number of constituencies.
- A.6 So in a 650-member parliament, single member constituencies would produce disproportionality of about (4%, 4-member constituencies a disproportionality of (2% and 16-member constituencies (1%.

- A.7 But we know that FPTP results can be disproportional by 20% or more. This is caused by systematic bias, which is a fundamental part of all single-member systems. The primary form of bias is in favour of large parties and against all other parties. Unless it is regionally based, a party with less than about 30% of the vote loses out most of the time.
- A.8 This is a threshold effect, as discussed earlier in this paper, only with an extremely high threshold. A list system with a 5% threshold (whether caused by constituency size or as an additional constraint) is systematically biased against parties with less than 5% of the vote. STV, whose effective threshold results from constituency size, is systematically biased against small extreme parties.
- A.9 Thus constituency size has a dual effect. The smaller the constituency, the larger the constituency level rounding error and the greater the systematic bias. Both act to increase disproportionality.

Seat allocation formulae

- A.10 Now we look at the effect of seat allocation formulae on proportionality. This area receives little attention; the usual assumption is that if a party receives 10% of the votes, it will win 10% of the seats. As we have seen above such accuracy is often not possible, so a formula is required.
- A.11 There is a wide variety of methods which can be used to translate votes into seats. There are two main categories: divisor systems and quota systems. Quota systems may be further divided into quota-remainder and quota-preferential systems. Most systems fall into these categories or are variations on them. The main types of system and some of their variations are explained below. The example used to illustrate them is necessarily contrived, but serves to demonstrate the key differences.

Divisor systems

- A.12 The object of divisor systems is, as far as possible, to equalise the average number of votes per seat for each party. The votes of each party are divided by a sequence of increasing numbers in turn to determine how many seats each party wins.
- A.13 D'Hondt/higher average method (used in Portugal and Spain): This method uses the whole number divisors 1, 2, 3, 4, An example for a 5 member constituency is shown in table A-1. The votes of each party are divided by each of the divisors in turn to produce the table above. Then seats are allocated to parties on the basis of the five highest numbers in the table (shown in bold). So party A gets three seats and party B two.

Party	A	B	C	D
% votes	50.1	31	14	4.9
Divided by 1	50.1	31	14	4.9
Divided by 2	25.1	15.5	7	2.5
Divided by 3	16.7	10.3	4.7	1.6
Divided by 4	12.5	7.8	3.5	1.2
Seats won	3	2	0	0

Table A-1: Seat allocation using d'Hondt

- A.14 Sainte-Lague method (Commonly used in Scandinavia): This method uses odd number divisors 1, 3, 5, 7, The result for the same 5 member constituency is shown in table A-2. Seats are allocated as for d'Hondt, but with different divisors. As a result, party A gets two seats, party B two and party C one.

Party	A	B	C	D
% votes	50.1	31	14	4.9
Divided by 1	50.1	31	14	4.9
Divided by 3	16.7	10.3	4.7	1.6
Divided by 5	10	6.2	2.8	1
Divided by 7	7.2	4.4	2	0.7
Seats won	2	2	1	0

Table A-2: Seat allocation using Sainte-Lague

- A.15 Modified Sainte-Lague (used in Sweden): As for Sainte-Lague except that the first divisor is larger, for example 1.4, 3, 5, 7, In the example given above, the result would be three seats to party A and two to party B.
- A.16 As can be seen from the examples, the d'Hondt divisor method slightly favours the larger parties in comparison to the Sainte-Lague method. However, the impact of the d'Hondt and Sainte-Lague methods of seat allocation depends on the overall number of seats to be filled. Modified Sainte-Lague is in between, very slightly favouring large and medium sized parties.

Quota-remainder systems

- A.17 The second type of allocation method is election by quota. Parties receive one seat for each whole quota of votes polled in the constituency. Any remaining seats are allocated to parties in order of high remainders.
- A.18 The Hare quota: The quota is calculated by dividing the total number of votes by the number of seats in the constituency. In a five seat constituency the quota is therefore 20% of the votes polled. Table A-3 shows the result for our example. The first three seats are allocated on the basis of whole quotas. Party A receives two seats, and party B one. The remaining seats are allocated on the basis of the highest remainders. Party C receives the fourth seat with a remainder of 0.7, and party B the fifth seat with a remainder of 0.55.

Party	A	B	C	D
% votes	50.1	31	14	4.9
Number of quotas	2.51	1.55	0.7	0.25
Seats won	2	2	1	0

Table A-3: Seat allocation using the Hare quota

- A.19 Hare-Niemayer (used in Germany): The quota is calculated in the same way as for Hare, but disregarding votes cast for parties not reaching the 5% threshold. The result is shown in table A-4. As before, party A receives 2 seats and party B one seat on the basis of whole quotas. Party C receives the fourth seat with a remainder of 0.736, and now party A

receives the fifth seat with a remainder of 0.634. This is because by disregarding votes cast for party D, the quota is lowered, favouring the larger party.

Party	A	B	C	D
% votes	50.1	31	14	4.9
Number of quotas	2.634	1.630	0.736	-
Seats won	3	1	1	0

Table A-4: Seat allocation using Hare-Niemayer

- A.20 The Droop quota: The quota is calculated by dividing the total number of votes by the one more than the number of seats in the constituency. In a five seat constituency the quota is therefore 16.7% of the votes polled. Table A-5 shows the result for our example. Party A receives three seats and party B one seat on the basis of whole quotas. The fifth seat goes to party B because it has the largest remainder.

Party	A	B	C	D
% votes	50.1	31	14	4.9
Number of quotas	3.0	1.86	0.84	0.3
Seats won	3	2	0	0

Table A-5: Seat allocation using the Droop quota

- A.21 As noted above, using a smaller quota is more favourable to larger parties. However, the detailed effects depend on the overall number of seats to be filled. For example, compare the results of the above election with 10 and 12 seat constituencies using the Hare quota, given in table A-6. In the 10 seat constituency, party D wins one seat. But when two seats are added, it ends up with no seats.

Party	A	B	C	D
% votes	50.1	31	14	4.9
Number of quotas (10 seats)	5.01	3.1	1.4	0.49
Seats won (10 seats)	5	3	1	1
Number of quotas (12 seats)	6.01	3.72	1.68	0.59
Seats won (12 seats)	6	4	2	0

Table A-6: a comparison of 10 and 12 seat constituencies

- A.22 Hagenbach-Bischoff (used in the Northern Ireland Peace Forum elections): This method combines seat allocation by Droop quota and the allocation of any unfilled seats by the d'Hondt divisor method. The Hagenbach-Bischoff method will always produce the same result as d'Hondt.

The quota-preferential system: STV

- A.23 STV is not directly comparable with party-based allocation systems because votes are cast for one or more individual candidates within each party. However, let us suppose that the percentages in our example represent genuine support for each party in an STV election. Then we can examine STV on the same basis as the other methods.
- A.24 Under STV, candidates have to reach a Droop quota in order to be elected. Taking our example, we would expect 3 candidates of party A and one

candidate of party B to reach the quota (see table A-5). The final seat is clearly between parties B and C, with the two candidates very close, having 0.86 and 0.84 of the quota respectively. Because the contest is so close, STV allows the supporters of party D to have a say in the result, according to how many of them transfer their votes to parties B and C.

- A.25 Suppose that the voters perceived parties C and D as having very similar policies. Then the transfers from party D voters would probably lead to the election of the candidate from party C, who would represent both groups of voters. STV is the only seat allocation system which enables this to happen.
- A.26 This example illustrates STV's claim to be the most proportional system of all, especially in smaller constituencies

Working Paper Number Three

Stable Government and Electoral Reform

The Submission of the
Electoral Reform Society
to the
Independent Commission on the Voting System

March 1998

**ELECTORAL
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ERS

Stable Government and electoral reform

This paper argues that stable government is not incompatible with proportional representation, and there is therefore no conflict between the Commission's criteria of 'broad proportionality' and the 'promotion of stable government'. The paper then examines the alternative types of proportional voting systems differ in the extent to which they facilitate the formation of coalitions or other forms of inter-party agreements which contribute to stable government when no party has an absolute majority.

1. 'Stable' government under FPTP

Proponents of FPTP often maintain that the system generally produces single-party governments with parliamentary majorities, and that such governments are 'strong' and 'stable'. Here we argue that FPTP only provides strong and stable government in a limited sense.

In Britain, although no government since 1945 has enjoyed majority support in the country, FPTP has generally given governments overall majorities in parliament. In 1950 and 1964, however, majorities have been so slender that governments have felt it necessary to call general elections after less than 2 years, and in February 1974 the general election produced no overall majority resulting in a further election later that year. The October 1974 election produced a majority of only 3 and the Labour government could only complete its term of office with Liberal support. Even when governments have won overall majorities in general, these have often been seriously eroded through by-elections (the government elected in October 1974 was defeated 42 times in by-elections, while the 1992 government only just managed to maintain its majority through to the 1997 general election).

Thus while FPTP has allowed governments to win majorities in parliament with a minority of votes, it has not always put them in positions of strength. A characteristic of FPTP is that it may only required a small swing in a minority of constituencies to produce changes in government, and governments have therefore been vulnerable to small changes in public opinion.

In the longer term, FPTP as a system is only viable when there are likely to be periodic changes in government. As put by Taagepera and Shugart:

"long-range stability depends on semiregular alternation of parties in power, so that no major group feels permanently excluded and the ruling party leaders do not grow stale. If the same party always gets to rule, the system may be unstable in the long run."

They give Northern Ireland as an example of how FPTP can lead to instability, and indeed conflict, when this condition is not met¹.

FPTP has also led to some instability in the broad direction of government policy. Governments have been able to introduce policies, e.g. nationalisation/privatisation² and the poll tax, which did not command majority support within the electorate and changes in government have resulted in major shifts in policy, often at great public expense.

In the run up to general elections (which can be one year out of every four) governments do not know whether their policies will be implemented and it is difficult for both governments and the business community to plan ahead with confidence.

As has been noted, FPTP does not guarantee that one party will have an overall majority. With the move from an essentially two-party system in the 1950s and 1960s to a system with three significant parties, the chance of no party having an absolute majority is likely to increase³. (Although the 1997 election gave Labour a very large majority, consideration of the swings in different constituencies suggests that Labour gained from much anti-Conservative tactical voting. It cannot be assumed that future elections under FPTP will always produce results so favourable to the winning party.)

Coalitions at Westminster under FPTP are likely to be unstable because the partners see them as temporary arrangements brought about by electoral circumstances rather than design and are unlikely to be cemented by a predetermined desire to enter into them. Partners know that a small change in the voting pattern might produce a majority government. The constituent political parties will operate with an early general election in mind and may therefore be inclined to seek ways of undermining the credibility of partner parties in the eyes of the electorate. (In contrast, in local government areas where 'no overall control' is the norm, the need to be seen to be making government work has reduced the level of conflict between coalition partners.⁴)

A final factor which threatens the future of stable government under FPTP is the regional spread of party support. Between 1992 and 1997 the Conservative Party had very few seats in Scotland and Wales, resulting in nationalist claims that the Government did not have a mandate in Scotland and Wales and, at least within Scotland, increasing pressure for devolution. While devolution can be regarded as a positive measure from a modernising Government, it can be argued that while the Conservatives were in government their minimal representation in Scotland was a constitutionally destabilising factor.

2. Stable government under proportional systems

Most countries, which use proportional systems, including Austria, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland, have enjoyed stable government⁵. Where coalitions have been necessary they have not inhibited governments from making and implementing policy. These are countries in which confidence in the government has remained high and which have enjoyed a reasonable degree of economic prosperity.

There are of course the cases of Israel and Italy which have PR systems and which appear to have suffered from unstable governments.

Italy has suffered periods in which coalitions have often broken apart and that is undoubtedly a form of instability. However, the reasons for this instability in Italy are more to do with the Italian political culture, political divisions which originated from the cold war and re-alignments when it came to an end⁶, corruption and, at least in part, from the dominant role of parties in political and economic life. Instability is not necessarily a consequence of the electoral system.

Moreover, the coalition changes in Italy need to be seen in perspective. Firstly, it must be noted that changes in coalition partners have not always meant significant changes in political direction, e.g. the Christian Democrats enjoyed a consecutive period of 522 months in government ensuring some continuity of policy. Secondly, the reconstruction of coalitions has not always necessitated fresh elections: between 1946 and 1987 Italy had only 10 general elections while Britain had 12 (13 if 1945 is included). Thirdly, we should also note that the Italian economy continued to grow in strength in spite of these changes in political leadership.

In Israel a national list system allows representation to small and sometimes extremist parties which can hold the balance of power: in order to govern larger parties must often accede to their demands in complex negotiations, resulting in some policies which the majority of the electorate find objectionable. These negotiations take place after elections thereby thwarting the will of the majority.

Israel, however, is unique⁷. Moreover, it should be noted that the electoral system used in Israel is not one that the Commission can accept as with a national list system there is no link between MPs and geographic constituencies. The use of geographic constituencies ensures that there will be a threshold, which parties must pass if they are to secure representation and the emergence of small extremist parties is not therefore a necessary consequence of PR.

Although the number of parties gaining representation can make the process of coalition-building more complex, there are many examples (e.g. the Scandinavian countries, Belgium and Switzerland) of countries with proportional systems forming stable governments with the support of smaller parties. In Ireland, which uses STV, and Germany, which uses AMS, the number of parties has actually decreased⁸.

One case, which has received much attention recently, is that of New Zealand. Following referendums in 1992 and 1993, New Zealand moved from FPTP to AMS. Since the elections, however, confidence in the government and, as a result in the new voting system, which elected it, has dropped dramatically. Various reports on the New Zealand situation are available⁹, but here it is sufficient to note that:

- a) the situation cannot be blamed on the electoral system: no party gained an absolute majority in the constituency elections and the same process of coalition formation would have been needed if FPTP had been retained¹⁰;
- b) no electoral system can ensure that politicians will act in accordance with their pre-election statements: the issue is whether the electoral system offers voters an opportunity to remove those considered to have acted unreasonably at the next election¹¹;

- c) New Zealand is not any more unstable than it was under FPTP.

3. Factors affecting the stability of government

From the above examples we can conclude that stability of government is not just a question of whether a single party is likely to obtain an absolute majority:

- i) When a single party gains power without relying on the support of an opposition party (or parties), there is not necessarily stability: there is a danger that key policies may not have majority support in the electorate leading to major policy shifts at elections and under FPTP governments may change as a result of small shifts in electoral support.
- ii) When no party has an absolute majority of seats, stability may depend on the extent to which parties can co-operate in forming coalitions or other forms of agreement. A related issue is the extent to which parties can co-operate as the stability of coalitions or agreements will depend on the extent to which there is a broad political consensus between the parties in coalition or agreement.
- iii) The stability of government can be affected by the stability of parties and the party structure. Parties play an essential role in our political system: they “structure the popular vote; integrate and mobilize the mass of citizenry; aggregate diverse interests; recruit leaders for public office; and formulate public policy”.¹² If a party which is part of a governing coalition is unstable (e.g. as a result of internal divisions and factional politics with consequent dangers of fragmentation of the party) then the coalition itself may be unstable (instability in opposition parties could also create uncertainty in government but is likely to be less serious).
- iv) A proliferation of many small parties, some more akin to single-issue pressure groups, may also affect stability in situations where a major party must negotiate with several such parties to achieve a governing coalition (Israel is a case in point).
- v) While the strength and cohesiveness of political parties must contribute to stability, forming coalitions or agreements is likely to be more difficult when parties have tightly defined policies and hence political boundaries. Where political boundaries of parties are more diffuse, encompassing members with a broader range of political views, it will be easier for parties to co-operate with other parties occupying adjacent political positions. Where parties are centralised and have more narrowly defined policies, negotiation and compromise will be more difficult. Electoral systems which contribute to the centralisation of parties are therefore likely to make the formation of coalitions harder to achieve.
- vi) Instability, where it arises, is often a consequence of factors only indirectly related to the electoral system, e.g. instability within the government party (e.g. the Conservative Party on its attitude to Europe in the year preceding the 1997 election), a political system which loses public confidence because

of sleaze and corruption, etc. The electoral system can, however, reduce the risk of instability arising from these factors by increasing voter influence on party policy formation and by increasing the accountability of MPs to the electorate.

4. How stable government relates to voting systems

While the stability of government is not directly related to the voting system, the system can influence some of the factors involved. The above section indicates that key questions are:

- Does the voting system encourage parties to co-operate with each other, recognising broad areas of agreement, or does it encourage them to campaign negatively by attacking each other?
- Does the voting system indicate how voters see parties in relation to each other and how they would like to see coalitions or agreements formed?
- Does the voting system enhance the stability of parties by facilitating party management?
- Does the voting system encourage proliferation of parties?
- Does the voting system encourage the centralisation of parties or does it promote a culture in which a range of views is recognised within parties?
- Does the voting system ensure the accountability of MPs and therefore reduce the danger of instability arising from misdemeanours by a small number of MPs?

Below we compare how the main types of voting system – AV, list systems, AMS and STV - are likely to perform in relation to these questions.

a) *Does the voting system encourage parties to co-operate, or to campaign negatively by attacking each other?*

If the voting system allows voters to express their preferences, parties need to campaign not just for first preferences, but also for the subsequent preferences of supporters of other parties. As a result party, A is encouraged to publicise the similarities between its policies and those of parties B and C in order to persuade supporters of B and C that A is the right second choice for them. While party A will continue to criticise the policies of B and C - and rightly so as a legitimate part of the democratic process - purely negative criticism is less likely as it may antagonise B and C voters whose second or subsequent preferences A might need to win seats. Preference voting is therefore more likely to build a basis for co-operative relationships between parties.

AV and STV are therefore more conducive to the formation of coalitions and agreements than list systems or AMS.

However, coalitions formed under AV, which is not a proportional system, may be prone to the instability referred to in section 1 above: as a small

change in voter opinion may restore an absolute majority, parties will act and relate to each other with elections in mind. With proportional systems small changes will not have such effects on the outcome of elections, and parties will not be able to view coalitions in such a transient way and will need a more positive approach to co-operation.

Of the systems considered, STV would therefore appear to do most to encourage co-operation between parties.

b) *Does the voting system indicate how voters see parties in relation to each other and how they would like to see coalitions or agreements formed?*

With list systems and single-vote AMS, parties might announce before an election with which other parties they would be prepared to co-operate. However, the election itself would give no indication of the acceptability of these alliances to the parties' supporters.

With dual-vote AMS a voter can give his or her list votes to parties different from that of the constituency candidate supported. In this way voters can give some indication of which coalitions would be acceptable to them,¹³ but they may only be able to do so by making an artificial choice (e.g. a voter supportive of Party A and of Party A's candidate in the constituency election could only indicate support for a coalition with Party B by making a tactical vote for either Party B or for Party B's candidate).

With preference voting parties can see from which other parties' supporters they are likely to gain support (and to which other parties their supporters will turn if their candidates are not successful). This gives parties an indication of the coalitions or agreements which would be most acceptable to voters.

Again, AV and STV will provide this information, but list systems and AMS will not.

c) *Does the voting system enhance the stability of parties by facilitating party management?*

AV is similar to FPTP in that there is only one candidate per party in each constituency and a change to AV would not therefore affect party management.

List systems (unless completely open) are party, rather than candidate, based and the role of the party is therefore strengthened, but only at the expense of voter choice. Party management considerations under list systems lead to a party-manager preference for closed lists (thereby preventing the risk of competition between candidates of the same party). Parties have the additional, and potentially divisive, task of ordering lists.

AMS is a hybrid of FPTP and a list system and therefore suffers from the problems inherent in list systems. AMS poses a further difficulty in that it produces two categories of MPs and the relationship between the two is a potential source of conflict. For example, the constituency MP and a list MP

of the same party might take differing positions on a constituency issue. While differences within a party's MPs in a constituency can arise with any multi-member constituency system, with AMS there is one MP (the constituency MP) who may consider him- or herself to have a greater right to speak for the constituency.¹⁴

Under STV parties propose lists of candidates, but voters choose candidates and not parties. Party managers need not, however, be concerned at voters choosing one candidate rather than another of their party as votes are transferable (assuming that most voters rank their preferences by party affiliation). The importance of party organisation and support is not diminished: a party with loyal supporters, who tend to rank the party's candidates higher than any other candidates, is likely to do better than a party whose support is less solid.

With some forms of STV, parties can choose to rank their candidates, but as the eventual ranking is in the hands of the voters the parties' ranking is not as critical as in list systems (with the exception of completely open list systems). STV can therefore be regarded as a primary election, in which voters can rank the candidates on a party's list, coupled to a general election.

It has been argued that by allowing voters to choose between candidates of the same party, there is a risk that competition between a party's candidates will create stresses in party management. This can be largely overcome by having in each constituency a single election agent per party responsible for the production of election literature and other materials. Moreover, by offering a choice of candidates, parties can increase their appeal to voters: votes are not lost if a particular candidate is popular within a sector of the electorate.

d) *Does the voting system encourage proliferation of parties?*

With all systems considered, with the exception of national lists, there is an effective threshold which parties must pass before they secure representation¹⁵.

With STV there is an additional advantage. Extremist parties which have support from a small proportion of voters but are opposed by the majority are unlikely to gain representation. Other parties (for example the Green Party¹⁶) which do not have many first preference votes but which feature strongly in the subsequent preferences of a majority stand a better chance of winning seats.

e) *Does the voting system encourage the centralisation of parties or does it promote a culture in which a range of views is recognised within parties?*

AV relies on single-member constituencies and there is therefore no opportunity for voters to elect candidates representing a range of views within a party. A party's candidates are therefore more likely to represent a narrow range of views.

Under list systems (unless completely open) it is the parties and not the voters who determine which of a party's candidates are likely to be successful. List systems therefore tend to centralise decision-taking and control (as can be seen in the debates over the introduction of the new voting system for European elections).

AMS, being partly based on single-member constituencies and partly on lists, will also tend to lead to narrowness in the candidates elected and a centralisation of control within the party.

With STV parties field a range of candidates and the electorate has a free choice amongst them. Voters will make their choices using criteria in addition to party affiliation, e.g. candidate's positions on the environment, fox-hunting, local issues, etc. There is therefore a greater chance that those elected for a particular party will encompass a range of views and characteristics and will not simply be elected on the basis of parties' key manifesto pledges.

f) *Does the voting system ensure the accountability of MPs and therefore reduce the danger of instability arising from misdemeanours by a small number of MPs?*

AV ensures the accountability of candidates. However, like FPTP, it poses a dilemma in that voters who wish to censure their MP might find they can only do so by voting against their party (e.g. the Tatton situation in the last general election).

List systems, with the exception of completely open list systems, greatly diminish the accountability of MPs to the electorate. Voters cannot vote to remove individual MPs - they can only vote against the entire party list.

AMS suffers from the problems of both AV and list systems. These problems will be exacerbated if, as some propose, lists consist of those contesting constituency seats: here there is the danger that voters may vote to remove a particular constituency MP only to find the same MP re-elected as a list MP.

With STV, voters vote for candidates rather than for parties. There is therefore greater accountability of all MPs to the electorate than is the case with list systems or AMS. STV allows voters to support the parties of their choice, but without supporting candidates to whom they are opposed.

5. Conclusions

From the above discussion it is clear that:

- 1) The examples given in sections 1 and 2 above show that there is no basis for arguing that governments elected by proportional voting systems are less stable than those which are not. There is therefore no conflict between the Commission's criteria of 'broad proportionality' and the promotion of stable government.

- 2) The Commission must therefore ask whether proportional systems differ in the extent to which they are likely to assist or hinder the formation of stable governments.

Here we have argued that a key issue is the extent to which voters can show their preferences across parties. STV and AV allow cross-party preference voting (but AV is not a proportional system) and dual-vote AMS makes it possible to a much more limited extent.

In closed list systems, including closed lists which are part of AMS, voters can only vote for parties and not for individual candidates on the parties' lists. This seriously reduces the accountability of MPs to the electorate and reduces the power of the electorate to remove unpopular MPs: this could well reduce public confidence in government and thereby affect stability.

A similar situation arises where voters are presented with only one choice of candidate by each party, as in AV and in the constituency section of AMS. Again, the accountability of MPs to voters and the power of voters to reject MPs is reduced and stability may suffer.

- 3) We therefore conclude that STV is the system most likely to facilitate the formation of stable coalitions or agreements between parties.

Footnotes

1. Rein Taagepera and Matthew Shugart (in *Seats and Votes*, Yale UP, 1989, p.63):
With a population of two-thirds Protestant and one-third Catholic largely voting along religious lines, there has been no alternation. Moreover, plurality in single-member districts previously reduced the Catholic representation much below their PR share of seats, denying them even the role of a meaningful parliamentary opposition. The situation looked stable for fifty years - until all too many Catholics replaced their meaningless ballots with bullets. The recent shift to Protestant-Catholic executive power-sharing and to PR in regional assembly elections came too late to defuse the issue."
2. Vernon Bogdanor (in *The People and the Party System*, Cambridge UP, 1981, p 195), in considering the effects of adversarial politics on industry, quotes from an article written by Lord Caldecote in 1980:
"[Steel] has been a political shuttlecock for a quarter of a century. Threatened with nationalisation, nationalised, denationalised, renationalised, now reduced through lack of coherent long-term policy to a shambles. In no other country has so much waste and human misery been caused by fundamental changes of government policy resulting from our two-party adversary electoral system."
3. In the period from 1945 to 1974 the combined Labour and Conservative vote never fell below 87.5%, but since 1974 it has never been above 76.3%.
4. Michael Temple, *Coalitions and Co-operation in local government*, ERS, 1996.
5. The stability of coalition governments in Europe is analysed in some detail by Michael

Laver and Norman Schofield, *Multiparty Government: the Politics of Coalition in Europe*, OUP 1992, pp. 144 – 163.

6. Alan Ware, *Political Parties and Party Systems*, OUP, 1996, p 232.
7. The Israeli population has increased eight-fold since 1948, mainly through immigration: Ware (op cit., p221) notes that "the sheer scale of the change in population would probably have brought about a new party system irrespective of the electoral rules used". Moreover, the party system is complicated by many immigrants having come from countries with very diverse political cultures and by the strong links between parties and religious sects.
8. David Butler, *Problems and implications in Proportional Representation*, in Jowell and Oliver (eds), *The Changing Constitution*, OUP, 1996.
9. A briefing paper and selected press cuttings are available from the Electoral Reform Society.
10. The National Party won 46% of the constituency seats, compared with 40% for Labour and 9% for New Zealand First. FPTP would not therefore have spared New Zealand from its difficulties in forming a government.
11. In the recent general election in New Zealand using AMS, the New Zealand First party was expected to coalesce with the Labour and Alliance parties in forming a new government. Instead it formed a coalition with with the National Party. As a result the New Zealand First party's public standing, as recorded in opinion polls, has plummeted. Political analysts believe that its decision accounts for many New Zealanders turning against AMS. It can be expected that the next general election will demonstrate to parties the dangers of parties forming coalitions against the wishes of their supporters.
12. Peter Mair, *The West European Party System*, OUP, 1990, p.1
13. Vernon Bogdanor, in *The People and the Party System*, Cambridge UP, 1981, pp. 222-233, notes how in the West German election of 1972 many SDP and FDP voters split their votes between the parties, thus indicating support for a coalition. However, in this case voters were urged by their party leaders to split their votes by voting tactically, rather than for their natural choices of constituency candidates and party lists. Moreover, the majority of voters appear to have voted for same party as that of the constituency candidate supported thereby giving no indication of support or otherwise for a coalition.
14. There are already reports of conflicts between some constituency and some list MPs in New Zealand. Germany, however, has not had similar difficulties as German MPs do not involve themselves to the same extent in constituency issues and casework. Britain's political culture, however, is closer to that of New Zealand.
15. With list systems it should be noted that if a considerable the number of parties contest seats in a region, it is possible that none of the parties will reach the quota, and seats will then be won with less than the quota. This problem cannot arise with STV.
16. Two Green candidates were elected to the Irish Dail in 1997 in this way.

Working Paper Number Four

Voter Choice and Electoral Reform

The Submission of the
Electoral Reform Society
to the
Independent Commission on the Voting System

April 1998

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Voter Choice in electoral systems

This paper examines the extent to which the main voting systems enhance voter choice. Systems and their variants are described and each is assessed against a number of voter choice criteria. It is concluded that although list systems and AMS can be improved by using open lists and preference voting, neither of these types of system offers the full choice which STV gives to voters.

1. Introduction

The Commission has been asked to recommend a voting system which extends voter choice. This Working Paper evaluates the degree to which the main types of voting system meet this criterion. The types of system examined are:

Section	
2	Majoritarian systems: Alternative Vote (AV) and Supplementary Vote (SV)
3	List systems
4	Additional Member System (AMS)
5	Single Transferable Vote (STV)

Voter Choice can be defined as extent to which voters can express their views and preferences through the ballot paper. While FPTP offers a straight choice between the single candidates proposed by each of the parties contesting the election (and in some cases independents). Other systems, however, enable voters to much more fully express their views on both candidates and parties. For the purpose of this paper we will evaluate voter choice in the following ways:

- 1. Voters are able to vote for their favourite candidates rather than just for their favourite party.**
- 2. Voters are given a choice of candidates within parties.**
- 3. Voters are able to vote across party lines and not just restricted to voting within a party.**
- 4. Voters can rank their preferences among candidates rather than just make a single choice.**

A related issue is the number of votes perceived to have been 'wasted' in the sense that they have not contributed to the result. Voters may consider their votes to have been wasted if either they have been cast for losing candidates or they have been given to candidates who already have sufficient support to secure election. Where voters fear that their votes are likely to be wasted, they are likely to regard their choice as a meaningless one. Voters then have little incentive to vote and turnouts will suffer.

With many voting systems there is often seen to be a conflict between the

interests of the voter and those of parties. Some voting systems are party-based with the party having control over which of its candidates are most likely to be elected, while with others put the choice of candidates more into the hand of voters. This paper therefore also considers the effect of voter choice on party management.

2. Majoritarian Systems

Firstly we examine majoritarian systems - SV and AV. Although these systems do not meet the Commission's criterion of 'broad proportionality', they may be components of hybrid systems which the Commission might consider.

2.1 Supplementary Vote (e.g. Sri Lanka Presidential Election)

The ballot paper is divided up into two columns, one for the voter's first preference vote and the other for their second preference vote (see Fig X). The voter places 'X's next his or her first and second choice candidates. If no candidate has a majority of first preference votes, all but the top two candidates are eliminated and second preference votes are added from voters whose first choices have been eliminated. SV seeks to insure that the winning candidate gains an overall majority of the vote in a single constituency or as near to it as possible.

2.2 Alternative Vote (e.g. Australia Lower House elections)

The elector votes by numbering the candidates in order of preference, 1 for the first choice, 2 for the second choice and so on. If no candidate has a majority of first preference votes then the bottom candidate is eliminated and his or her votes are transferred to their voter's next choice. This process continues until one candidate has a majority of the votes.

2.3 SV and AV evaluated

On the basis of our four criteria, SV and AV allow voters to vote for their favorite candidate although candidate and party are synonymous in these systems, as in FPTP and all single seat systems. Voters are able to express preferences across party lines, but with SV only to a limited degree. Voters are not given a choice of candidates within a political party (¹). AV allows voters to rank all candidates in order of preference, but with SV only two candidates can be so ranked (this means that voters, in making their second choices, do not have to guess who the leading two candidates will be). Overall, SV is a limited improvement on FPTP when it comes to an extension of voter choice, but AV gives a voter the maximum choice within a single seat system.

3. List Systems

3.1 Factors affecting voter choice

List systems can be '**open**' in that the choice of candidate is open to the voter, or '**closed**' in that it is not. Open lists extend voter choice as the voter can choose the candidate whom he or she considers will best represent his or her views. With closed lists the voter must accept the party's decision on which candidates will fill seats won by the party, and voter choice is therefore restricted.

However, other features of list systems which determine the degree of voter choice are:

- whether the lists are ordered;
- whether or not the voter has the option of voting for a party or for an individual candidate (e.g. as in the Belgium system);
- whether votes are transferable and the voter can rank preferences within a party list;
- whether cross-party voting is possible.

3.2 Examples of list systems

Below we give some examples of the list systems.² We start with the list system which offers the least voter choice and then look at changes by which voter choice can be improved.

a) Closed lists

Closed lists are so-called because the choice of candidate is closed to the voter. Israel uses closed lists using the entire country as a single constituency, but closed lists can also be used at regional level. This is the system which the Government is proposing for European elections in Britain.

Electors vote for an individual party. The party's list of candidates may be on the ballot paper or may be published before the election. Seats are allocated to each party according to their share of the vote. Within each party, seats are allocated in the order chosen by the party.

The only choice voters have is between parties. They cannot express an opinion on any issue other than by voting for a party. They have no choice over who gets elected from each party.

b) Ordered list with the option of casting a party vote

This type of system is used in a number of other European countries. The particular variant of the system used in Belgium was considered for European elections in Britain but has recently been rejected by the Government. (Note, however, that the option of casting a party vote can also be offered in open

lists – see below.)

The ballot paper is laid out as a series of ordered party lists with a tick box at the head of each. Electors may either use this box to vote for a party or vote for an individual candidate of the party (with that vote also counting towards the party vote). Seats are allocated to each party according to their share of the vote.

In Belgium, for each party a quota of votes which candidates must reach to secure election is calculated. Party votes are then added to candidates' individual votes, firstly giving the candidate at the top of the list sufficient to raise his or her total to the quota. Party votes are then given to the second candidate, and so on, until the party votes are exhausted. Candidates with a quota of votes, or with the highest number of votes, are then allocated the seats (see Fig 5).

Denmark uses a similar system. There, however, parties can opt to top up candidates' individual votes (as in Belgium), or they can fill seats solely on the basis of individual votes.

Experience from other countries indicates that only occasionally will the votes for individual candidates make any difference to who gets elected. The party votes, where allocated in accordance with the parties' ranking of their candidates, will generally determine who is elected. This can lead to situations in which candidates can be elected, but others in the same list with higher numbers of individual votes may not - a situation which would appear to overturn the choices of the voters. The system ensures, however, that there is a safety valve, so voters' concerns can be safely channelled without having to vote against their preferred party (as might happen with closed lists).

Even where party votes are not transferred to candidates (e.g. Denmark), the ordering of the party list on the ballot paper tends to influence the choices of many voters.³

c) Open list with 'X' voting (e.g. Finland, proposed in 1976 for UK European Elections)

Electors vote for one candidate on a party list, with their vote counting for the party as well. Seats are allocated to each party according to their share of the vote and those seats are allocated within each party on the basis of the numbers of individual votes received by each candidate.

Within party lists voters are therefore able to choose candidates on the basis of whatever criteria they consider important (e.g. gender, age, ethnicity, support for the environment, position on Europe, etc.). Voters can reject an individual candidate (e.g. as in Tatton in the recent general election) without being forced to reject their party as well.

This system can cause anomalies, as can be seen in the following example: A party puts up 10 candidates in a region and gains 40% of the vote entitling it to 4 seats. One of its candidates gets 75% of the party's vote and is elected

top of the list, the next 3 candidates with the highest personal vote are also elected, but these three candidates may have only a few percentage of the vote each. Under this system it would be possible for the overwhelming majority of a parties supporters to elect only one candidate and a minority to elect three candidates. The second, third and fourth candidates may be elected with fewer votes than received by unsuccessful candidates of other parties.

d) Open party lists with preference voting

Each party puts up a list of candidates and the ballot paper is organised into a series of columns, one for each party. Voters can mark their preferences, using 1, 2, 3 ... within their chosen party list, rather than using an 'X'. Candidates can be listed in the order chosen by their party, or they can be listed randomly or alphabetically.

This system is similar to open party lists with 'X' voting. Voters are still forced to vote by party, but within party lists voters will have a more refined choice. With 'X' voting, a vote may not influence the order in which listed candidates will be allocated seats because they are cast for candidates with either more than sufficient votes or insufficient votes. With preference voting votes, which would otherwise be wasted in the ranking of the list, can be transferred to voters' subsequent preferences. However, the organisation of the ballot paper positively encourages voters not to use their choice, and to vote exactly how the party wants. Therefore the theoretical presence of voter choice has little effect.

3.3 Voter choice in list systems evaluated

Closed lists do not offer the voter any more choice than FPTP. If a voter does not favour one candidate on a party list, the only options are to reject the whole party list (which may include some the voter wishes to support) or to support the list including the candidate the voter wishes to reject.

Under open lists the voter can vote for their preferred candidate, and voter choice is therefore extended by allowing a choice of candidate within a party's list. Within most open list systems voters cannot vote across party lines, though there are a limited number of systems such as the one used in Luxembourg which do allow voters to do this.⁴ As noted in 3.2 (c) above, this can produce results which appear to overturn the wishes of voters.

Closed lists are necessarily ordered (i.e. ranked) by the parties; open lists may be ordered by parties or presented on ballot papers in alphabetic or random order. While an ordered open list does not in theory restrict the choice of the individual voter, in practice, because many voters will vote according to the wishes of the parties, the ordering of the list has a major effect on which candidates will be successful and which will not. The ordering can therefore impose the will of the parties on those of the voters.

Similarly, if a party 'tick box' is used, allowing voters to cast a vote simply for the party (as in the Belgium system), party votes tend to determine which of a party's candidates will be elected. Studies of such 'flexible' list systems show

that it is very rare for individual candidate votes to alter the order in which candidates are elected⁵ (in Belgium the order is changed only on about one case in every 24). The effectiveness of a voter's choice may therefore be much reduced.

Voter choice is enhanced where voters can indicate their preferences between candidates and votes are transferable. Unless STV is used, however, preferences cannot be expressed across parties and choice is denied to the voter who has a second, or subsequent choice candidate belonging to another party. There are list systems which allow cross-party voting. Luxembourg uses a system in which voters have as many votes as there are seats to be filled, and they can use up to 2 votes on any candidate. The system has merits, but simplicity is not one of them.

Wasted votes: With list systems the number of votes which are 'wasted', in that they do not count towards the election of a successful candidate, is relatively low. If, for example, in a six-member region the only votes 'wasted' are likely to be those cast for parties receiving under 14% of the total vote (although, particular when many parties contest an election, it is possible for parties to gain seats without a quota of votes).⁶ With open lists, however, many votes may be wasted in that they do not influence how a party's seats are allocated (although they may contribute to the party's overall electoral success).

Effect on Parties: A closed list will give the party the most control over the process, though it does have a number of negative consequences for party management. Because the order of the list becomes all-important under a closed list system, this tends to increase the pressure on the party selection process. It will also increase the public perception that political parties are remote and out of touch. A closed list system leaves no safety valve for public discontent with certain candidates other than to vote against the party as a whole. This can lead to the party losing votes, which it would otherwise have kept if there were an element of voter choice built into the electoral system.

Systems with ordered party lists which allow voters to use a party tick box do not overcome the dangers of intra-party competition, but they ensure that in the majority of cases the parties' decisions on the ranking of their candidates will not be overturned by the choices of voters.

Any open list system can raise concern that candidates of the same party will be in competition for votes with each other. While that may be a concern for parties, it is not one for voters: it extends voter choice by loosening the grip of party managers. Moreover, campaigning between candidates of the same party can be minimised by the use of common election agents, campaign literature, etc.

4. Additional Member System (AMS)

4.1 In this section we will look at the standard version of AMS and some of its

possible variants. AMS is sometimes called Mixed Member Proportional or MMP, but they are the same system. As AMS is a mixed or hybrid system it combines the effects of majoritarian or plurality systems with those of a list system.

Characteristics of an AMS system which affect voter choice are:

- Whether the system is 'dual-vote' (with separate votes in the constituency and list sections) or 'single-vote' (with the constituency vote also being considered a party vote);
- Whether the constituency section election uses FPTP or AV (or SV);
- Whether the list section is an open or closed list.

4.2 Some versions of AMS

a1) Dual-vote AMS with Closed Lists (e.g. Germany and New Zealand)

The voter has two votes and therefore two choices to make. The first vote is to elect a single constituency representative by FPTP and the other is cast for a party by a closed list system. The constituency section suffers from all the voter-choice limitations of FPTP and voters will often need to vote tactically to make their choices effective⁷.

The party vote, being a closed-list vote, offers little voter choice (in both New Zealand and Germany this vote is the most important because it determines the number of seats a party will win). New Zealand and Germany also use a 5% threshold for a party to gain seats from the list: this will contribute to the number of 'wasted' votes, but, arguably, not seriously so.⁸

If parties decide to propose lists with the same candidates as are contesting the constituency, then it is likely that some candidates who are rejected by voters in constituency contests will end up as MPs. This could appear to overturn the choices of voters.

a2) Dual-vote AMS with AV and/or open lists

Voter choice in AMS could be improved in two ways. Using AV rather than FPTP to elect constituency candidates, constituency MPs would need the support of at least 50% of the electorate, thus strengthening the power of voter choice. The number of wasted votes could be greatly reduced.

Secondly, an open rather than a closed list system could be used – as is done in Bavaria – thereby increasing voter choice. The extent to which choice is increased would depend of the type of open list used (it would be possible to construct an AMS system with any of the open or flexible list systems described in 3.2 above). An open list which allowed preferential voting would give the greatest voter choice, but it could lead to a very complex system.

b1) Single Vote AMS (used in a number of German states for state elections)

Under this version of AMS voters simply have one vote and this is used for

the single member seats and also for the list members. Voters have no more choice than they would under FPTP.

b2) Best loser AMS

Instead of parties proposing lists, the top-up seats won by a party are given to the party's unsuccessful constituency candidates who did 'best' in the constituency contests. This system was advocated by a Commission on Electoral Reform, established by the Hansard Society in 1976. While the Commission aim - that all candidates should face the electorate, rather than being imposed by parties – was commendable, this system has a number of unfortunate weaknesses. There are practical problems in defining a 'best loser' as the number of votes a candidate receives in a FPTP constituency election will depend many factors, e.g. the number of parties contesting the seat, other than the candidate's merits.

Moreover, the system can produce anomalous results. For example, in a constituency election the candidate placed second might not gain an additional-member seat because her party already has its share of seats, but the candidate placed third might gain a seat because he is one of his party's best losers. While this outcome can be justified in terms of the choices of voters across the whole region, it is not an easy result to present to voters within the constituency. These anomalies were of course exposed when the system was proposed in a Commons amendment in 1977 and the amendment was consequently rejected.⁹

b3) Single-vote AMS with AV

Instead of using an 'X' vote in the constituency vote, voters could mark their preferences 1, 2, 3, ... The first preference would be regarded as the party vote and used to calculate the party's entitlement to overall seats, but, as in AV, votes for constituency candidates would be transferred until one candidate had at least 50% of the constituency vote. This revision would significantly increase voter choice and reduce the number of wasted votes.

4.3 Evaluation of AMS

Dual-vote AMS

In the constituency section of AMS, voters have no more choice than they would have under FPTP (although they may feel less bound by party loyalty if they know their party's position is protected by their party vote). Voters choose constituency candidates rather than just parties with their first votes, but when lists are closed there is not a choice of which additional members will take the seats won by the party.

Voters can, however, vote across party lines. In New Zealand, where this system was used for the first time in 1996, 37% of voters took the opportunity to vote for a constituency candidate from a party different from the one they voted for on the list (in effect splitting their vote).

In terms of voter choice, AMS is much improved by the use of AV in the constituency section and open lists for the additional members. Choice is maximised if both AV and open lists are used.

Unless AV is used, the level of wasted votes in the constituency section will be as in FPTP. Provided that thresholds for the allocation of list seats are not over-restrictive, the lists give opportunities for smaller parties, which would be unlikely to win in constituency contests, to gain representation: in this way voter choice is increased over FPTP as voters can choose these parties with less risk of their votes being wasted.

Single Vote AMS

This version of AMS offers no more choice than FPTP. Votes for unsuccessful candidates (or for those with more than required to secure election) will not necessarily be wasted, however, in that they will determine the overall allocation of seats.

With single-vote AMS, each party in each constituency nominates only one candidate. There is concern that under such a system women and people from minority groups will find it more difficult to become candidates than under dual-vote AMS (in which a diverse group of candidates can be included in a list) or STV.

If AV (or SV) rather than 'X' voting were to be used, then choice would be considerably increased.

Effect on Parties

Under AMS, whether single or dual-vote, parties would need terms with having two types of MP and two routes by which individuals can be elected. Parties would need to devise new procedures for selecting which candidates contest constituency seats and which appear on lists, but these are issues with which parties will already need to contend in elections for the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly. As noted in 3.3 above, open lists give voters more choice at the expense of control through internal party procedures.

5. Single Transferable Vote

5.1 Versions of STV

In all versions of STV, electors vote preferentially with no restrictions on the order in which they can put the candidates. They can vote according to any criteria they choose, including party, single issues (e.g. Europe, environment), individual attributes (e.g. women candidates, ethnic minorities), the candidate's local origins or personal qualities. There is the opportunity for voters to reject an individual candidate (e.g. as in Tatton in the last election) without being forced to reject their party as well.

There are, however, different forms of STV ballot papers. While the different forms do not restrict voter choice, they each give parties different degrees of influence over the choices of voters.

a) 'Classic STV' (e.g. N Ireland for European and local elections, Republic of Ireland)

Here the ballot paper is a single column, ordered alphabetically or in random order, by candidate name. This form of STV leaves voters to make their choices without the parties being able to influence (at least through the ballot paper) the way in which voters list their preferences.

b) STV with open party lists (e.g. Tasmania and Malta)

The ballot paper is organised into a series of columns, one for each party. Candidates are listed alphabetically within their party list¹⁰. Non-party candidates may choose to be grouped into one or more lists. Electors vote preferentially, with no restrictions on the order they can put the candidates (see Fig 2a & 2b). However, the organisation of the ballot paper encourages voters to vote by party, rather than by other criteria.

c) STV with ordered party lists

As a variant of the above system, candidates may be listed in the order chosen by their party. Non-party candidates may again choose to be grouped into one or more lists. While electors vote preferentially, with no restrictions on the order in which they can put the candidates, many voters will vote 1, 2, 3 ... down the list of their chosen party. Here the organisation of the ballot paper encourages not just voting by party, but in accordance with the ranking of candidates by the parties (as this is the easiest thing for voters to do).

d) STV with party tick box (e.g. Australian Senate)

The Australian Senate elections use a variant of STV with ordered party lists in which the ballot paper also has a tick box at the top of each list. A voter's tick for a party counts as if the ballot paper were marked 1, 2, 3, etc down the ordered list of the party. Here the tick box encourages voters to effectively ask parties to make the choices on their behalf. Moreover, the greater the number of voters who use the tick boxes, the parties will gain greater influence over the election at the expense of more independently-minded

voters. (In Australian Senate elections, voters who do not use a party tick box must rank all candidates of all parties for their votes to be considered valid: this requirement gives a strong incentive to voters to use a tick box.¹¹) Thus while the addition of a tick box option might appear to increase voter choice, it actually has the effect of weakening voter control.

5.2 STV EvaluatedEvaluated

Voters are to vote for candidates rather than just their favourite party and voters can vote across party lines if they so wish. Voters are able to choose between candidates of their own party and can rank individuals in the order of their preference. All the above variants of STV allow voters a wide degree of choice. The distinction between the variants is the degree to which the wishes of a party are made clear to the voters. The version used in Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic gives voters to at least steer where as Senate STV gives the largest say to political parties.

The number of wasted votes in STV is very small as votes for candidates who are eliminated and for candidates who have more votes than they need to secure election are transferred to voters' subsequent preferences.

STV maximises the choice open to voters and decreases the influence of party managers on who is elected. As with open lists systems (including open lists within AMS), this can give party managers concern that candidates of the same party will be in competition with each other. However, if there were to be conflict between the wishes of party managers and voters, we would argue that the wishes of voters should be paramount.

Problems of party management can, however, be largely overcome by having just one agent per party in each constituency, responsible for the production of all election materials.

Moreover, STV lessens the internal party strains on candidate selection: a candidate less favoured by party managers can still be elected if he or she has a significant following within the electorate. STV is effectively a primary election, in which all voters for a particular party can determine the order in which party candidates are awarded seats, with a general election which determines how many seats a party will win.

STV ballot papers in which candidates of the same party are grouped together help to preserve party identities and guide voters for whom party is the primary selection criterion. If party lists are ordered, then many voters will number their preferences down their party's list, thereby giving some influence to party managers while still leaving the final choice to the electorate.

The Australian Senate system, which allows voters to tick a party box rather than ranking preferences, gives greatest control to party managers, but to the extent that the choices of independently-minded voters are undermined.

6. Conclusion

The analysis of the voting systems described above is summarised in the table on page 13.

From this analysis we can see that AV and SV give more voter choice than FPTP. They allow voters to vote for candidates rather than just parties but choice is limited by only one candidate being offered for each party.

Closed list systems offer little choice, but list systems can be improved by making lists open. List systems which allow voters to tick a box for a party rather than voting for particular candidates do not in theory restrict voter choice but they are like to produce the results wanted by the parties voter choice within party lists is therefore largely illusory. The use of preference voting within party lists maximises the choice offered by list systems.

AMS can take many forms. Dual-vote AMS offers more voter choice than single-vote systems in that voters can support different parties in the constituency and list sections. Voter choice can be greatly increased by using AV in the constituency section and open lists.

STV gives voters more choice than any of the other systems considered. STV ballot papers which show ordered lists of candidates offer parties the opportunity to indicate to voters how they wish votes to be cast, but voters still free to rank candidates, within parties and across parties, in whatever way they want.

	Vote for candidates and not just parties	Choice candidates within parties	Voting across party lines	Ranking of preferences	Proportion of wasted votes	Need for tactical voting
SV	YES	NO	NO	PART	HIGH	PART
AV	YES	NO	NO	YES	MODERATE	NO
Closed lists	NO	NO	NO	NO	LOW	NO
Belgium system	YES, but ineffective	YES, but ineffective	NO	NO	LOW	NO
Open lists	NO	YES	NO	NO	LOW	NO
Single vote AMS	YES in constituencies NO in lists	NO	NO	NO	HIGH in constituency section	HIGH in constituency section
Single vote AMS with AV	YES in constituencies NO in lists	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Dual vote AMS	YES in constituencies NO in lists	NO	YES	NO	HIGH in constituency section	HIGH in constituency section
Dual vote AMS with AV	YES in constituencies NO in lists	NO	YES in constituencies NO in lists	YES in constituencies NO in lists	LOW	LOW
AMS with AV and open lists	YES in constituencies NO in lists	NO in constituencies; YES in lists	YES in constituencies NO in lists	YES in constituencies NO in lists	LOW	LOW
Standard STV	YES	YES	YES	YES	VERY LOW	NO
STV with ordered party lists	YES	YES	YES	YES	VERY LOW	NO
STV with lists and tick box	YES	YES, but limited by party votes	YES	YES	VERY LOW	NO

- 1 In Australia where AV is used parties do not traditionally put up more than one candidate. Though there are a very limited number of examples where a party, which held a particular constituency, could not agree on a particular candidate and therefore put up two candidates and allowed their voters to choose between them.
- 2 We have not included those list systems which use multiple X's. However, should the Commission decide to give these systems serious consideration, we would be pleased to provide a supplementary note.
- 3 For a more detailed analysis, see *Elections under Regional Lists*, The Constitution Unit, School of Public Policy, London, 1998.
4. See Enid Lakeman, *Twelve Democracies*, Arthur McDougall Trust, 1991.
- 5 According to a report by the Constitution Unit (op. cit.), in Belgium and the Netherlands in the 1979 and 1984 elections to the European Parliament only two candidates were elected out of order from the 49 MEPs for both countries at each election.
- 6 The number of wasted votes can increase where thresholds are used. However, a threshold of 5% is only likely to have an effect with national lists.
7. Tactical voting may even increase. Having voted for their preferred parties, unlike a normal FPTP election, voters can vote for a candidate of another party without damaging the preferred party's prospects of forming a government.
- 8 Where there are a large number of small parties, however, the number of wasted list votes can be considerable.
- 9 Vernon Bogdanor, *The People and the Party System*, Cambridge UP, 1981, pp 225 – 228, gives examples of the anomalies which led to the rejection of this system in the Commons in 1977.
- 10 In Tasmania the candidates are listed in random, rather than alphabetical, order.
- 11 In the 1993 Australian Senate elections 94.4% of electors used a party tick box, thus destroying many of the advantages of STV.

Constituency Link and Voting Systems

The Submission of the
Electoral Reform Society
to the
Independent Commission on the Voting System

April 1998

Constituency links and voting systems

This working paper looks at the nature of links between MPs and geographic constituencies. It notes that proportional systems require multi-member constituencies but argues that such constituencies may, subject to the choice of voting system, enhance rather than weaken links.

The paper rejects claims that AMS preserves MP-constituency links, noting the difficulties which AMS can create for both 'constituency' and 'additional' members.

It is concluded that STV in constituencies of 4 – 6 seats (fewer in sparsely populated areas) does most to strengthen links between MPs and their constituents.

1. Introduction

Maintaining a link between MPs and geographic constituencies is one of the four criteria which the Commission has been asked to use in recommending a voting system.

That there should be a link between MPs and geographic constituencies is one of the few features of the British electoral system which almost universally accepted. Indeed, for many electoral reformers, 'maintaining the link' has become a key issue and within the Labour Party a new group has been established with that aim. However, for an issue which is so central to our parliamentary system, it is surprising that so little academic work has been done on the nature of the link.

Many politicians proclaim the need for a direct link with 'their' constituents in an almost proprietorial way. That they have won an election (even if on a minority of votes) in a constituency certainly gives MPs a legitimacy beyond that of a party agent, but politicians' assertions that they speak on behalf of their constituents with rarely be more than part truths.

Constituents' views of the link may be very different. Surveys show that many voters:

- do not know who their MP is;
- do not know which constituency they live in;
- have never had contact with their MP.

Given that, under FPTP, many MPs have been elected with the support of only a minority of the electorate, it is not surprising that MPs' sense of attachment to their electorates is not reciprocated by the voters. While MPs can claim that they give service to constituents irrespective of their political views, many constituents may be reluctant to use the services of an MP

whose views they oppose and such constituents will certainly not feel any sense of 'link'. In discussing constituency links it is therefore necessary to try to separate what is perception or myth from the real features of our democratic system.

In this paper we consider the nature of MPs' links with geographic constituencies and examine how they might be enhanced, or otherwise, through a change in the voting system.

A major issue is whether constituencies will be represented by one or by several MPs. All proportional systems require multi-member constituencies¹ (with AMS a proportion of MPs is elected in single-member constituency contests within multi-member regions, although the 'single-member' constituencies are represented by list MPs as well as by the winners of the constituency elections).

2. The British experience

It is a common myth that Britain has always used single-member constituencies for elections to the House of Commons. In the period 1867 to 1884 a number of MPs were elected by the Limited Vote in three-member constituencies. It was only in 1885 that single-member constituencies became the norm. However, multi-member constituencies continued to be used in many urban areas and for the university seats (which used STV) until after the Second World War.

Although Britain no longer has multi-member constituencies for Westminster elections, they are common, and widely accepted, in local government. Northern Ireland is also regarded as a three-member constituency for the election of MEPs.

Multi-member constituencies (or 'regions') will also be used under the proposed new voting system for European elections in England, Scotland and Wales. The proposed voting systems for the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh and London Assemblies (AMS) will also use multi-member regions, but with some members elected in single-member constituencies within these regions.

The concept of electors having more than one elected representative is therefore not an entirely new one in Britain.

3. Issues to be considered

3.1 The nature of representation

How we view the MP-constituency link will depend on how we view the role of MPs.

- (1) We can regard MPs as national policy-makers and legislators in which case a strong link with a particular constituency is not of great value – it is

more important that the MP has a good grasp of the nation's affairs and needs.

- (2) Alternatively, we can see the MP as a constituency representative, looking after any special interests of the constituency in public debates (e.g. an MP in a mining constituency will try to represent the interests of that industry and those who work within it). Here a link with a geographic constituency becomes more important, although it might be more appropriate for the link to be to a region larger than existing single-member constituencies (e.g. metropolitan areas, local authority areas, areas covered by the same transport networks and health authorities, etc.).
- (3) We can also see MPs as having a constituency service role, responding to the needs of constituents and acting as a gatekeeper between the individual constituent and the state. Here the constituency link is important. Where constituents have problems which require the intervention of MPs, however, it is also important that they can turn to MPs whom they believe will be sympathetic to their cases. Thus there are advantages in multi-member constituencies in which constituents have a choice of MP.

In Ireland, where the ratio of electors to MP is much less than in Britain and where local government is weaker, this third role of MPs is an important one. Multi-member constituencies increase access to MPs and MPs, mindful of their electoral prospects, are required to give constituency casework a high priority. Multi-member constituencies therefore strengthen the MP-constituency link in Ireland.


In Germany, however, the role of MPs is better described by (1) above. In Germany's AMS system it is therefore not a great problem that AMS produces two categories of MPs nor that list MPs do not have a constituency link. However, in political cultures in which more emphasis is put on the MP-constituency link, AMS poses some problems.

In Britain the role of the MP must cover all three roles described above, although different MPs are likely to assign them different priorities. All MPs may undertake casework for individual constituents, but many would argue that MPs should only be involved in casework as a last resort and when the case raises some wider issue of policy or service provision. We expect that most MPs in Britain would prioritise role (2) and, as noted above, that might be best served by larger constituencies than we have at present.

3.2 Constituency size (number of seats)

The larger the constituency, the more proportional the outcome of an election can be. In a single-member constituency a majority of voters may not be represented (in the sense that they do not feel the MP represents their views), but as the number of seats increases, the proportion of votes necessary to gain a seat decreases as shown in the graph below:

*Percentage vote
to ensure a seat*



Number of seats in constituency

Thus in a single-member constituency, at least 50% of the vote is needed to ensure representation. In a 4-member constituency only 20% is needed and if the constituency is enlarged to 10 seats, then a party with a little over 9% of the vote will win a seat.

While some MPs may feel their link with their constituency would be weakened if they lost their monopoly of representation within their constituency through a change to multi-seat constituencies. However, constituents might take a different view: given a greater choice of MP, people might have access to MPs with whom they felt a stronger link.

However, while increasing constituency sizes (in terms of seats) offers a number of advantages, larger constituencies increase the difficulties of MPs in maintaining an overview of issues within their constituencies. Moreover, with larger constituencies, voters may feel that MPs are too remote and not sufficiently linked to particular local areas or issues within the constituency. Thus there is a balance to be struck.

3.3 Constituency boundaries

With single-member constituencies the Boundary Commission must endeavour to create constituencies in which the electorates are roughly the same. The size of a single-member constituency, however, will rarely correspond with the size of what we might term a 'natural constituency' (i.e. an area which may have a sense of regional identity, which can be defined by common characteristics and which has common issues).

Here multi-member constituencies offer advantages, particularly if the system used allows flexibility in the number of seats. At present cities are divided into a number of single-member constituencies but many voters do not know in which of a city's constituencies they live – the boundaries are often drawn for reasons of electoral arithmetic rather than to divide areas of different characteristics. Many of the issues within a constituency are issues of the city as a whole: even where city constituencies differ in the relative prosperity of their constituents, people travel across constituency boundaries for work or leisure activities and they benefit from services which are city-wide – voters in all constituencies thus have a common interest in the affairs of the city. Boundaries which unnecessarily divide cities can be removed by making the

city a multi-member constituency with a group of MPs working together to advance the city's interests.

Similar arguments can be made outside the main metropolitan areas. Many counties are made up of small towns and villages with shared characteristics and which rely on the same regional services. Rather than having boundaries drawn purely for electoral convenience, more natural constituencies can be established in which a group of MPs can tackle problems at what is likely to be a more appropriate level.

However, if the geographic size of constituencies becomes too large, links between MPs and their constituents may be weakened by problems of access and communication. Thus while constituencies of 4 – 6 seats in cities would offer benefits, a 4-member constituency in the north of Scotland would cover a huge area. If one party were to win all or a majority of the constituency seats then it might be able to allocate responsibilities for the representation of all areas, but there would be difficulties in ensuring proper representation throughout the constituency if seats were spread between parties (e.g. a surgery held in a city might be accessible to tens of thousands of constituents, but in a rural area hundreds of surgeries would be needed to service the same population).

Thus, while we recommend the use of 4 – 6 member constituencies in most areas, we accept the case for smaller constituencies in areas of sparse population in order to maintain sufficiently strong MP-constituency links.

3.4 Constituency size and party management

As noted in other working papers, some party managers and politicians do not like multi-member constituency systems in which candidates from the same party might be tempted to compete against each other in public. Hence their opposition to open lists (either as a system or as part of AMS) and STV.

Elsewhere we have argued in favour of systems which allow voters to choose between the candidates offered by parties and, moreover, the extension of voter choice is another of the Commission's terms of reference.

With regard to constituency links, an MP who has been freely elected by voters rather than imposed by parties are likely to enjoy stronger links with the electorate. Indeed, the power of the electorate to replace MPs considered unsatisfactory ensures that MPs maintain strong links with their constituents.

Nevertheless, we recognise that parties need to be able to project messages during election campaigns and their wish to avoid internal competition while competing with other parties is understandable. However, the risk of internal competition can be largely overcome by having a single agent responsible for the production of materials and election plans in each constituency. Moreover, candidates will know that their own chances of election will be damaged by any signs that their party teams are not working in harmony.

4. Voting systems and constituency links

Here we consider how the main types of voting system will affect the MP-constituency link.

4.1 The Alternative Vote (AV)

AV is not a proportional system and does not therefore meet the Commission's terms of reference. It is briefly considered here as it can be used as a component of AMS.

AV is a single-member constituency system and from the perspective of MPs is unlikely to be much different from FPTP with regard to constituency links. Because MPs must gain the support of at least 50% of the electorate, however, it is possible that more voters will feel they have an MP they are happy to use and this may strengthen the link (but only marginally so).

4.2 List systems

Closed list systems, whether on their own or as part of AMS, weaken MP-constituency links. Voters vote for parties and not for candidates and therefore the MPs become more beholden to party committees than the voters. The direct link of accountability between the electorate and the elected representatives is broken.

In a completely open list system (in which voters determine not just how many seats a party wins, but which of the party's candidates fill the seats), however, strong constituency links could be maintained. As discussed in section 3 above, that list systems use multi-member constituencies (or 'regions') need not weaken links provided that the region is of a sensible size in terms of the number of seats and its geography.

4.3 Additional Member System (AMS)

AMS requires close examination as it is often presented as a proportional system which maintains constituency links.

Under AMS at least half of the MPs are elected using FPTP in single-member constituencies within a larger multi-member region. It is possible that these 'constituency' MPs might enjoy links which are no better and no worse than MPs under our present voting system. However, their situation is different from those elected under FPTP in that they are not the only representatives of their constituencies - 'additional members' may also involve themselves in constituency matters and constituents may prefer to approach 'additional members' who may be perceived to give a better quality of service. (Although AMS can be improved by the use of AV in the constituency contests, that does not overcome the problems of having two categories of members.)

The additional members, who may be as many as half the total number of MPs, are in most forms of AMS elected from closed party lists.² As noted in

4.2 above, closed lists are likely to substantially weaken the MP-constituency link. For MPs elected from closed lists within AMS, however, the position could be even worse: in a list system all MPs³ are in the same boat, but with AMS electors are likely to develop stronger links with their constituency MPs thereby further reducing the strength of the links which 'additional members' have with the electorate.

How the position of constituency members will be affected by additional members and how additional members will link with the electorate will depend on the roles which the two categories of MP develop. While many take encouragement from the apparent success of the German system,⁴ it should be remembered that in Germany MPs do not involve themselves in constituency casework in the British sense and MP-constituency links are not seen with the same importance. In New Zealand, however, additional member MPs have involved themselves in constituency casework and conflicts have resulted⁵ (in some cases, it is alleged, additional member MPs have used their freedom to target their efforts on constituencies which they hope to fight in future elections). Given the political culture in Britain, if AMS were introduced it is much more likely that the British experience would be similar to that of New Zealand than that of Germany.

Thus although up to half of the MPs under AMS are elected in FPTP contests, it is seriously misleading to suggest that AMS preserves MP-constituency links.

4.4 Single Transferable Vote

Where it is used, STV has produced strong MP-constituency links. Unlike closed lists and AMS with closed lists, all MPs are elected on votes they receive as individuals and they therefore have a strong link of accountability to the electorate. (In Ireland the politicians' complaint is not that STV weakens MP-constituency links but that it over-strengthens it!⁶)

STV uses multi-member constituencies. As argued above, MP-constituency links in constituencies of 4 – 6 seats (perhaps fewer in sparsely populated areas) can be as strong, and even stronger, than under the current voting system. Because STV offers flexibility in constituency size, constituency boundaries can be drawn taking account of natural regions and the density of the population, thereby allowing MPs to represent communities at an appropriate level.

With STV, few votes are wasted in that they do not contribute to the election of an MP. Thus a very large majority of voters will have at least one MP whom they have supported and with whom they will therefore feel a link.

5. Summary and Conclusions

The MP-constituency link is an important feature of Britain's parliamentary system. It should be preserved. It must be viewed, however, in terms of the needs of the electorate and not just from the perspective of MPs who may be concerned at losing their monopoly of representation within a constituency.

The Commission has been asked to recommend a system which is broadly proportional and proportional systems require the use of multi-member constituencies. The impact of multi-member constituencies on MP-constituency links is therefore a key issue.

The link, and how it might be affected by changes in the voting system, must be understood in terms of the roles which MPs play – as national legislators and policy makers, as advocates for concerns and as gatekeepers between individual constituents and the state. The effectiveness of MPs in some of these roles might be increased, rather than diminished, by the use of multi-member constituencies.

The larger the constituency size (in terms of seats) used by a voting system, the more proportional the outcome will be. Too large a constituency will make identification between MPs and the constituency more difficult. A balance must therefore be struck. It is recommended that constituencies should have between 4 and 6 seats, except in sparsely populated areas where constituencies might have fewer seats.

Multi-member constituencies allow boundaries to be drawn to create constituencies which are more natural in the sense of having common characteristics and concerns. They may also allow MPs to act at a more appropriate level representing, for example, the same areas as covered by metropolitan or county authorities.

Arguments that some voting systems may damage parties by encouraging intra-party competition in multi-member constituencies have been overstated. The wishes of voters and extent to which their exercise of choice strengthens constituency links should take precedence over the concerns of those anxious to maintain internal party discipline.

AV does very little to enhance MP-constituency links. Closed list systems in which voters vote for parties rather than candidates weaken the links.

It is seriously misleading to suggest that AMS preserves MP-constituency links. Up to half of the MPs will be 'additional members' with no constituency links. 'Constituency' MPs are not in the same position as current MPs in that they are no longer the sole representatives within their constituencies. That AMS is relatively successful in Germany may be more a consequence of the role of MPs in Germany than the merits of the voting system.

STV maintains a strong link between all MPs and the electorate. By extending voter choice, the accountability of MPs to the voters is increased and through the flexibility which STV allows in constituency size, boundaries can be drawn to form more natural constituencies.

Links between MPs and geographic constituencies are therefore best strengthened by the use of STV.

Footnotes

¹ Here we do not consider the Weighted Parliamentary Vote which produces proportionality in parties' voting power if not in the number of MPs. We do not consider that this system merits serious consideration, but we would be prepared to comment on it should the Commission wish us to do so.

² Open lists could be used in AMS and indeed they are used in Bavaria. Open lists would certainly improve AMS in terms of the accountability, and hence links, of list MPs to the electorate. Open lists do not, however, overcome the problems of having two categories of MPs.

³ Other than independent MPs, but the chances of independent candidates being elected without party support are exceedingly small.

⁴ Which is not without its problems ...

⁵ 'MPs in row over representation', The Christchurch Press, 9th Nov 1996.

⁶ "The day to day contact which PR-STV forces on Irish TDs ensures that their constituents' interests are in their minds when they are legislating and acting on their behalf" (James McBride, 'Positive Aspects of PR-STV for the Irish Political system', in *Representation*, Vol. 23, no. 1, Winter 1996/7)

Working Paper Number Six

The Use of STV in the United Kingdom

The Submission of the
Electoral Reform Society
to the
Independent Commission on the Voting System

April 1998

**ELECTORAL
REFORM
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The Use of STV in the United Kingdom

STV in public elections

The Single Transferable Vote is a system which has been tried and tested in the UK. STV was devised in Britain in the last century as a way in which all significant bodies of opinion could secure representation at Westminster and in which participation in the electoral process could be encouraged.

In 1919 the British Government introduced STV for local elections in Ireland and the following year the use of STV was extended to elections for the devolved parliaments in Ireland. Around the same time Scottish School Boards started using STV for their elections.

While the Republic of Ireland has continued to use STV, the Unionists in Northern Ireland reverted to FPTP. When the UK government took direct responsibility for the government of Northern Ireland in 1972, however, STV was restored and has been used in local and Assembly elections since 1973. STV has also been used for European Parliament elections in Northern Ireland since 1979 and, although a list system is to be used in other parts of the UK, the government proposes to continue using STV for European elections in Northern Ireland.

In mainland Britain STV was also used in 4 multi-member university seats until 1950.

STV in other elections

Although STV, except in Northern Ireland, is no longer used in public elections in Britain, it is widely used by other bodies.

On the following page we list the national organisations known to the Electoral Reform Society which use STV (STV is also used by many regional and local organisations, including some Diocesan and Deanery Synods in the Church of England and some school governing bodies for the election of parent governors).

National Organisations known to ERS which use STV:

Companies

Allied Dunbar	National Power
BUPA BLC	National Westminster Bank Group
Burmah Castrol	Pensions Trust
Coopers & Lybrand	Powergen
IBM	Price Waterhouse
Imperial Tobacco	Prudential Assurance
London Electricity	Railtrack
Midland Bank PLC	Sainsbury's
National Freight Consortium	Shell UK
National Grid	

Trade Groups, Trade Unions, and Professional Bodies

Architects Registration Council	Institute of Mechanical Engineers
Association of University Teachers	Institute of Electrical Engineers
Automobile Association	National Association of Teachers in Further & Higher Education
Bar Council	National Citizen Advice Bureaux
British Dental Association	National Council for Voluntary Organisations
British Psychological Society	National Housing Federation
British Medical Association	National Union of Teachers
British Association of Counselling	National Union of Students
British Computer Society	Pensions Management Institute
Chartered Society of Physiotherapists	Professional Association of Teachers
Committee of Vice Chancellors & Principals	Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain
Engineering Council	Royal College of General Practitioners
General Dental Council	Royal College of Midwives
General Medical Council	Royal College of Nursing
Headmasters Conference	Royal College of Pathologists
Institute of the Motor Industry	Royal Town Planning Institute
Institute of Management Services	U.K. Central Council for Nursing, Midwifery, and Health Visiting
Institute of Linguists	
Institute of Civil Engineers	

Others

Amnesty International	Campaign for Homosexual Equality
Board of Deputies of British Jews	Church of England
British Mensa	Consumers Association
British Union of Anti-Vivisectionists	Liberal Democrat Party
Liberty (NCCL)	Plaid Cymru
Test and County Cricket Board	

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Options for Multi-Member Constituencies

A Working Paper of the
Electoral Reform Society
for the
Independent Commission on the Voting System

July 1998

**ELECTORAL
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Summary

1. This paper illustrates different ways in which Britain could be divided into multi-member constituencies.
2. The Electoral Reform Society has argued the case for using STV in constituencies of 4 – 6 seats. Recognising some concern over constituency sizes in a political culture accustomed to single-member constituencies, this paper considers three options for the creation of multi-member constituencies:
 - a) 'A' leading to an average constituency size of 4.4 seats;
 - b) 'B' leading to an average constituency size of 3.6 seats;
 - c) 'C' leading to an average constituency size of 3.0 seats.
3. In each of the examples given, multi-member constituencies have been formed by the amalgamation of existing Westminster constituencies. No new constituency boundaries have therefore been introduced (thereby avoiding a difficulty which would arise with AMS or 'AV plus' if there were not the same number of constituency and 'top-up' MPs).
4. It is concluded that the use of STV in such constituencies would produce broadly proportional results.
5. Although using constituencies of 3 – 4 seats rather than 5 – 6 seats might result in a very slight decrease in proportionality:
 - a) using STV, the reduction does not decrease the choice extended to voters;
 - b) even in 3-seat constituencies, the majority of voters would have an MP of their choice and constituents' links with their MPs may be strengthened by geographic proximity;
 - c) reducing the constituency size would facilitate party management; and
 - d) would facilitate election administration.
6. Most constituencies would be represented by 3 or 4 MPs, all of whom would have been elected on the basis of the votes they receive rather than the votes received by their parties, thus ensuring the accountability of MPs to the electorate. This compares with AMS (and AV plus) in which constituencies would be represented by a larger number of MPs, only one of whom would have been elected directly by the voters.

1. Introduction

This working paper considers how STV might be applied in Britain using constituencies, which are smaller than those normally recommended for STV elections.

Proportional voting systems require the use of multi-member constituencies or regions¹ (even AMS must use multi-member regions to achieve broad proportionality). The more seats there are in the constituency/region, the greater the proportionality which can be achieved.

Concern has been expressed, however, over difficulties which could arise if constituency sizes become too large – both geographically and in terms of seats.

In the Society's submission to the Commission, the Society recommended the use of STV in constituencies of 4 – 6 seats, except in areas of very sparse population.

Here we look at how STV might be applied:

- A: using **constituencies of 5 seats or less**, other than where there are exceptional reasons for 6-seat constituencies.
- B. using **constituencies of 4 seats where possible** and not using constituencies of more than 4 seats unless there are exceptional reasons;
- C. using **constituencies of less than 4 seats where possible** and not using constituencies of 4 or more seats unless there are exceptional reasons.

Using criterion A, the distribution of seat sizes would be roughly the same as in Ireland. We have not considered using constituencies of 2 seats other than where necessary as the cost to proportionality would be too high².

2. Constituency boundaries and constituency size

The models we have prepared use multi-member constituencies which are combinations of existing Westminster constituencies. This would allow implementation without a great deal of work by the Boundary Commission.³

In addition to the criteria of constituency size in models A, B and C, we have proposed multi-member constituencies which:

- a) do not cross county boundaries
- b) are entirely within or outside metropolitan areas;
- c) can be defined, wherever possible, as natural regions of common characteristics.

¹ Other than 'weighted vote' systems which, we assume, the Jenkins Commission would not wish to consider.

² note that a 2-seat STV constituency would be of the same geographical size as an AMS or AV-plus 'constituency' in a multi-member region if a 50% 'top up' were used.

³ A great deal of redrawing of constituency boundaries would be needed if AMS or AV-plus were introduced with other than a 50% top up of additional members.

In **appendix 2** we give 3 lists of possible constituencies based on criteria A, B and C (as defined above). Constituency sizes are summarised in the following tables:

	Number constituencies by number of seats:							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	Total	Average
A	3	3	13	60	61	11	659	4.36
B	3	8	61	103	9	0	659	3.58
C	3	27	155	33	1	0	659	3.01

	%age of constituencies by number of seats:						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	
A	2.0%	2.0%	7.9%	41.1%	39.7%	7.3%	
B	1.6%	4.3%	33.2%	56.0%	4.9%	0.0%	
C	1.4%	12.3%	70.8%	15.1%	0.5%	0.0%	

The above figures may give undue prominence to small constituencies. Below we therefore show the percentages of MPs who would be in constituencies of different sizes (this can also be regarded as the percentages of voters in constituencies of different sizes).

	%age of MPs in constituencies of sizes:						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	
A	0.5	0.9	5.5	37.6	45.5	10.0	
B	0.5	2.4	27.8	62.5	6.8	0.0	
C	0.5	8.2	70.6	20.0	0.8	0.0	

We have prepared these lists of multi-member constituencies for illustrative purposes only. In some cases we recognise that local considerations might lead to other groupings of existing Westminster constituencies. In particular, we would recommend that one- or two-seat constituencies should be avoided unless there are no suitable alternatives.⁴

3. Estimates of Proportionality

3.1 General effect of small constituencies

It has in the past been recommended that STV be used in constituencies which are between 4 and 6 seats in size. This has been regarded as a satisfactory compromise between the requirements of proportionality and the desire to avoid constituencies, which are too large geographically or in terms of population. This paper has been prepared recognising that some may put a greater emphasis on

⁴ For example, although we have shown the Isle of Wight as a single-member constituency because we understand there are strong views of the special characteristics of the island, the Boundary Commission would need to consider whether these characteristics are sufficiently different from adjacent mainland constituencies to justify single-member status. Similarly, there may be cases where it may be better to allow multi-member constituencies to cross local authority boundaries rather than have 2-seat constituencies. E.g., in option C, N and S Harrow is shown as a separate constituency from the 3-seat Brent constituency, but given that the area has the same health authority and TEC, a single 5-member seat may be preferable.

the perceived problems of constituency size than on the need for proportionality and the representation of minority opinions.

The effect of constituency size on the threshold for representation within the constituency is shown below:

Constituency size	%age of vote required to <u>guarantee</u> representation
6	14%
5	17%
4	20%
3	25%
2	33%
1	50%

Depending on the distribution of votes, however, it would be quite possible for parties to gain representation with less than the above percentages.

3.2 Sampled counties and regions

To get a rough measure of the level of proportionality which could be achieved if STV were to be used in the proposed constituencies, we have looked at a sample of constituencies and considered what might have happened if people were to have voted as they did in May 1997.

The areas which we have sampled are:

- A. Cornwall
- B. Grampian
- C. Kent
- D. Merseyside
- E. Northamptonshire
- F. Northern Ireland
- G. South Glamorgan

Notes on how these counties might be divided into multi-member constituencies using criteria A, B and C, and how the outcome of the May 1997 might have been affected, are given in **appendix 3**.

3.3 Note on projected outcomes

Our projected outcomes, however, are provided for illustration only and need to be treated with great care.

- It is dangerous to measure proportionality against votes cast for parties in elections conducted under first-past-the-post, and particularly against votes in the 1997 general election, because of distortions created by tactical voting (we regard the use of 1997 figures in making projections as a major weakness of work done by Dunleavy et al⁵).
- We do not know how voters would vote under the preference voting system. For this illustration we have assumed that voters first preferences would reflect votes cast in the 1997 election, but for the above reasons this can only be a crude estimate.

⁵ *Making Votes Count*, Dunleavy, Margetts, O'Duffy and Weir, Democratic Audit, 1997.

- We do not know how voters would use second and subsequent preferences and we have therefore ignored the possible effect of transfers of votes.

To give a rough picture, we have therefore allocated seats in the multi-member constituencies using the Droop quota and highest remainder method.⁶ We have not attempted to estimate what the effects of transferable voting might have been.

3.4 Comparison of proportionality for different options

In looking at the sampled counties, it is clear that any move to multi-member constituencies leads to a more proportional outcome. In order to quantify and summarise the improvement we have given a measure of 'comparative disproportionality'. This index puts disproportionality on a scale between the FPTP result (100) and the best achievable proportionality (0) (See **appendix 1** for details.)

The overall results for the sample areas are as follows:

Area	Comparative proportionality				
	FPTP	A	B	C	Best achievable
Cornwall	100	0	0	0	0
Grampian	100	9	9	9	0
Kent	100	31	0	31	0
Merseyside	100	25	25	50	0
Northamptonshire	100	0	30	30	0
Northern Ireland	100	0	39	10	0
South Glamorgan	100	0	38	38	0
TOTAL*	100	41	41	49	0

- * The calculation of the 'total' figure in the above table excludes Northern Ireland (because of the different parties contesting the elections there).

These figures show that while there is a loss in proportionality as we decrease the size of multi-member constituencies, even when the average constituency size is only 3 seats we can expect a very significant improvement on proportionality over FPTP.

We again stress that these figures are indicative only. They have been calculated using 1997 election results; they do not make any assumptions about how people might vote if freed from the need to consider tactical voting; and they do not consider how transferable votes might affect the outcomes.

⁶ The Droop Quota is $M/(N+1)$ where M is the number of votes and N the number of seats. For every full quota of votes a party receives, it is allocated a seat, and the remaining seat is allocated to the highest remainder (after subtraction of quotas).

4. Other advantages of smaller multi-member constituencies

4.1 Retention of voter choice

Although reducing the size of multi-member constituencies would sacrifice a small degree of proportionality, the extension in voter choice which STV provides would not be lost. Voters would still be able to list their preferences on the ballot paper, confident that through transferability their votes would not be wasted.

4.2 Strengthening of the constituents' links with MPs

A large majority of electors would have a constituency MP of their choice.

First preference votes alone would ensure that the majority of voters get an MP of their preferred party. For example, in a 3-seat constituency any group with 25% of first preference votes would be assured representation. However, depending on the distribution of votes between parties, representation can be gained with much smaller percentages of first preferences (as can be seen from the illustrations in appendix 3).

Even where first preferences do not give a voter an MP of his or her choice, in the great majority of cases a voter's second or third preferences will then contribute to the election of an MP.

4.3 Advantages for party management

From experience from other countries, we would expect parties to nominate one more candidate than the number of seats they could reasonably expect to win. For example, if in a 4-seat constituency a party expected to win 2 seats they might nominate 3 candidates in hope that an exceptionally good result might gain them an additional seat. To propose 4 candidates might lead to a dilution in the campaign for each of the candidates individually.

In many constituencies parties would therefore field between 1 and 3 candidates, thereby making campaign co-ordination and planning much easier than would be the case with larger constituencies (or AMS with open lists). Should parties wish to rank their candidates then a smaller number of candidates should make this easier (the recent Assembly elections in Northern Ireland demonstrated how parties can influence the order in which their candidates are elected, even when the ballot paper gives a single alphabetic list of candidates).

4.4 Advantages for election administration

Decreasing the number of members to be elected in a multi-member constituency should greatly simplify the count, both because of the reduction in the number of votes at each count and because of the number of stages of STV counting likely to be required to produce a result.

Moreover, reducing the size of multi-member constituencies does not change the fact that with STV all representatives are elected on the same basis as constituency representatives – there is no need for different categories of representatives and types of representation.

5. The accountability of MPs to the electorate

The point that reducing the size of multi-member constituencies from 5/6 to 3/4 may increase constituents' geographic proximity to their MPs and hence their access to MPs has already been made.

More importantly, however, reducing the size of multi-member constituencies does not change the fact that with STV all MPs would be elected in the same way, i.e. on the basis of the votes they receive. None would be elected through party votes alone and therefore all MPs would be directly accountable to the electorate rather than some feeling more accountable to their parties. There would be no need for different categories of representatives and types of representation as arises with AMS (or variants such as AV plus).

Moreover, although we are considering multi-member constituencies, the number of members with responsibility for a constituency would be less than is the case with AMS: The constituencies proposed in this paper would typically have 3 or 4 members while with AMS voters would have one MP⁷ (elected on individual votes) and at least 4 (but probably more) top-up MPs from party lists.

We therefore conclude that STV, particularly in constituencies typically of 3 or 4 seats, would provide a much stronger link between MPs and constituencies than would be achieved with AMS or its variants.

⁷ Or around 2 MPs if we are to make an adjustment for constituency size.

Appendix 1

Measurement of comparative disproportionality

Indices of disproportionality are generally calculated over the whole country. As we have only been able to look at votes cast over a sample of counties/regions, the index of disproportionality calculated over the sample can be expected to be much higher. For example, some have suggested that systems giving an index of disproportionality of greater than 8 cannot be considered to be proportional systems, but if the index is calculated over, say, the 17 seats of Kent in which the major parties received 41%, 37% and 17% of the vote, no system could allocate seats to give an index of disproportionality lower than 23. Rather than using a conventional index of disproportionality, we have therefore, for each county examined, considered '*comparative disproportionality*', measured as:

$$\frac{(\text{Index for proposals}) - (\text{index for best achievable outcome})}{(\text{Index for FPTP}) - (\text{index for best achievable outcome})} \times 100$$

Example:

In Merseyside the seats and shares of the votes gained by the parties in the 1997 general election were as shown in rows A, B and C below.

		Cons	Labour	Lib Dem	Other	Total
A	Number of seats	0	15	1	0	16
B	%age of seats	0	93.75	6.25	0	
C	%age of votes	20	62	14	4	
D	Difference B-C	20	31.75	7.75	4	63.5

Row D gives the differences between the percentages of seats and votes showing a total difference of 64. The normal index of disproportionality is half of this total – 32. As we are comparing disproportionality, however, we can use the total figure – 64 – as the index.

If we now look at the possible outcome of Option A (see appendix 3, pages 10 and 11), we have a different distribution of seats leading to the following calculation:

		Cons	Labour	Lib Dem	Other	Total
A	Number of seats	3	12	1	0	16
B	%age of seats	18.75	75	6.25	0	
C	%age of votes	20	62	14	4	
D	Difference B-C	1.25	13	7.75	4	26

However, with this distribution of votes in a 16 member region, perfect proportionality could never be achieved. The most proportional outcome would be as follows:

		Cons	Labour	Lib Dem	Other	Total
A	Number of seats	3	11	2	0	16
B	%age of seats	18.75	68.75	12.5	0	
C	%age of votes	20	62	14	4	
D	Difference B-C	3.25	6.75	1.5	4	13.5

Our measurement of comparative disproportionality is therefore:

$$\{(26 - 13.5) / (63.5 - 13.5)\} \times 100 = 25.$$

Appendix 2

Possible multi-member constituencies for Britain

The following tables show possible multi-member constituencies using criteria A, B and C:

- A: using **constituencies of 5 seats or less**, other than where there are exceptional reasons for 6-seat constituencies.
- B: using **constituencies of 4 seats where possible** and not using constituencies of more than 4 seats unless there are exceptional reasons;
- C: using **constituencies of less than 4 seats where possible** and not using constituencies of 4 or more seats unless there are exceptional reasons.

The multi-member constituencies have been selected so as not to cross county/regional boundaries. The following table has been used as a guideline in dividing counties and areas of different sizes:

No. seats in county/region	Criterion A:	Criterion B:	Criterion C
5	5	5	3, 2
6	6	3, 3	3, 3
7	3, 4	4, 3	4, 3
8	4, 4	4, 4	3, 3, 2 or 4, 4
9	4, 5	4, 5 or 3, 3, 3	3, 3, 3
10	5, 5	4, 3, 3	4, 3, 3
11	4, 4, 3	4, 4, 3	4, 4, 3 or 3, 3, 3, 2
12	4, 4, 4	4, 4, 4	3, 3, 3, 3
13	5, 4, 4	4, 3, 3, 3	4, 3, 3, 3
14	5, 5, 4	4, 4, 3, 3	4, 4, 3, 3 or 3, 3, 3, 3, 2
15	5, 5, 5	4, 4, 4, 3	3, 3, 3, 3, 3
16	4, 4, 4, 4	4, 4, 4, 4	4, 3, 3, 3, 3
17	5, 4, 4, 4	4, 4, 3, 3, 3	4, 4, 3, 3, 3 or 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2
18	5, 5, 4, 4	4, 4, 4, 3, 3	3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3

These patterns of constituency sizes have, however, been used only as guidelines and different divisions have been used where geography or sparsity of population have suggested alternatives.

The following tables are for illustration only. We have not been able to examine all local factors which might dictate different boundaries.

Proposed constituencies using criterion A (average size 4.36 seats)								
REGION	County	Seats	Constituency 1	Constituency 2	Constituency 3	Constituency 4	Constituency 5	Constituency 6
SW	Avon_1	5	Bath	Bristol E	Kingswood	Northavon	Wansdyke	
SW	Avon_2	5	Bristol NW	Bristol W	Bristol S	Weston-S-Mare	Woodspring	
SW	Cornwall	5	Cornwall N	Cornwal Se	Falmouth & Cranb	St Ives	Truro & St Austell	
SW	Devon_1	5	Devon W & T	Devon N	Devon SW	Ply Devonport	Ply Sutton	
SW	Devon_2	6	Tiverton & H	Exeter	Devon E	Teignbridge	Torbay	Totnes
SW	Dorset_1	4	W Dorset	S Dorset	Mid Dorset	N Dorset		
SW	Dorset_2	4	Poole	Christchurch	E Bournemouth	W Bournemouth		
SW	Gloucs	6	Cheltenham	Cotswold	Forest Of Dean	Gloucester	Stroud	Tewksbury
SW	Somerset	5	Bridgewater	Somerton & Frome	Taunton	Wells	Yeovil	
SW	Wilts	6	Devizes	Slisbury	N Swindon	S Swindon	Westbury	
SE	Beds	6	Bedford	Mid Bedfordshie	NE Bedfordshire	SW Bedfordshire	N Luton	S Luton
SE	Berks_1	4	Bracknell	Maidenhead	Slough	Windsor		
SE	Berks_2	4	Newbury	E Reading	W Reading	Wokingham		
SE	Bucks_1	4	Aylesbury	Buckingham	NE Milton Keynes	SW Milton Keynes		
SE	Bucks_2	3	Beaconsfield	Chesham & Amers	Wycombe			
SE	E Sussex1	4	Eastbourne	Bexhill & Battle	Hastings & Rye	Wealden		
SE	E Sussex2	4	K Brighton	P Brighton	Hove	Lewes		
SE	Essex_1	5	Thurrock	Basildon	Billericay	Rayleigh	Castlepoint	
SE	Essex_2	4	Chelmsford W	W Southend	Rochford & Sleafd	Maldon & Chelms		
SE	Essex_3	4	Harwich	N Essex	Colchester	Braintree		
SE	Essex_4	4	Saffron Waldon	Harlow	Epping Forest	Brentwood		
SE	Gt London1	5	Hayes & H	N Ruislip	Uxbridge	E Harrow	W Harrow	
SE	Gt London2	5	Brentfd & Isleworth	Feltham & Heston	Twickenham	Richmond Park	Kingston & Subiton	
SE	Gt London3	5	Ealing, Acton, Shepherds Bush	N Ealing	Ealing Southall	Hammersmith & Fulham	Kensington & Chelsea	
SE	Gt London4	5	Battersea	Putney	Tooting	Mitcham & Morden	Wimbledon	
SE	Gt London5	5	Cent Croydon	N Croydon	S Croydon	Carshalton Wallington	Sutton & Cheam	
SE	Gt London6	5	Streatham	Vauxhall	Camberwell & Peckham	Dulwich & W Norwood	N Southwark & Bermondsey	

Proposed constituencies using criterion A (average size 4.36 seats)								
REGION	County	Seats	Constituency 1	Constituency 2	Constituency 3	Constituency 4	Constituency 5	Constituency 6
SE	Gt London7	5	Deptford Lewisham	E Lewisham	W Lewisham	Eltham	Greenwich & Woolwich	
SE	Gt London8	5	Chipping Barnet	Finchley & G Green	Hendon	Hampstead Heath	Holborn & St Panc	
SE	Gt London9	5	Hornchurch	Romford	Upminster	Barking	Dagenham	
SE	Gt London10	5	Chingford & Woodford Green	Leyton & Wanstead	Walthamstow	N Ilford	S Ilford	
SE	Gt London11	5	City Of London	N Islington	S Islington	N Hackney	S Hackney & Shoreditch	
SE	Gt London12	5	Edmonton	N Enfield	Enfield Southgate	Hornsey & Wood Green	Tottenham	
SE	Gt London13	6	Beckenham	Bromley Chislehurst	Orpington	Bexleyheath & Crayford	Erith & Thamesmead	Old Bexley & Sidcup
SE	Gt London14	4	N Brent	E Brent	S Brent	Reg Pk & N Kens		
SE	Gt London15	4	Bethnal Green	Poplar & CanTown	E Ham	W Ham		
SE	Hants_1	5	Fareham	Havant	Gosport	N Portsmouth	S Portsmouth	
SE	Hants_2	4	Aldershot	NE Hants	E Hants	Basingstoke		
SE	Hants_3	4	E New Forest	W New Forest	Romsey	NW Hants		
SE	Hants_4	4	Winchester	Eastleigh	I Southampton	T Southampton		
SE	Herts_1	4	Hitchin & Harpend.	St Albans	Hertsmere	Welwyn Hatfield		
SE	Herts_2	4	Broxbourne	Hartford & Stortford	Ne Herts	Stevenage		
SE	Herts_3	3	Watford	Hemel Hempstead	Sw Herts			
SE	Isle Wight	1	Isle Of Wight					
SE	Kent_1	5	Dartford	Sevenoaks	Tonbridge & Malling	Tunbridge Wells	Gravesham	
SE	Kent_2	4	N Thanet	S Thanet	Dover	Folkstone		
SE	Kent_3	4	Canterbury	Ashford	Faversham	Sittingbourne & Shepey		
SE	Kent_4	4	Maidstone	Chatham	Medway	Gillingham		
SE	Oxon	6	Banbury	Henley	E Oxford	W Oxford & Abingdon	Wantage	Witney
SE	Surrey_1	4	Epsom & Ewell	Mole Valley	Reigate	E Surrey		
SE	Surrey_2	4	H Surrey	Runnymede & Weybridge	Spelthorne	Esher & Walton		

Proposed constituencies using criterion A (average size 4.36 seats)								
REGION	County	Seats	Constituency 1	Constituency 2	Constituency 3	Constituency 4	Constituency 5	Constituency 6
SE	Surrey_3	3	Guildford	Sw Surrey	Woking			
SE	W Sussex1	4	Bognor Regis & Littlehampton	Chichester	E Worthing & Shoreham	W Worthing		
SE	W Sussex2	4	Arundel	Crawley	Horsham	M Sussex		
EA	Cambs_1	4	Huntingdon	SE Cambs	S Cambs	Cambridge		
EA	Cambs_2	3	NE Cambs	Nw Cambs	Peterborough			
EA	Norfolk_1	4	NW Norfolk	N Norfolk	Mid Norfolk	Great Yarmouth		
EA	Norfolk_2	4	N Norwich	S Norwich	S Norfolk	Sw Norfolk		
EA	Suffolk_1	4	Bury St Edmonds	S Suffolk	W Suffolk			
EA	Suffolk_2	3	Ipswich	Central Suffolk	Coastal Suffolk	Waveney		
EM	Derbs_1	5	S Derbyshire	W Derbyshire	N Derby	S Derby	High Peak	
EM	Derbs_2	5	Bolsover	Chesterfield	Amber Valley	NE Derbyshire	Erewash	
EM	Leics_1	5	Harborough	E Leicester	S Leicester	W Leicester	Rutland	
EM	Leics_2	5	Blaby	NW Leics	Loughborough	Bosworth	Charnwood	
EM	Lincs_1	4	Gainsborough	Louth & Horncastle	Boston & Skegness	Lincoln		
EM	Lincs_2	3	Sleaford & Hykeham	Grantham & Stamford	S Holland & Deepings			
EM	Northants	6	Corby	Daventry	Kettering	N Northampton	S Northampton	Wellingborough
EM	Notts_1	4	Rushcliffe	Gedling	E Nottingham	S Nottingham		
EM	Notts_2	4	Broxtowe	N Nottingham	Ashfield	Mansfield		
EM	Notts_3	3	Sherwood	Bassetlaw	Newark			
WM	H'ford_1	4	Wyre Forest	Bromsgrove	Redditch	Mid Worcs		
WM	H'ford_2	4	Leominster	Hereford	Worcester	W Worcs		
WM	Shrops	5	Ludlow	Shrewsbury & Atcham	N Shropshire	Telford	Wrekin	
WM	Staffs_1	4	S Staffs	Cannock Chase	Lichfield	Tamworth		
WM	Staffs_2	4	N Stoke	S Stoke	Stoke Central	Staff Moorlands		
WM	Staffs_3	4	Stafford	Stone	Burton	Newcastle U Lyme		
WM	Warwicks	5	Nuneaton	Rugby & Kenilworth	Stratford Upon Avon	Warw & Leamington	N Warwickshire	
WM	W Mid_1	5	NE Wolverhampton	SW Wolverhamp	SE Wolverhampton	N Dudley	S Dudley	
WM	W Mid_2	5	W West Brom	E West Brom	N Wallsall	S Wallsall	Aldridge	

Proposed constituencies using criterion A (average size 4.36 seats)								
REGION	County	Seats	Constituency 1	Constituency 2	Constituency 3	Constituency 4	Constituency 5	Constituency 6
							Brownhills	
WM	W Mid_3	5	B Hodge Hill	B Yardley	B Hall Green	B Sparkbrook	Solihull	
WM	W Mid_4	5	B Northfield	B Selley Oak	B Edgebaston	Halesowen & Rowley R	Stourbridge	
WM	W Mid_5	5	Sutton Coldfield	B Erdington	B Ladywood	B Perry Bar	Warley	
WM	W Mid_6	4	NE Coventry	NE Coventry	S Coventry	Meriden		
N	Cleveland	6	Hartlepool	Middlesborough	Redcar	N Stockton	S Stockton	S Middlesborough
N	Cumbria	6	Barrow & Furness	Carlisle	Copeland	Penrith & Border	Westmoreland & L	Workington
N	Durham_1	4	Easington	City Durham	Sedgefield	Darlington		
N	Durham_2	3	N Durham	NW Durham	Bishop Auckland			
N	Northumberland and	4	Berwick U Tweed	Blyth Valley	Hexham	Wansbuck		
N	Tyne & W1	4	N Newcastle U Tyne	N Tyneside	S Shields	Tynemouth		
N	Tyne & W2	4	Houghton & Was E	N Sunderland	S Sunderland	Gateshead & Wash		
N	Tyne & W3	5	Tyne Bridge	Central Newcastle	E Newc & Wash E	Jarrow	Blaydon	
NW	Cheshire1	4	Ellesmere & Neston	Chester City	Eddisbury	Weavervale		Weavervale
NW	Cheshire2	4	Tatton	Macclesfield	Congleton	Crewe & Nantwich		
NW	Cheshire3	3	N Warrington	S Warrington	Halton			
NW	Gt Man_1	5	W Bolton	NE Bolton	SE Bolton	N Bury	S Bury	
NW	Gt Man_2	4	Rochdale	Heywood & Midd	W Oldham & R	E Oldham		
NW	Gt Man_3	5	Makerfield	Wigan	Leigh	Worsley	Eccles	
NW	Gt Man_4	5	Ashton U Lyme	Stalybridge & H	Hazel Grove	Stockport	Denton & Redditch	
NW	Gt Man_5	5	Salford	M Central	M Gorton	M Withington	M Blackley	
NW	Gt Man_6	4	Stretford & Urnston	Altringham & W Sale	Wythenshawe & E Sale	Cheadle		
NW	Lancs_1	5	Morecome	Lancaster	N Blackpool	S Blackpool	Fylde	
NW	Lancs_2	5	Ribble Valley	Pendle	Burnley	Hyndbury	Rossendale	
NW	Lancs_3	5	Blackburn	Preston	Ribble South	Chorley	W Lancashire	
NW	Mersey1	4	N Knowsley	S Knowsley	S St Helens	N St Helens		
NW	Mersey2	5	L Riverside	L Wavertree	L & W Derby	L Walton	L Garston	

Proposed constituencies using criterion A (average size 4.36 seats)								
REGION	County	Seats	Constituency 1	Constituency 2	Constituency 3	Constituency 4	Constituency 5	Constituency 6
NW	Mersey3	3	Southport	Crosby	Bootle			
NW	Mersey4	4	W Wirral	S Wirral	Birkenhead	Wallasey		
YH	Humbs_1	5	Gt Grimsby	Cleethorpes	Brigg & Goole	Scunthorpe	Haltemprice & Howd	
YH	Humbs_2	5	E Yorkshire	Beverley & Holderness	N Hull	E Hull	W Hull & Hessle	
YH	N Yorks_1	4	Scarborough & Whitby	Richmond	Harrogate & Knaresborough	Skipton		
YH	N Yorks_2	4	Vale Of York	City York	Selby	Ryedale		
YH	S Yorks_1	5	Sheff Brightside	Sheff Central	Sheff Hiisborough	Sheff Heeley	Sheff Hallam	
YH	S Yorks_2	5	Sheff Attercliffe	Rotheram	Wentworth	Rother Valley	Don Valley	
YH	S Yorks_3	5	N Doncaster	Cent Doncaster	Barnsley Central	Barnsley E & Mexborough	Barnsley W & Pnnistone	
YH	W Yorks1	5	Keighly	Shipley	W Bradford	N Bradford	S Bradford	
YH	W Yorks2	5	NW Leeds	NE Leeds	Cent Leeds	W Leeds	Pudsey	
YH	W Yorks3	5	Batley & Spen	Moreley & Rothwell	Dewsbury	Wakefield	Normanton	
YH	W Yorks4	4	Calder Valley	Halifax	Colne Valley	Huddersfield		
YH	W Yorks5	4	E Leeds	Elmet	Pontefract & Castle	Hemsworth		
W	Clwyd	6	Alyn & Deside	S Clwyd	W Clwyd	Delyn	Vale Of Clwyd	Wrexham
W	Dyfed	5	E Carmathen & D	W Carmathen & W Pembrokeshire	Ceredigion	Llanelli	Preseli P	
W	Gwent	6	Blaeneau Gwent	Islwyn	Monmouth	E Newport	W Newport	Torfaen
W	Gwynedd	4	Caernarfon	Conway	Meirionnydd Nc	Ynys Mon		
W	Mid Glam1	4	Bridgeend	Ogmore	Rhondda	Pontypridd		
W	Mid Glam2	3	Cynon Valley	Methyr Tydfil & R	Caephilly			
W	Powys	2	Montgomeryshire	Brecon & Radnor				
W	S Glam	5	City Cardiff	N Cardiff	S & P Cardiff	W Cardiff	Vale Of Glamorgan	
W	W Glam	5	Aberavon	Gower	Neath	E Swansea	W Swansea	
S	Borders	2	Roxborough & B	Tweeddale E & L				
S	Central	4	E Falkirk	W Falkirk	Ochil	Stirling		
S	Dumfries & Galloway	2	Dumfries	Galloway & Upper Nithsdale				

Proposed constituencies using criterion A (average size 4.36 seats)								
REGION	County	Seats	Constituency 1	Constituency 2	Constituency 3	Constituency 4	Constituency 5	Constituency 6
S	Fife	5	Kirkcaldy	E Dunfermline	W Dunfermline	Cent Fife	NE Fife	
S	Grampian1	3	N Aberdeen	S Aberdeen	Cent Aberdeen			
S	Grampian2	4	Moray	Gordon	Banff & Buchan	W Aberdeen & Kin		
S	Highlands	3	Caithness, S & Er	E Inverness, N & L	Ross,S&W Invern's			
S	Lothian1	5	Linlithgow	Livingstone	Cent Edinburgh	W Edinburgh	Pentlands Edinburgh	
S	Lothian2	5	E Edinburgh	S Edinburgh	N Edinburgh	Mid Lothian		
S	Orkney & Shet	1	Orkney & Shet					
S	Strath_1	5	G Anniesland	G Maryhill	G Kelvin	G Pollok	G Govan	
S	Strath_1	5	G Cathcart	G Shettleston	G Springburn	G Rutherglen	G Baillestone	
S	Strath_1	5	Argyll & Bute	Dumbarton	Clydebank & M	W Renfrewshire	Greenock& Inverclyde	
S	Strath_1	5	N Cunninghame	S Cunninghame	Kilmarnock & I	Carrick , Cumnock & Don Valley	Ayr	
S	Strath_1	4	N Paisley	S Paisley	Eastwood	E Kilbride		
S	Strath_1	4	N Hamilton & Bellshill	S Hamilton	Motherwell & Wishaw	Clydesdale		
S	Strath_1	4	Airdrie & Shotts	Coatbridge & Chryston	Cumberland & Kilsyth	Strathkelvin & Bearsden		
S	Tayside	5	Angus	E Dundee	W Dundee	Perth	N Tayside	
S	W Isles	1	W Isles					
NI		5	E Antrim	N Antrim	S Antrim	E Londonderry	Foyle	
NI		5	N Down	S Down	Lagan Valley	Upper Bann	Strangford	
NI		4	N Belfast	E Belfast	S Belfast	W Belfast		
NI		4	Newry & Armagh	Fermanagh & St	W Tyrone	Mid Ulster		

Proposed constituencies using criterion B (average size 3.58 seats)							
REGION	County	Seats	Constituency 1	Constituency 2	Constituency 3	Constituency 4	Constit_5
SW	Avon_1	4	Northavon	Kingswood	Wansdyke	Bath	
SW	Avon_2	3	W Bristol	E Bristol	S Bristol		
SW	Avon_3	3	NW Bristol	Woodspring	Weston Super Mare		
SW	Cornwall	5	Cornwall N	Cornwal Se	Falmouth & Cranborne	St Ives	Truro & St Austell
SW	Devon_1	4	D & Plymouth	Sutton & Plymouth	SW Devon	Totnes	
SW	Devon_2	4	N Devon	E Devon	Exeter	Tiverton & Honiton	
SW	Devon_3	3	Torbay	Teignbridge	W Devon		
SW	Dorset_1	4	W Dorset	S Dorset	Mid Dorset	N Dorset	
SW	Dorset_2	4	Poole	Christchurch	E Bournemouth	W Bournemouth	
SW	Gloucs_1	3	Stroud	Cotswold	Cheltenham		
SW	Gloucs-2	3	Tewkesbury	Gloucester	Forest Of Dean		
SW	Someret	5	Bridgewater	Somerton & Frome	Taunton	Wells	Yeovil
SW	Wilts_1	3	N Swindon	S Swindon	N Wiltshire		
SW	Wilts_2	3	Salisbury	Devizes	Westbury		
SE	Beds_1	3	SW Beds	N Luton	S Luton		
SE	Beds_2	3	NE Beds	Mid Beds	Bedford		
SE	Berks_1	4	Bracknell	Maidenhead	Slough	Windsor	
SE	Berks_2	4	Newbury	E Reading	W Reading	Wokingham	
SE	Bucks_1	4	Aylesbury	Buckingham	NE Milton Keynes	SW Milton Keynes	
SE	Bucks_2	3	Beaconsfield	Chesh & Amersham	Wycombe		
SE	E Sussex1	4	Eastbourne	Bexhill & Battle	Hastings & Rye	Wealden	
SE	E Sussex2	4	K Brighton	P Brighton	Hove	Lewes	
SE	Essex_1	3	Harwich	N Essex	Colchester		
SE	Essex_2	3	Harlow	Epping Forest	Brentwood		
SE	Essex_3	3	Saffron Waldon	Braintree	Chelmsford		
SE	Essex_4	4	Maldon & Chelmsford	Rayleigh	Rochford & Sleaford	W Southend	
SE	Essex_4	4	Thurrock	Basildon	Billericay	Castlepoint	
SE	London_1	5	Bexheath & Crayford	Erith & Thamesmead	Old Bexley & Sidcup	Eltham	Greenwich & Woolwich
SE	London_2	5	Feltham & Heston	Hayes & H	Uxbridge	N Ealing	Ealing Southall

Proposed constituencies using criterion B (average size 3.58 seats)							
REGION	County	Seats	Constituency 1	Constituency 2	Constituency 3	Constituency 4	Constit_5
SE	London_3	5	Carshalton Wall'ton	Sutton & Cheam	Mitcham & Morden	Wimbledon	Kingston & Subiton
SE	London_4	4	Regents Park & N Ken	City Of London	Hammersmith & Fulham	Kensington & Chelsea	
SE	London_5	4	Hampstead Heath	Holborn & St Pancras	N Islington	S Islington	
SE	London_6	4	N Hackney	S Hackney & Shoreditch	Bethnal Green	Poplar & Canning Town	
SE	London_7	4	E Ham	W Ham	Leyton & Wanstead	Walthamstow	
SE	London_8	4	N Ilford	S Ilford	Barking	Dagenham	
SE	London9	4	N Enfield	Enfield Southgate	Edmonton	Chingford & Woodford Green	
SE	London10	4	Chipping Barnet	Finchly & Golders Green	Homsey & Wood Green	Tottenham	
SE	London11	4	N Southwark & Bermondsey	Camberwell & Peckham	Dulwich & W Norwood	Debtford Lewisham	
SE	London12	4	Streatham	Vauxhall	Battersea	Tooting	
SE	London13	4	E Lewisham	W Lewisham	Bromley Chislehurst	Orpington	
SE	London14	4	Cent Croydon	N Croydon	S Croydon	Beckenham	
SE	London15	4	Richmond Park	Putney	Brentford & Isleworth	Twickenham	
SE	London16	4	N Brent	E Brent	S Brent	Ealing, Acton & Shepherds Bush	
SE	London17	4	N Ruislip	E Harrow	W Harrow	Hendon	
SE	London18	3	Hamchurch	Romford	Upminster		
SE	Hants_1	5	Fareham	Basingstoke	Gosport	N Portsmouth	S Portsmouth
SE	Hants_2	4	Aldershot	Ne Hants	E Hants	Havant	
SE	Hants_3	4	E New Forest	W New Forest	Romsey	NW Hants	
SE	Hants_4	4	Winchester	Eastleigh	I Southampton	T Southampton	
SE	Herts_1	4	Hitchin & Harpenden	St Albans	Hertsmere	Welwyn Hatfield	
SE	Herts_2	4	Broxbourne	Hartford & Stortford	NE Herts	Stevenage	
SE	Herts_3	3	Watford	Hemel Hempstead	SW Herts		
SE	Isle Wight	1	Isle Of Wight				
SE	Kent_1	4	Maidstone	Faversham	Ashford	Canterbury	
SE	Kent_2	4	N Thanet	S Thanet	Folkstone	Dover	

Proposed constituencies using criterion B (average size 3.58 seats)							
REGION	County	Seats	Constituency 1	Constituency 2	Constituency 3	Constituency 4	Constt 5
SE	Kent_3	3	Sevenoaks	Tonbridge	Tunbridge Wells		
SE	Kent_4	3	Chatham	Gillingham	Sittingbourne		
SE	Kent_5	3	Dartford	Gravesham	Medway		
SE	Oxon_1	3	Wantage	W Oxford	Witney		
SE	Oxon_2	3	Banbury	E Oxford	Henley		
SE	Surrey_1	4	Epsom & Ewell	Mole Valley	Reigate	E Surrey	
SE	Surrey_2	4	H Surrey	Runnymede & Weybridge	Spelthorne	Esher & Walton	
SE	Surrey_3	3	Guildford	SW Surrey	Woking		
SE	W Sussex1	4	Bognor Regis & Littlehampton	Chichester	E Worthing & Shoreham	W Worthing	
SE	W Sussex2	4	Arundel	Crawley	Horsham	M Sussex	
EA	Cambs_1	4	Huntingdon	SE Cambs	S Cambs	Cambridge	
EA	Cambs_2	3	NE Cambs	NW Cambs	Peterborough		
EA	Norfolk_1	4	NW Norfolk	N Norfolk	Mid Norfolk	Great Yarmouth	
EA	Norfolk_2	4	N Norwich	S Norwich	S Norfolk	SW Norfolk	
EA	Suffolk_1	3	Bury St Edmonds	S Suffolk	W Suffolk		
EA	Suffolk_2	4	Ipswich	Central Suffolk	Coastal Suffolk	Waveney	
EM	Derbys_1	3	High Peak	W Derbys	S Derbys		
EM	Derbys_2	3	NE Derbys	Chesterfield	Bolsover		
EM	Derbys_3	4	Amber Valley	Erewash	N Derby	S Derby	
EM	Leics_1	3	E Leics	S Leics	W Leics		
EM	Leics_2	3	Rutland	Harbrough	Blaby		
EM	Leics_3	4	Bosworth	Loughborough	Charnwood	NW Leics	
EM	Lincs_1	4	Gainsborough	Louth & Horncastle	Boston & Skegness	Lincoln	
EM	Lincs_2	3	Sleaford & Hykeham	Grantham & Stamford	S Holland & Deepings		
EM	Northants1	3	Daventry	N Northampton	S Northampton		
EM	Northants2	3	Kettering	Wellingborough	Corby		
EM	Notts_1	4	Rushcliffe	Gedling	E Nottingham	S Nottingham	
EM	Notts_2	4	Broxtowe	N Nottingham	Ashfield	Mansfield	
EM	Notts_3	3	Sherwood	Bassetlaw	Newark		

Proposed constituencies using criterion B (average size 3.58 seats)							
REGION	County	Seats	Constituency 1	Constituency 2	Constituency 3	Constituency 4	Constit_5
WM	H'ford_1	4	Wyre Forest	Bromsgrove	Redditch	Mid Worcs	
WM	H'ford_2	4	Leominster	Hereford	Worcester	W Worcs	
WM	Shrops	5	Ludlow	Shrewsbury & Atcham	N Shropshire	Telford	Wrekin
WM	Staffs_1	4	S Staffs	Cannock Chase	Lichfield	Tarnworth	
WM	Staffs_2	4	N Stoke	S Stoke	Stoke Central	Staff Moorlands	
WM	Staffs_3	4	Stafford	Stone	Burton	Newcastle U Lyme	
WM	Warwicks	5	Nuneaton	Rugby & Kenilworth	Stratford Upon Avon	Warwick & Leamington	N Warwickshire
WM	W Mid_1	4	NW Coventry	S Coventry	NE Coventry	Meriden	
WM	W Mid_2	4	Aldridge Brownhill	Sutton Coldfield	N Walsall	S Walsall	
WM	W Mid_3	4	W West Brom	E West Brom	B Perry Barr	B Erdington	
WM	W Mid_4	4	Stourbridge	Halesowen & Rowley	Warley	B Edgbaston	
WM	W Mid_5	4	B Northfield	B Selly Oak	B Hall Green	Solihull	
WM	W Mid_6	4	B Ladywood	B Sparkbrook	B Hodge Hill	B Yardley	
WM	W Mid_7	5	NE Wolverhampton	SW Wolverhampton	SE Wolverhampton	N Dudley	S Dudley
N	Cleveland1	3	Middlesborough	S Middlesborough & Cleveland E	Redcar		
N	Cleveland2	3	Hartlepool	N Stockton	S Stockton		
N	Cumbria_1	3	Barrow & Furness	Copeland	Workington		
N	Cumbria_2	3	Carlisle	Penrith & Border	Westmoreland & L		
N	Durham_1	4	Easington	City Durham	Sedgefield	Darlington	
N	Durham_2	3	N Durham	NW Durham	Bishop Auckland		
N	Northumberland	4	Berwick Upon Tweed	Blyth Valley	Hexham	Wansbuck	
NW	Tyne & W1	3	Tyne Bridge	E Gateshead & Was	Blaydon		
NW	Tyne & W2	3	S Shields	N Tyneside	Tynemouth		
NW	Tyne & W3	3	N Newcastle	Cent Newcastle	E Newcastle & Wash		
NW	Tyne & W4	4	Houghton & Was E	S Sunderland	N Sunderland	Jarrow	
NW	Cheshire1	4	Ellesmere P & Neston	Chester City	Eddisbury	Weavervale	
NW	Cheshire2	4	Tatton	Macclesfield	Congleton	Crewe & Nantwich	
NW	Cheshire3	3	N Warrington	S Warrington	Halton		
NW	Gt Man_1	4	NE Bolton	SE Bolton	N Bury	S Bury	

Proposed constituencies using criterion B (average size 3.58 seats)							
REGION	County	Seats	Constituency 1	Constituency 2	Constituency 3	Constituency 4	Constit_5
NW	Gt Man_2	4	W Bolton	Wigan	Makerfield	Leigh	
NW	Gt Man_3	4	Rochdale	Heywood & Midd	W Oldham	E Oldham	
NW	Gt Man_4	4	Ashton Under Lyme	Stalybridge & H	Denton & Redittch	Hazel Grove	
NW	Gt Man_5	4	Stockport	Cheadle	Wythens & E Sale	Altrincham & W Sale	
NW	Gt Man_6	4	Worsley	Eccles	Stretford & Urnston	Salford	
NW	Gt Man_7	4	M Blackley	M Central	M Gorton	M Withington	
NW	Lancs_1	4	Morecambe & Lunesdale	Ribble Valley	Pendle	Lancs & Wyre	
NW	Lancs_2	4	Blackburn	Burnley	Rosendale & Darwen	Hyndburn	
NW	Lancs_3	4	Preston	Ribble South	W Lancs	Chorley	
NW	Lancs-4	3	N Blackpool	S Blackpool	Fylde		
NW	Mersey1	4	L Garston	S Knowsley	S St Helens	N St Helens	
NW	Mersey2	4	L Riverside	L Wavertree	L & W Derby	L Walton	
NW	Mersey3	4	Southport	Crosby	N Knowsley & E Sefton	Bootle	
NW	Mersey4	4	W Wirral	S Wirral	Birkenhead	Wallasey	
YH	Humbs_1	4	Gt Grimsby	Cleethorpes	Brigg & Goole	Scunthorpe	
YH	Humbs_2	3	Haltemprice & Howd	E Yorks	Beverley & Holderness		
YH	Humbs_3	3	N Hull	E Hull	W Hull		
YH	N Yorks_1	4	Scarborough & Whitby	Richmond	Harrogate & Knaresb'h	Skipton	
YH	N Yorks_2	4	Vale Of York	City York	Selby	Ryedale	
YH	S Yorks_1	4	Sheff Brightside	Sheff Central	Sheff Heeley	Sheff Hallam	
YH	S Yorks_2	4	Sheff Attercliffe	Rotheram	Wentworth	Rother Valley	
YH	S Yorks_3	4	Sheff Hillsborough	E Barnsley & Mexborough	W Barnsley & Pennistone	Cent Barnsley	
YH	S Yorks_4	3	Cent Doncaster	N Doncaster	Don Valey		
YH	W Yorks1	4	NE Leeds	Cent Leeds	E Leeds	Elmet	
YH	W Yorks2	4	Morley & Rothwell	Hemsford	Normanton	Pontefract & Castle	
YH	W Yorks3	4	Colne Valley	Huddersfield	Dewsbury	Wakefield	
YH	W Yorks4	4	Batley & Spen	S Bradford	Halifax	Calder Valley	
YH	W Yorks5	4	NW Leeds	W Leeds	Pudsey	N Bradford	
YH	W Yorks6	3	W Bradford	Shipley	Keighley		

Proposed constituencies using criterion B (average size 3.58 seats)							
REGION	County	Seats	Constituency 1	Constituency 2	Constituency 3	Constituency 4	Constit_5
W	Clwyd1	3	W Clywd	S Clwyd	Vale Of Clwyd		
W	Clwyd2	3	Alyn & Deeside	Delyn	Wrexham		
W	Dyfed1	3	Ceredigion	E Carmathen & D	Lanelli		
W	Dyfed2	2	Preseli	W Carmathen & Pembrokeshire			
W	Gwent1	3	E Newport	W Newport	Islwyn		
W	Gwent2	3	Blaeneau Gwent	Torfaen	Monmouth		
W	Gwynedd	4	Caernarfon	Conway	Meirionnydd Nc	Ynys Mon	
W	Mid Glam1	4	Bridgend	Ogmore	Rhondda	Pontypridd	
W	Mid Glam2	3	Cynon Valley	Methyr Tydfil & R	Caephilly		
W	Powys	2	Montgomeryshire	Brecon & Radnor			
W	S Glam1	3	N Cardiff	W Cardiff	Cent Cardiff		
W	S Glam2	2	S Cardiff	Vale Of Glamorgan			
W	W Glam1	3	Gower	E Swansea	W Swansea		
W	W Glam2	2	Neath	Aberavon			
S	Borders	2	Roxborough & B	Tweeddale E & L			
S	Central	4	E Falkirk	W Falkirk	Ochil	Stirling	
S	Dumf & Gall	2	Dumfries	Galloway & U N			
S	Fife1	3	Kirkcaldy	E Dunfermline	W Dunfermline	Kirkcaldy	
S	Fife2	2	Cent Fife	NE Fife			
S	Grampian1	3	N Aberdeen	S Aberdeen	Cent Aberdeen		
S	Grampian2	4	Moray	Gordon	Banff & Buchan	W Aberdeenshire & K	
S	Highlands	3	Caithness, S & Er	E Inverness, N & L	Ross, S & W Inverness		
S	Lothian1	3	Linlithgow	Livingstone	W Edinburgh		
S	Lothian2	3	E Pentlands	Mid Lothian	E Lothian		
S	Lothian3	4	E Edinburgh	S Edinburgh	N Edinburgh	Cent Edinburgh	
S	Orkney & Shet	1	Orkney & Shet				
S	Strath_1	4	G Anniesland	G Maryhill	G Kelvin		

Proposed constituencies using criterion B (average size 3.58 seats)							
REGION	County	Seats	Constituency 1	Constituency 2	Constituency 3	Constituency 4	Constit_5
S	Strath_2	4	N Paisley	S Paisley	G Pollok	G Govan	
S	Strath_3	4	G Cathcart	G Rutherglen	G Shettleston	G Bailleston	
S	Strath_4	4	Cumbernauld & Kilsyth	Coatbridge & Chryston	Airdrie & Shotts	Motherwell & Wishaw	
S	Strath_5	4	N Hamilton & Bellshill	S Hamilton	E Kilbride	Clydesdale	
S	Strath_6	4	Kilmarnock & I	Carrick , Cumnock & Don Valley	Ayr	Eastwood	
S	Strath_7	4	N Cunninghame	S Cunninghame	Greenock& Inverclyde	W Renfrewshire	
S	Strath_8	4	Argyll & Bute	Dumbarton	Clydebank & M	Strathkelvin & Bearsden	
S	Tayside1	3	Angus	Perth	N Tayside		
	Tayside2	2	E Dundee	W Dundee			
S	W Isles	1	W Isles				
NI		4	N Belfast	E Belfast	S Belfast	W Belfast	
NI		4	E Londonderry	Mid Ulster	W Tyrone	Foyle	
NI		4	Lagan Valley	Upper Bann	Newry & Armagh	Fermanagh & St	
NI		3	E Antrim	N Antrim	S Antrim		
NI		3	N Down	S Down	Strangford		

Proposed constituencies using criterion C (average size 3.00 seats)							
REGION	County	Seats	Constituency 1	Constituency 2	Constituency 3	Constituency 4	Constit_5
SW	Avon_1	4	Northavon	Kingswood	Wansdyke	Bath	
SW	Avon_2	3	W Bristol	E Bristol	S Bristol		
SW	Avon_3	3	NW Bristol	Woodspring	Weston Super Mare		
SW	Cornwall1	2	Cornwall N	Cornwall SE			
SW	Cornwall2	3	Falmouth & Cranborne	St Ives	Truro & St Austell		
SW	Devon_1	3	Plymouth Devonport	Plymouth Sutton	SW Devon		
SW	Devon_2	3	E Devon	Exeter	Tiverton & Honiton		
SW	Devon_3	3	Teignbridge	Totnes	Torbay		
SW	Devon_4	2	N Devon	W Devon			
SW	Dorset_1	3	Poole	S Dorset	Mid Dorset		
SW	Dorset_2	3	Christchurch	E Bournemouth	W Bournemouth		
SW	Dorset_3	2	N Dorset	W Dorset			
SW	Gloucs_1	3	Stroud	Cotswold	Cheltenham		
SW	Gloucs-2	3	Tewkesbury	Gloucester	Forest Of Dean		
SE	Somerset1	2	Bridgewater	Taunton			
SW	Somerset2	3	Somerton & Frome	Wells	Yeovil		
SW	Wilts_1	3	N Swindon	S Swindon	N Wiltshire		
SW	Wilts_2	3	Salisbury	Devizes	Westbury		
SE	Beds_1	3	SW Beds	N Luton	S Luton		
SE	Beds_2	3	NE Beds	Mid Beds	Bedford		
SE	Berks_1	3	Bracknell	Windsor	Slough		
SE	Berks_2	3	Maidenhead	E Reading	W Reading		
SE	Berks_3	2	Newbury	Wokingham			
SE	Bucks_1	4	Aylesbury	Buckingham	NE Milton Keynes	Sw Milton Keynes	
SE	Bucks_2	3	Beaconsfield	Chesham & Amersham	Wycombe		
SE	E Sussex1	3	Eastbourne	Bexhill & Battle	Hastings & Rye		
SE	E Sussex2	3	Brighton kemptown	Brighton Pavillion	Hove		
SE	E Sussex3	2	Lewes	Wealden			
SE	Essex_1	3	Harwich	N Essex	Colchester		
SE	Essex_2	3	Harlow	Epping Forest	Brentwood		

Proposed constituencies using criterion C (average size 3.00 seats)							
REGION	County	Seats	Constituency 1	Constituency 2	Constituency 3	Constituency 4	Constit_5
SE	Essex_3	3	Saffron Waldon	Braintree	Chelmsford		
SE	Essex_4	4	Maldon & Chelmsford	Rayleigh	Rochford & Sleaford	W Southend	
SE	Essex_4	4	Thurrock	Basildon	Billericay	Castlepoint	
SE	Lond C1	4	Regents Pk & N Ken	City Of London	Kensington & Chelsea	Hampstead	
SE	Lond C2	3	Holborn & St Pancras	S Islington	N Islington		
SE	Lond C3	3	N Hackney	S Hackney & Shoreditch	Bethnal Green		
SE	Lond E1	3	E Ham	W Ham	Poplar & Canning Town		
SE	Lond E2	2	Barking	Dagenham			
SE	Lond E3	3	Hornchurch	Romford	Upminster		
SE	Lond E4	4	Bexleyheath & Crayford	Old Bexley & Sidcup	Erith & Thamesmead	Eltham	
SE	Lond N1	3	N Brent	E Brent	S Brent		
SE	Lond N2	2	E Harrow	W Harrow			
SE	Lond N3	3	Chipping Barnet	Finchly & Golders Green	Hendon		
SE	Lond N4	4	Hornsey & Wood Green	Leyton & Wanstead	Walthamstow	Tottenham	
SE	Lond N5	3	N Enfield	Enfield Southgate	Edmonton		
SE	Lond N6	4	N Ilford	S Ilford	Chingford & Woodford Green		
SE	Lond S1	4	N Southwark & Bermondsey	Camberwell & Peckham	Dulwich & W Norwood		
SE	Lond S2	3	Battersea	Vauxhall	Putney		
SE	Lond S3	3	Streatham	Tooting	Wimbledon		
SE	Lond S4	3	Carshalton Wallington	Sutton & Cheam	Mitcham & Morden		
SE	Lond S5	3	Cent Croydon	N Croydon	S Croydon		
SE	Lond S6	3	Beckenham	Bromley Chislehurst	Orpington		
SE	Lond S7	4	E Lewisham	W Lewisham	Deptford Lewisham	Greenwich & Woolwich	
SE	Lond W1	3	Ealing, Acton &	N Ealing	Ealing Southall		

Proposed constituencies using criterion C (average size 3.00 seats)							
REGION	County	Seats	Constituency 1	Constituency 2	Constituency 3	Constituency 4	Constit_5
			Shepherds Bush				
SE	Lond W2	3	Richmond Park	Brentford & Isleworth	Hammersmith & Fulham		
SE	Lond W3	3	Kingston & Surbiton	Twickenham	Feltham & Heston		
SE	Lond W4	3	N Ruislip	Hayes & H	Uxbridge		
SE	Hants_1	3	Romsey	I Southampton	T Southampton		
SE	Hants_2	3	Aldershot	Ne Hants	E Hants		
SE	Hants_3	3	Gosport	Fareham	Eastleigh		
SE	Hants_4	3	Winchester	Nw Hants	Basingstoke		
SE	Hants_5	3	Havant	N Portsmouth	S Portsmouth		
SE	Hants_6	2	E New Forest	W New Forest			
SE	Herts_1	3	Hitchin & Harpenden	St Albans	Hertsmere		
SE	Herts_2	3	Broxbourne	Stevenage	Welwyn Hatfield		
SE	Herts_3	3	Watford	Hemel Hempstead	SW Herts		
SE	Herts_4	2	NE Herts	Hartford & Stortford			
SE	Isle Wight	1	Isle Of Wight				
SE	Kent_1	3	Sevenoaks	Tonbridge & Malling	Tunbridge Wells		
SE	Kent_2	3	N Thanet	S Thanet	Dover		
SE	Kent_3	3	Ashford	Faversham	Sittingbourne & Sheppey		
SE	Kent_4	3	Maidstone	Chatham	Gillingham		
SE	Kent_5	3	Medway	Gravesham	Dartford		
SE	Kent_6	2	Folkstone	Canterbury			
SE	Oxon_1	3	Wantage	W Oxford	Witney		
SE	Oxon_2	3	Banbury	E Oxford	Henley		
SE	Surrey_1	3	Epsom & Ewell	Reigate	E Surrey		
SE	Surrey_2	3	Runnymede & Weybridge	Spelthorne	Esher & Walton		
SE	Surrey_3	3	H Surrey	Mole Valley	Woking		
SE	Surrey_4	2	Guildford	SW Surrey			
SE	W Sussex1	3	Bognor Regis & Littlehampton	W Worthing	E Worthing & Shoreham		

Proposed constituencies using criterion C (average size 3.00 seats)							
REGION	County	Seats	Constituency 1	Constituency 2	Constituency 3	Constituency 4	Constit_5
SE	W Sussex2	3	Crawley	Horsham	M Sussex		
SE	W Sussex3	2	Arundel	Chichester			
EA	Cambs_1	4	Huntingdon	Se Cambs	S Cambs	Cambridge	
EA	Cambs_2	3	NE Cambs	NW Cambs	Peterborough		
EA	Norfolk_1	3	S Norfolk	Mid Norfolk	Great Yarmouth		
EA	Norfolk_2	3	N Norwich	S Norwich	N Norfolk		
EA	Norfolk_3	2	NW Norfolk	SW Norfolk			
EA	Suffolk_1	3	Bury St Edmonds	S Suffolk	W Suffolk		
EA	Suffolk_2	4	Ipswich	Central Suffolk	Coastal Suffolk	Waveney	
EM	Derbys_1	3	High Peak	W Derbys	S Derbys		
EM	Derbys_2	3	Ne Derbys	Chesterfield	Bolsover		
EM	Derbys_3	4	Amber Valley	Erewash	N Derby	S Derby	
EM	Leics_1	3	E Leics	S Leics	W Leics		
EM	Leics_2	3	Rutland	Harbrough	Blaby		
EM	Leics_3	4	Bosworth	Loughborough	Charnwood	NW Leics	
EM	Lincs_1	4	Gainsborough	Louth & Horncastle	Boston & Skegness	Lincoln	
EM	Lincs_2	3	Sleaford & Hykeham	Grantham & Stamford	S Holland & Deepings		
EM	Northants1	3	Daventry	N Northampton	S Northampton		
EM	Northants2	3	Kettering	Wellingborough	Corby		
EM	Notts_1	3	Rushcliffe	Newark	Bassetlaw		
EM	Notts_2	3	Broxtowe	N Nottingham	S Nottingham		
EM	Notts_3	3	Sherwod	Gedling	E Nottingham		
EM	Notts_4	2	Ashfield	Mansfield			
WM	H'ford_1	3	Worcester	Redditch	Mid Worcs		
WM	H'ford_2	3	Leominster	Hereford	W Worcs		
WM	H'ford_3	2	Wyre Forest	Bromsgrove			
WM	Shrops_1	3	Ludlow	Wrekin	Telford		
WM	Shrops_2	2	Shrewsbury & Atcham	N Shropshire			
WM	Staffs_1	3	Lichfield	Tamworth	Burton		
WM	Staffs_2	3	N Stoke	Staff Moorlands	Stoke Central		
WM	Staffs_3	3	S Stoke	Stone	Newcastle U Lyme		

Proposed constituencies using criterion C (average size 3.00 seats)							
REGION	County	Seats	Constituency 1	Constituency 2	Constituency 3	Constituency 4	Constit 5
WM	Staffs 4	3	Stafford	Cannock Chase	S Staffs		
WM	Warwick1	3	Rugby & Kenilworth	Stratford Upon Avon	Warwick & Leamington		
WM	Warwick2	2	N Warwickshire	Nuneaton			
WM	W Mid 1	3	NW Coventry	NE Coventry	S Coventry		
WM	W Mid 2	3	SW Wolverhampton	NE Wolverhampton	SE Wolverhampton		
WM	W Mid 3	3	N Wallsall	S Wallsall	Aldridge Brownhill		
WM	W Mid 4	3	N Dudley	S Dudley	Stourbridge		
WM	W Mid 5	3	B Perry Barr	W West Brom	E West Brom		
WM	W Mid 6	3	Halesowen & Rowley	Warley	B Edgbaston		
WM	W Mid 7	3	B Northfield	B Selly Oak	B Hall Green		
WM	W Mid 8	3	Sutton Coldfield	B Erdington	B Ladywood		
WM	W Mid 9	3	Solihull	B Yardley	B Sparkbrook		
WM	W Mid 10	2	Meriden	B Hodge Hill			
N	Cleveland1	3	Middlesborough	S Middlesborough & Cleveland E	Redcar		
N	Cleveland2	3	Hartlepool	N Stockton	S Stockton		
N	Cumbria 1	3	Barrow on Furness	Copeland	Workington		
N	Cumbria 2	3	Carlisle	Penrith & Border	Westmoreland & L		
N	Durham 1	4	Easington	City Durham	Sedgefield	Darlington	
N	Durham 2	3	N Durham	NW Durham	Bishop Auckland		
N	Northumbria	4	Berwick Upon Tweed	Blyth Valley	Hexham	Wansbuck	
NW	Tyne & W1	3	Tyne Bridge	E Gateshd & Was W	Blaydon		
NW	Tyne & W2	3	S Shields	N Tyneside	Tynemouth		
NW	Tyne & W2	3	N Newcastle Upon Tyne	Cent Newcastle Upon Tyne	E Newcastle & Wash W		
NW	Tyne & W2	4	Houghton & Was E	S Sunderland	N Sunderland	Jarrow	
NW	Cheshire1	3	Ellesmere P & Neston	Chester City	Weavervale		
NW	Cheshire2	3	Tatton	Macclesfield	Congleton		
NW	Cheshire3	3	N Warrington	S Warrington	Halton		
NW	Cheshire4	2	Eddisbury	Crewe & Nantwich			
NW	Manch 1	3	W Bolton	NE Bolton	SE Bolton		

Proposed constituencies using criterion C (average size 3.00 seats)							
REGION	County	Seats	Constituency 1	Constituency 2	Constituency 3	Constituency 4	Constit_5
NW	Manch_2	3	Wigan	Makerfield	Leigh		
NW	Manch_3	3	N Bury	S Bury	Heywood & Midd		
NW	Manch_4	3	Rochdale	W Oldham	E Oldham		
NW	Manch_5	3	Worsley	Eccles	Salford		
NW	Manch_6	3	Altincham & W Sale	Stretford & Urnston	Wythenshawe & E Sale		
NW	Manch_7	3	Cheadle	Stockport	Hazel Grove		
NW	Manch_8	3	Ashton Under Lyme	Denton & Redditch	Stalybridge		
NW	Manch_9	4	M Blackley	M Central	M Garston	M Withington	
NW	Lancs_1	3	W Lancs	Ribble South	Preston		
NW	Lancs_2	3	Blackburn	Chorley	Rosendale & Darwen		
NW	Lancs_3	3	Ribble Valley	Morecambe & Lunesdale	Lancs & Wyre		
NW	Lancs_4	3	N Blackpool	S Blackpool	Fylde		
NW	Lancs_5	3	Pendle	Burnley	Hyndburn		
NW	Mersey1	3	Southport	Crosby	Bootle		
NW	Mersey2	3	N Knowsley & E Sefton	N St Helens	S St Helens		
NW	Mersey3	3	L W Derby	L Wavertree	L Walton		
NW	Mersey4	3	L Riverside	L Garston	S Knowsley		
NW	Mersey5	4	W Wirral	S Wirral	Birkenhead	Wallasey	
YH	Humbs_1	4	Gt Grimsby	Cleethorpes	Brigg & Goole	Scunthorpe	
YH	Humbs_2	3	Haltemprice & Howd	E Yorks	Beverley & Holdemess		
YH	Humbs_3	3	N Hull	E Hull	W Hull		
YH	N Yorks_1	3	Richmond	Harrogate & Knaresb'h	Skipton		
YH	N Yorks_2	3	Vale Of York	Scarbrough & Whitby	Ryedale		
YH	N Yorks_3	2	City York	Selby			
YH	S Yorks_1	3	E Barnsley	Cent Barnsley	W Barnsley		
YH	S Yorks_2	3	N Doncaster	Cent Doncaster	Don Valley		
YH	S Yorks_3	3	Rotherham	Rother Valley	Wentworth		
YH	S Yorks_4	3	Sheff Hillsborough	Sheff Brightside	Sheff Hallam		
YH	S Yorks_5	3	Sheff Central	Sheff Heeley	Sheff Attercliffe		

Proposed constituencies using criterion C (average size 3.00 seats)							
REGION	County	Seats	Constituency 1	Constituency 2	Constituency 3	Constituency 4	Constit_5
YH	W Yorks1	4	NE Leeds	Cent Leeds	E Leeds	Elmet	
YH	W Yorks2	4	Keighley	Shipley	W Bradford	N Bradford	
YH	W Yorks3	3	Normanton	Hemsworth	Pontefract		
YH	W Yorks4	3	Batley & Spen	Dewsbury	Moreley & Rothwell		
YH	W Yorks5	3	Huddersfield	Colne Valley	Wakefield		
YH	W Yorks6	3	Clader Valley	Halifax	S Bradford		
YH	W Yorks7	3	Nw Leeds	Pudsey	W Leeds		
W	Clwyd1	3	W Clywd	S Clywd	Vale Of Clwyd		
W	Clwyd2	3	Alyn & Deeside	Delyn	Wrexham		
W	Dyfed1	3	Ceredigion	E Carmathen & D	Llanelli		
W	Dyfed2	2	Preseli	W Carmathen & Pembrokeshire			
W	Gwent1	3	E Newport	W Newport	Islwyn		
W	Gwent2	3	Blaeneau Gwent	Torfaen	Monmouth		
W	Gwynedd	4	Caernarfon	Conway	Meirionnydd Nc	Ynys Mon	
W	Mid Glam1	4	Bridgend	Ogmore	Rhondda	Pontypridd	
W	Mid Glam2	3	Cynon Valley	Methyr Tydfil & R	Caephilly		
W	Powys	2	Montgomeryshire	Brecon & Radnor			
W	S Glam1	3	N Cardiff	W Cardiff	Cent Cardiff		
W	S Glam2	2	S Cardiff	Vale Of Glamorgan			
W	W Glam1	3	Gower	E Swansea	W Swansea		
W	W Glam2	2	Neath	Aberavon			
S	Borders	2	Roxborough & B	Tweeddale E & L			
S	Central	4	E Falkirk	W Falkirk	Ochil	Stirling	
S	Dumf & Gall	2	Dumfries	Galloway & U N			
S	Fife1	3	Kirkcaldy	E Dunfermline	W Dunfermline		
S	Fife2	2	Cent Fife	NE Fife			
S	Grampian1	3	N Aberdeen	S Aberdeen	Cent Aberdeen		
S	Grampian2	4	Moray	Gordon	Banff & Buchan	W Aberdeenshire & K	

Proposed constituencies using criterion C (average size 3.00 seats)							
REGION	County	Seats	Constituency 1	Constituency 2	Constituency 3	Constituency 4	Constit_5
S	Highlands	3	Caithness, S & Er	E Inverness, N & L	Ross, S & W Inverness		
S	Lothian1	3	Linlithgow	Livingstone	W Edinburgh		
S	Lothian2	3	E Pentlands	Mid Lothian	E Lothian		
S	Lothian3	4	E Edinburgh	S Edinburgh	N Edinburgh	Cent Edinburgh	
S	Orkney & Shet	1	Orkney & Shet				
S	Strath_1	3	Argyll & Bute	Dumbarton	Clydebank & M		
S	Strath_2	3	N Cunninghame	Greenock & Inverclyde	W Renfrewshire		
S	Strath_3	3	S Cunninghame	Kilmarnock & I	Ayr		
S	Strath_4	3	N Paisley	S Paisley	Eastwood		
S	Strath_5	3	Cumbern & Kilsyth	Coatbdge & Chryston	Strathk & Bearsden		
S	Strath_6	3	G Pollok	G Govan	G Cathcart		
S	Strath_7	3	G Shettleston	G Rutherglen	G Bailleston		
S	Strath_8	3	Clydesdale	Motherwell	Airdree & S		
S	Strath_9	4	Carrick, Cumnock & Don Valley	E Kilbride	N Hamilton & Bellshill	S Hamilton	
S	Strath_10	4	G Anniesland	G Maryhil	G Kelvin	G Springburn	
S	Tayside1	3	Angus	Perth	N Tayside		
S	Tayside2	2	E Dundee	W Dundee			
S	W Isles	1	W Isles				
NI	Ni_1	3	N Belfast	S Belfast	W Belfast		
NI	Ni_2	3	E Londonderry	Mid Ulster	Foyle		
NI	Ni_3	3	Lagan Valley	Upper Bann	S Down		
NI	Ni_4	3	E Antrim	N Antrim	S Antrim		
NI	Ni_5	3	Newry & Armagh	Fermanagh & St	W Tyrone		
NI	Ni_6	3	E Belfast	N Down	Strangford		

Appendix 3

ILLUSTRATIONS OF MULTI-MEMBER CONSTITUENCIES AND EFFECTS ON PARTY PROPORTIONALITY

This appendix looks at how a sample of counties/regions might be divided into multi-member constituencies. The sample is:

- A. Cornwall**
- B. Grampian**
- C. Kent**
- D. Merseyside**
- E. Northamptonshire**
- F. Northern Ireland**
- G. South Glamorgan**

In each case the effect on proportionality is considered by using 1997 general election data. However, no allowance has been made for the different ways in which people might vote under an alternative system, or for transfers of votes which would take place under STV.

A. CORNWALL IN MULTI-MEMBER CONSTITUENCIES

1. Existing constituencies

At present Cornwall has 5 parliamentary constituencies.

Cornwall North (LD)
 Cornwall South East (C)
 Falmouth & Cranborne (L)
 St Ives (LD)
 Truro & St Austell (LD)

The result of the 1997 general election was as follows:

	Conservative	Labour	LD	Other
Number of seats	1	1	3	0
%age of seats	20	20	60	0
%age of votes	30	17	44	9

2. Options A and B: 5-member Cornwall constituency

A 5-member area cannot be subdivided without creating a constituency of 2 seats or less. Options A and B would both therefore lead to a single, 5-member constituency.

	Conservative	Labour	LD	Other
Number of seats	2	1	2	0
%age of seats	40	20	40	0
%age of votes	30	17	44	9

3. Option C: One 3-member and one 2-member constituency

As an alternative to a 5-member seat, which would be geographically large, the county might be divided into 2 constituencies. A possible way of doing this would be as follows:

(a) Cornwall North, Cornwall South East

	Conservative	Labour	LD	Other
Number of seats	1	0	1	0
%age of seats	50	0	50	0
%age of votes	33	11	50	6

(b) Falmouth & Cranborne, St Ives, Truro & St Austell

	Conservative	Labour	LD	Other
Number of seats	1	1	1	0
%age of seats	33	33	33	0
%age of votes	29	21	40	10

Total for Option C:

	<i>Conservative</i>	<i>Labour</i>	<i>LD</i>	<i>Other</i>
<i>Number of seats</i>	2	1	2	0
<i>%age of seats</i>	40	20	40	0
<i>%age of votes</i>	30	17	44	9

Here, as might be expected, the move from FPTP in 5 single-member constituencies to a single 5-member constituency produces a more proportional result. However, the same level of proportionality is achieved in this case by using a 3-member and a 2-member constituency.

4. Comparative disproportionality

FPTP	100
Options A/B	0
Option C	0
Best achievable	0

Options A, B and C all lead to the most proportional allocation of seats which could have been achieved on the 1997 election results (which, of course, might have been different if an alternative voting system had been used).

B. GRAMPIAN IN MULTI-MEMBER CONSTITUENCIES

1. Existing constituencies

At present Grampian has 7 parliamentary constituencies:

Aberdeen Central (L)
 Aberdeen North (L)
 Aberdeen South (L)
 Aberdeenshire West & Kincardine (LD)
 Banff & Buchan (SNP)
 Gordon (LD)
 Moray (SNP)

The result of the 1997 general election was as follows:

	Conservative	Labour	LD	SNP	Other
Number of seats	0	3	2	2	0
%age of seats	0	42	29	29	0
%age of votes	25.0	25.6	22.6	25.2	1.6

Looking at the region as a whole, votes were very evenly spread across the main parties and there was a highly disproportional result. Labour had less than 1% of the vote more than the Conservatives, yet Labour won 3 seats while the Conservatives did not win any.

2. Options A, B and C

Grampian could be regarded as a single 7-member constituency. However, as a region which includes areas of sparse population, it is regarded as too large for a single constituency for the purposes of this report.

If we are to work within the boundaries of the region and if we work with existing constituency boundaries, Grampian can only be divided into constituencies of 4 and 3 member constituencies (or 5 and 2) if we are to avoid a majority of 2-member constituencies.

Options A, B and C in this case therefore lead to the same proposal: one 4-member and one 3-member constituency. The region could be divided as follows (with 1997 results):

(a) Aberdeen Central, Aberdeen North, Aberdeen South

	Conservative	Labour	LD	SNP	Other
Number of seats	1	1	1	0	0
%age of seats	33	33	33	0	0
%age of votes	20.6	43.8	18.9	15.6	1.1

Allocating seats using 'highest remainders', the Liberal Democrats only gained the third seat from Labour by very narrow margin.

(b) Aberdeenshire West & Kincardine, Banff & Buchan, Gordon, Moray

	Conservative	Labour	LD	SNP	Other
Number of seats	1	1	1	1	0
%age of seats	25	25	25	25	0
%age of votes	28.2	12.6	25.2	32.1	1.9

In this case the calculations show the SNP very close to taking the final seat rather than Labour (although, as emphasised elsewhere, these examples are illustrations and not predictions of what might happen under an alternative voting system).

Options A, B and C overall:

	Conservative	Labour	LD	SNP	Other
Number of seats	2	2	2	1	0
%age of seats	29	14	29	29	0
%age of votes	25	26	22	25	0

4. Comparative disproportionality

FPTP	100
Options A/B/ C	9
Best achievable	0

(With four parties with roughly equal support competing for 7 seats there is a limit to the proportionality which could be achieved here. However, the 'Options A/B/C' result can be slightly improved by transferring a Liberal Democrat seat to the SNP.)

C. KENT IN MULTI-MEMBER CONSTITUENCIES

1. Existing constituencies

At present Kent has 17 parliamentary constituencies.

Tonbridge (C)
 Tunbridge Wells (C)
 Maidstone & Weald (C)
 Gillingham (L)
 Sittingbourne & Sheppey (L)
 Faversham (C)
 Ashford (C)
 Folkstone & Hythe (C)
 Canterbury (C)
 Dover (L)
 Thanet North (C)
 Thanet South (L)
 Sevenoaks (C)
 Dartford (L)
 Gravesham (L)
 Medway (L)
 Chatham & Aylesford (L)

The result of the 1997 general election was as follows:

	Conservative	Labour	Lib Democrat	Other
Number of seats	9	8	0	0
%age of seats	53	47	0	0
%age of votes	40.5	37.1	17.0	5.4

2. Option A: three 4-member and one 5-member constituency

Below we give a possible way of dividing the county into 4 constituencies, only one of which has 5 members.

(a) Thanet North, Thanet South, Dover, Folkstone

	Conservative	Labour	Lib Democrat	Other
Number of seats	2	2	0	0
%age of seats	50	50	0	0
%age of votes	39	41	15	5

(b) Canterbury, Sittingbourne, Faversham, Ashford

	Conservative	Labour	Lib Democrat	Other
Number of seats	2	1	1	0
%age of seats	50	25	25	0
%age of votes	40	35	19	6

(c) Medway, Chatham, Maidstone, Gillingham

	Conservative	Labour	Lib Democrat	Other
Number of seats	2	2	0	0
%age of seats	50	50	0	0
%age of votes	39	39	17	5

(d) Tonbridge, Tunbridge Wells, Sevenoaks, Dartford, Gravesham

	Conservative	Labour	Lib Democrat	Other
Number of seats	2	2	1	0
%age of seats	40	40	20	0
%age of votes	43	35	18	4

Option A overall

	<i>Conservative</i>	<i>Labour</i>	<i>Lib Democrat</i>	<i>Other</i>
<i>Number of seats</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>0</i>
<i>%age of seats</i>	<i>47</i>	<i>41</i>	<i>12</i>	<i>0</i>
<i>%age of votes</i>	<i>41</i>	<i>37</i>	<i>17</i>	<i>5</i>

3. Option B: two 4-member and three 3 member constituencies

(a) Thanet North, Thanet South, Folkstone & Hythe, Dover

	Conservative	Labour	Lib Democrat	Other
Number of seats	2	2	0	0
%age of seats	50	50	0	0
%age of votes	39	41	15	5

(b) Maidstone & Weald, Faversham, Ashford, Canterbury

	Conservative	Labour	Lib Democrat	Other
Number of seats	2	1	1	0
%age of seats	67	33	0	0
%age of votes	42	31	20	7

(c) Sevenoaks, Tonbridge, Tunbridge Wells,

	Conservative	Labour	Lib Democrat	Other
Number of seats	1	1	1	0
%age of seats	33	33	33	0
%age of votes	46	24	24	6

(d) Chatham & Aylesford, Gillingham, Sittingbourne & Sheppey

	Conservative	Labour	Lib Democrat	Other
Number of seats	1	1	1	0
%age of seats	33	33	33	0
%age of votes	37	41	17	5

(At present Labour holds all of these seats. The assumptions used for this illustration very narrowly give the third seat to the Liberal Democrats rather than Labour. This example can be compared with 4(a) on the following page.)

(e) Dartford, Gravesham, Medway

	Conservative	Labour	Lib Democrat	Other
Number of seats	1	2	0	0
%age of seats	33	67	0	0
%age of votes	39	49	9	3

Option B overall

	Conservative	Labour	Lib Democrat	Other
Number of seats	7	7	3	0
%age of seats	41	41	18	0
%age of votes	41	37	17	5

4. Option C: Five 3-member and one 2-member constituency

(a) Sevenoaks, Tonbridge, Tunbridge Wells

	Conservative	Labour	Lib Democrat	Other
Number of seats	1	1	1	0
%age of seats	33	33	33	0
%age of votes	46	24	24	5

(At present the Conservatives hold all 3 seats. Under the assumptions used, in this illustration they would very narrowly fail to win a second seat. See also 3 (d) above.)

(b) Dover, Thanet North, Thanet South

	Conservative	Labour	Lib Democrat	Other
Number of seats	1	2	0	0
%age of seats	33	67	0	0
%age of votes	39	47	10	4

(c) Sittingbourne, Faversham, Ashford

	Conservative	Labour	Lib Democrat	Other
Number of seats	1	1	1	0
%age of seats	33	33	33	0
%age of votes	41	36	17	6

(d) Chatham, Maidstone, Gillingham

	Conservative	Labour	Lib Democrat	Other
Number of seats	1	1	1	
%age of seats	33	33	33	0
%age of votes	39	36	19	6

(e) Dartford, Gravesham, Medway

	Conservative	Labour	Lib Democrat	Other
Number of seats	1	2	0	0
%age of seats	33	67	0	0
%age of votes	39	49	9	3

(f) Folkstone, Canterbury

	Conservative	Labour	Lib Democrat	Other
Number of seats	1	1	0	0
%age of seats	50	50	0	0
%age of votes	39	28	25	8

Option C overall

	Conservative	Labour	Lib Democrat	Other
Number of seats	6	8	3	0
%age of seats	35	47	18	0
%age of votes	41	37	17	5

4. Comparative disproportionality

FPTP	100
Option A	31
Option B	0
Option C	31
Best achievable	0

All three options give, as expected, significant improvements over FPTP. More surprisingly, the particular combinations of constituencies used has produced a more proportional result option B than in option A. Other combinations would have produced different results, but in the illustrations the multi-member constituencies have been compiled on the basis of geography alone.

D. MERSEYSIDE IN MULTI-MEMBER CONSTITUENCIES**1. Existing constituencies**

At present Merseyside has 16 parliamentary constituencies.

Birkenhead (L)
 Wallasey (L)
 Wirral West (L)
 Wirral (S)
 St Helen's North (L)
 St Helen's South (L)
 Liverpool Garston (L)
 Liverpool Riverside (L)
 Liverpool Wavertree (L)
 Liverpool Walton (L)
 Liverpool West Derby (L)
 Knowsley North & East Sefton (L)
 Knowsley South (L)
 Bootle (L)
 Crosby (L)
 Southport (LD)

The result of the 1997 general election was as follows:

	Conservative	Labour	Lib Democrat	Other
Number of seats	0	15	1	0
%age of seats	0	94	6	0
%age of votes	20	62	14	4

2. Option A: Four constituencies of 5, 4, 4 and 3 seats

Here the region is divided into 4 constituencies but of unequal sizes in order to preserve what appear to be more natural boundaries.

(a) Birkenhead, Wallasey, Wirral West, Wirral South

	Conservative	Labour	Lib Democrat	Other
Number of seats	1	3	0	0
%age of seats	25	75	0	0
%age of votes	29	57	10	4

(b) Liverpool Garston, Liverpool Riverside, Liverpool Walton, Liverpool Wavertree and Liverpool West Derby

	Conservative	Labour	Lib Democrat	Other
Number of seats	0	4	1	0
%age of seats	0	75	25	0
%age of votes	10	69	15	6

(c) Bootle, Crosby, Southport

	Conservative	Labour	Lib Democrat	Other
Number of seats	1	2	0	0
%age of seats	33	67	0	0
%age of votes	28	45	24	3

(d) St Helen's North, St Helen's South, Knowsley South, Knowsley North

	Conservative	Labour	Lib Democrat	Other
Number of seats	1	3	0	0
%age of seats	25	75	0	0
%age of votes	16	70	11	3

Option A overall

	Conservative	Labour	Lib Democrat	Other
Number of seats	3	12	1	0
%age of seats	19	75	6	0
%age of votes	20	62	14	4

3. Option B: Four 4-member constituencies

As an alternative, the region might be divided into 4 constituencies each with 4 seats. One possible way of doing this would be as follows:

(a) Birkenhead, Wallasey, Wirral West, Wirral South

	Conservative	Labour	Lib Democrat	Other
Number of seats	1	3	0	0
%age of seats	25	75	0	0
%age of votes	29	57	10	4

(b) Liverpool Riverside, Liverpool Wavertree, Liverpool Walton, Liverpool West Derby

	Conservative	Labour	Lib Democrat	Other
Number of seats	0	3	1	0
%age of seats	0	75	25	0
%age of votes	9	71	14	6

(c) Knowsley North & East Sefton, Bootle, Crosby, Southport

	Conservative	Labour	Lib Democrat	Other
Number of seats	1	3	0	0
%age of seats	25	75	25	0
%age of votes	25	52	20	3

(d) St Helen's North, St Helen's South, Knowsley South, Liverpool Garston

	Conservative	Labour	Lib Democrat	Other
Number of seats	1	3	0	0
%age of seats	25	75	0	0
%age of votes	15	68	13	4

Option B overall

	<i>Conservative</i>	<i>Labour</i>	<i>Lib Democrat</i>	<i>Other</i>
<i>Number of seats</i>	3	12	1	0
<i>%age of seats</i>	19	75	6	0
<i>%age of votes</i>	20	62	14	4

4. Option C: one 4-member and four 3-member constituencies

As an alternative, the region might be divided into 5 constituencies as follows:

(a) Birkenhead, Wallasey, Wirral West, Wirral South

	<i>Conservative</i>	<i>Labour</i>	<i>Lib Democrat</i>	<i>Other</i>
<i>Number of seats</i>	1	3	0	0
<i>%age of seats</i>	25	75	0	0
<i>%age of votes</i>	29	57	10	4

(b) St Helen's North, St Helen's South, Knowsley North & East Sefton

	<i>Conservative</i>	<i>Labour</i>	<i>Lib Democrat</i>	<i>Other</i>
<i>Number of seats</i>	0	3	0	0
<i>%age of seats</i>	0	100	0	0
<i>%age of votes</i>	17	68	12	3

(This shows Labour narrowly taking the third seat from the Conservatives, although we cannot be certain that would happen under real election conditions and with transferable voting.)

(c) Liverpool Wavertree, Liverpool Walton, Liverpool West Derby

	<i>Conservative</i>	<i>Labour</i>	<i>Lib Democrat</i>	<i>Other</i>
<i>Number of seats</i>	0	3	0	0
<i>%age of seats</i>	0	100	0	0
<i>%age of votes</i>	9	71	14	6

(d) Liverpool Riverside, Liverpool Garston, Knowsley South

	<i>Conservative</i>	<i>Labour</i>	<i>Lib Democrat</i>	<i>Other</i>
<i>Number of seats</i>	0	3	0	0
<i>%age of seats</i>	0	100	0	0
<i>%age of votes</i>	13	70	13	4

(e) Crosby, Bootle, Southport

	Conservative	Labour	Lib Democrat	Other
Number of seats	1	1	1	0
%age of seats	33	33	33	0
%age of votes	28	45	24	3

Option C overall

	<i>Conservative</i>	<i>Labour</i>	<i>Lib Democrat</i>	<i>Other</i>
<i>Number of seats</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>13</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>0</i>
<i>%age of seats</i>	<i>13</i>	<i>81</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>0</i>
<i>%age of votes</i>	<i>20</i>	<i>62</i>	<i>14</i>	<i>4</i>

5. Comparative disproportionality

	Index
FPTP	100
Option A	25
Option B	25
Option C	50
Best achievable	0

E. NORTHAMPTONSHIRE IN MULTI-MEMBER CONSTITUENCIES

1. Existing constituencies

There are six constituencies:

Corby (L)
 Daventry (C)
 Kettering (L)
 Northampton North (L)
 Northampton South (L)
 Wellingborough (L)

The result of the 1997 general election was as follows:

	Conservative	Labour	Lib Democrat	Other
Number of seats	1	5	0	0
%age of seats	17	83	0	0
%age of votes	40	45	11	3

The 1997 result was therefore highly in favour of Labour – although prior to the election the Conservatives held all 6 seats giving a similar high level of disproportionality in the opposite direction.

2. Option A: 6-member Northamptonshire constituency

For STV elections one option would be to regard Northants as a single 6-member constituency - an area served by a single county council. If we assume that people were to vote as they did in many would vote differently under a system which provides more voter choice), then the outcome would have been:

	Conservative	Labour	Lib Democrat	Other
Number of seats	3	3	0	0
%age of seats	50	50	0	0
%age of votes	40	45	11	3

(Depending on how voters rank their preferences, it is quite likely that one of the Conservative seats would move to the Liberal Democrats under STV).

3. Options B and C: Two 3-member constituencies

As an alternative to a 6-member seat, which would be geographically large, the county might be divided into 2 three-member constituencies. One possible way of doing this would be to divide into West- and East-Northamptonshire. On the 1997 results, this would give:

a) West Northants (Daventry, Northampton North, Northampton South)

	Conservative	Labour	Lib Democrat	Other
Number of seats	1	2	0	0
%age of seats	33	67	0	0
%age of votes	40	42	13	4

(Here again the Lib Democrats could well take a seat from one or other of the major parties depending on voters' preferences.)

b) East Northants (Corby, Kettering, Wellingborough)

	Conservative	Labour	Lib Democrat	Other
Number of seats	1	2	0	0
%age of seats	33	67		0
%age of votes	40	47	9	3

Option B and C overall:

	<i>Conservative</i>	<i>Labour</i>	<i>Lib Democrat</i>	<i>Other</i>
<i>Number of seats</i>	2	4	0	0
<i>%age of seats</i>	33	67	0	0
<i>%age of votes</i>	40	45	11	3

(Note: It might be considered appropriate to divide the county into one 2-seat constituency of Northampton North and South and a 4-seat constituency covering all other areas. This arrangement would recognise that Northampton town might have different characteristics from the smaller towns and surrounding rural areas.)

4. Comparative disproportionality

	Index
FPTP	100
Option A	0
Option B/C	30
Best achievable	0

F. N IRELAND IN MULTI-MEMBER CONSTITUENCIES

1. Existing constituencies

At present N Ireland has 18 parliamentary constituencies.

Antrim East (UUP)
 Antrim North (DUP)
 Antrim South (UUP)
 Londonderry East (UUP)
 Foyle (SDLP)
 Down North (UKU)
 Down South (SDLP)
 Lagan Valley (UUP)
 Upper Bann (UUP)
 Strangford (UUP)
 Belfast East (DUP)
 Belfast North (UUP)
 Belfast South (UUP)
 Belfast West (SF)
 Newry (SDLP)
 Fermanagh (UUP)
 Tyrone West (UUP)
 Ulster Mid (SF)

The result of the 1997 general election was as follows:

	UUP	DUP	SDLP	SF	PUP	UKU	ALL	Other
Number of seats	10	2	3	2	0	1	0	0
%age of seats	55	11	17	11	0	6	0	0
%age of votes	32	14	24	16	1	2	8	3

In considering what might have happened if multi-member constituencies had been used, special care is needed in this illustration. We have made no allowances for the transfers of votes which would probably take place within the Unionist parties and within the Nationalist parties, between those supporting the recent inter-party agreement and those opposed to it, etc.

2. Option A: Two 5-member and two 4-member constituencies

(a) Antrim East, Antrim North, Antrim South, Londonderry East, Foyle

	UUP	DUP	SDLP	SF	PUP	UKU	ALL	Other
Number of seats	2	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
%age of seats	40	20	20	20	0	0	0	0
%age of votes	29	23	24	10	3	0	9	2

(b) Down North, Down South, Lagan Valley, Upper Bann, Strangford

	UUP	DUP	SDLP	SF	PUP	UKU	ALL	Other
Number of seats	2	1	1	0	0	0	1	0
%age of seats	40	20	20	0	0	0	20	0
%age of votes	41	11	21	6	0	6	11	4

(c) Belfast East, Belfast North, Belfast South, Belfast West

	UUP	DUP	SDLP	SF	PUP	UKU	ALL	Other
Number of seats	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
%age of seats	25	25	25	25	0	0	0	0
%age of votes	28	10	22	22	3	0	10	4

(d) Newry, Fermanagh, Tyrone West, Ulster Mid

	UUP	DUP	SDLP	SF	PUP	UKU	ALL	Other
Number of seats	1	0	2	1	0	0	0	0
%age of seats	25	0	50	25	0	0	0	0
%age of votes	30	9	30	29	0	0	2	0

Option A overall result

	UUP	DUP	SDLP	SF	PUP	UKU	ALL	Other
Number of seats	6	3	5	3	0	0	1	0
%age of seats	33	17	28	17	0	0	6	0
%age of votes	32	14	24	16	1	2	8	3

3. Option B: Three 4-member and two 3-member constituency

(a) Belfast East, Belfast North, Belfast South, Belfast West

	UUP	DUP	SDLP	SF	PUP	UKU	ALL	Other
Number of seats	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
%age of seats	25	25	25	25	0	0	0	0
%age of votes	28	10	22	22	3	0	10	4

(b) Londonderry East, Ulster Mid, Foyle, Tyrone West

	UUP	DUP	SDLP	SF	PUP	UKU	ALL	Other
Number of seats	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
%age of seats	25	25	25	25	0	0	0	0
%age of votes	16	21	32	27	0	0	2	1

(c) Lagan Valley, Upper Bann, Newry, Fermanagh

	UUP	DUP	SDLP	SF	PUP	UKU	ALL	Other
Number of seats	2	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
%age of seats	50	0	25	25	0	0	0	0
%age of votes	46	6	25	15	0	0	7	2

(d) Antrim East, Antrim North, Antrim South,

	UUP	DUP	SDLP	SF	PUP	UKU	ALL	Other
Number of seats	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
%age of seats	67	33	0	0	0	0	0	0
%age of votes	39	23	13	5	4	0	12	4

e) Strangford, Down North, Down South

	UUP	DUP	SDLP	SF	PUP	UKU	ALL	Other
Number of seats	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
%age of seats	67	0	33	0	0	0	0	0
%age of votes	36	10	24	4	0	10	12	4

Option B overall result

	UUP	DUP	SDLP	SF	PUP	UKU	ALL	Other
Number of seats	8	3	4	3	0	0	0	0
%age of seats	44	17	22	17	0	0	0	0
%age of votes	32	14	24	16	1	2	8	3

4. Option C: six 3-member constituencies

(a) Londonderry East, Ulster Mid, Foyle

	UUP	DUP	SDLP	SF	PUP	UKU	ALL	Other
Number of seats	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
%age of seats	0	33	33	33	0	0	0	0
%age of votes	10	28	32	26	0	0	3	1

(b) Lagan Valley, Upper Bann, Down South

	UUP	DUP	SDLP	SF	PUP	UKU	ALL	Other
Number of seats	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
%age of seats	67	0	33	0	0	0	0	0
%age of votes	44	8	29	8	0	0	9	2

(c) Antrim East, Antrim North, Antrim South

	UUP	DUP	SDLP	SF	PUP	UKU	ALL	Other
Number of seats	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
%age of seats	67	33	0	0	0	0	0	0
%age of votes	39	23	13	5	4	0	12	4

(d) Newry, Fermanagh, Tyrone West

	UUP	DUP	SDLP	SF	PUP	UKU	ALL	Other
Number of seats	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
%age of seats	33	0	33	33	0	0	0	0
%age of votes	40	0	38	25	0	0	2	0

(e) Strangford, Down North, Belfast East

	UUP	DUP	SDLP	SF	PUP	UKU	ALL	Other
Number of seats	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
%age of seats	33	33	0	0	0	0	33	0
%age of votes	34	25	4	1	0	11	19	6

(f) Belfast North, Belfast South, Belfast West

	UUP	DUP	SDLP	SF	PUP	UKU	ALL	Other
Number of seats	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
%age of seats	33	0	33	33	0	0	0	0
%age of votes	29	0	28	28	5	0	6	4

Option C overall result

	UUP	DUP	SDLP	SF	PUP	UKU	ALL	Other
Number of seats	7	3	4	3	0	0	1	0
%age of seats	39	17	22	17	0	0	6	0
%age of votes	32	14	24	16	1	2	8	3

5. Comparative disproportionality

	Index
FPTP	100
Option A	0
Option B	39
Option C	10
Best achievable	0

(Again we stress that these figures assume that, even with a different voting system, voters would vote as they did in the 1997 general election. Moreover, no attempt has been made in the figures to allow for the effect of transfers which could be quite significant in Northern Ireland.)

G. SOUTH GLAMORGAN IN MULTI-MEMBER CONSTITUENCIES

1. Existing constituencies

At present South Glamorgan has 5 parliamentary constituencies:

Cardiff Central (L)
 Cardiff North (L)
 Cardiff South & Penarth (L)
 Cardiff West (L)
 Vale of Glamorgan (L)

The result of the 1997 general election was as follows:

	Conservative	Labour	LD	PC	Other
Number of seats	0	5	0	0	0
%age of seats	0	100	0	0	0
%age of votes	27	52	13	3	5

2. Options A: 5-member South Glamorgan constituency

	Conservative	Labour	LD	PC	Other
Number of seats	1	3	1	0	0
%age of seats	20	60	20	0	0
%age of votes	27	52	13	3	5

Allocating seats using the Droop quota and highest remainders method gives the Liberal Democrats a seat at the expense of the Conservatives by only 0.02 of a quota. In real STV election conditions this seat would be decided by transfers from other parties.

3. Options B and C: One 3-member and one 2-member constituency

As an alternative to a 5-member seat, which would be geographically large, the county might be divided into 2 constituencies. One possible way of doing this would be as follows:

(a) Cardiff Central, Cardiff North, Cardiff West

	Conservative	Labour	LD	PC	Other
Number of seats	1	2	0	0	0
%age of seats	33	67	0	0	0
%age of votes	26	51	15	4	4

(b) Cardiff South, Vale of Glamorgan

	Conservative	Labour	LD	PC	Other
Number of seats	1	1	0	0	0
%age of seats	50	50	0	0	0
%age of votes	28	54	9	3	6

Options B and C overall

	<i>Conservative</i>	<i>Labour</i>	<i>LD</i>	<i>PC</i>	<i>Other</i>
<i>Number of seats</i>	2	3	0	0	0
<i>%age of seats</i>	40	60	0	0	0
<i>%age of votes</i>	27	52	13	3	5

4. Comparative disproportionality

	Index
FPTP	100
Options A	0
Options B and C	38
Best achievable	0

Ballot Papers

The Submission of the
Electoral Reform Society
to the
Independent Commission on the Voting System

April 1998

**ELECTORAL
REFORM
SOCIETY**

ERS

Introduction

This paper contains a mix of copies of actual ballot papers and versions adapted to the British political circumstance. This is not an exhaustive list of ballot papers - it would be impossible here to include all the possible versions.

The aim is to give the reader an idea of how the various systems may look to the voter.

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Closed List Ballot Papers	page 6 - 9
Open List Ballot Papers	page 10 - 14
AMS Ballot Papers	page 15 - 19
STV Ballot Papers	page 20 - 25

Majoritarian Ballot Papers



Supplementary Vote Ballot Paper

Australian Alternative Vote Ballot Paper

Adapted AV Ballot Paper











BALLOT PAPER FOR THE SUPPLEMENTARY VOTE SYSTEM

You have two votes. Cast one in the first column for your first choice; one in the second column for your second choice



Mark "X" here for
your first choice

Mark "X" here for
your second choice

C	DANIELS, Peter Conservative		
L	BENNETT, Kim Labour		
LD	DARCEY, Steve Liberal Democrat		
Gn	LYNCH, Emma Green		
PC	BROWN, Delme Plaid Cymru		



BALLOT PAPER
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
ELECTORAL DIVISION OF
PERTH

***Number the boxes
from 1 to 7 in the
order of your choice.***

7 CHEUK, Rodney
DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST PARTY

3 JENKINS, Brian
AUSTRALIAN DEMOCRATS

6 GUDGEON, Don
GREY POWER

1 RODGERS, Marylyn
LIBERAL

5 CHARLESWORTH, Ric
AUSTRALIAN LABOR PARTY (ALP)

4 CONOCHIE, Brenda
THE GREENS (W.A.)

2 WITHAM, William
NATIONAL PARTY

Remember...
number every box to make your vote count.

Australian Electoral Commission

AEC

ALTERNATIVE VOTE BALLOT PAPER

HOUSE OF COMMONS

ELECTORAL CONSTITUENCY OF DEWSBURY

*Number the boxes
in the order of your choice,
1 for your first choice, 2 for
your second choice, etc.*

☐

CHEUK, Rodney
LABOUR PARTY

☐

JENKINS, Brian
CONSERVATIVE PARTY

☐

GUDGEON, Don
LIBERAL DEMOCRATS

☐

RODGERS, Marylyn
GREENS

☐

CHARLESWORTH, Ric
REFERENDUM PARTY

☐

CONOCHIE, Brenda
PRO-LIFE PARTY

☐

WITHAM, William
REFORM PARTY

Closed List Ballot Papers

German 1933 Ballot Paper

French Closed List Ballot Papers (RPR & UDF)

Mock Up of what the Regional Closed List Ballot Paper for the European Elections in 1999 might look like.

Reichstagswahl 1933

Wahlkreis Potsdam II

1	Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter- Partei (Hitler-Bewegung) Hitler — Dr. Fricke — Wöring — Dr. Wobbeke	1	<input type="radio"/>
2	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands Künster — Dr. Löwenstein — Helmig — Frau Kunert	2	<input type="radio"/>
3	Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands Thälmann — Ulbricht — Dähle — Grosse	3	<input type="radio"/>
4	Deutsche Zentrumspartei Dr. Brüning — Dr. Krome — Schmitt — Vernoth	4	<input type="radio"/>
5	Kampffront Schwarz-weiß-rot Dr. Hugenberg — Steinhoff — Frau Lehmann — Eimm	5	<input type="radio"/>
7	Deutsche Volkspartei Dr. Groß — Frau Dr. Mah — Lüdecke — Gommel	7	<input type="radio"/>
8	Christlich-sozialer Volksdienst (Evangelische Bewegung) Behrens — Weinschke — Fränkel Wolff — Pleh	8	<input type="radio"/>
9	Deutsche Staatspartei Dr. Schreiber — Coloff — Frau Dr. Ellers — Dr. Goepel	9	<input type="radio"/>
10	Deutsche Bauernpartei Professor Dr. Fehr	10	<input type="radio"/>
12	Deutsch-Hannoversche Partei Meyer — Prell — Meier — Saller	12	<input type="radio"/>
15	Sozialistische Kampfgemeinschaft Erdmann — Schmidt — Huppach — Renning	15	<input type="radio"/>

RPR POUR PARIS

LISTE D'UNION

PRESENTÉE PAR LE RPR, LE CNI, UNITE RADICALE, UNIR, LE PARTI DEMOCRATE FRANÇAIS

Alain DEVAQUET

Professeur à la Faculté des Sciences de Paris - Vice-Président du Conseil Régional d'Ile-de-France - Adjoint au Maire de Paris - Maire du 11^e arrondissement

Pierre-Charles KRIEG

Avocat honoraire - Député de Paris (1^{er} et 4^e arrds)
Adjoint au Maire de Paris
Maire du 4^e arrdt

Maurice COUVE de MURVILLE

Ancien Premier Ministre

Nicole CATALA

Professeur agrégée des Facultés de Droit
Vice-Présidente du "Club 89"

Michèle BARZACH

Médecin Gynécologue
Adjoint au Maire du 15^e arrdt

Paul VIOLET

Adjoint au Maire de Paris
Conseiller Régional d'Ile-de-France

Jacqueline NEBOUT

Adjoint au Maire de Paris - Conseiller Régional d'Ile-de-France
Président National des Clubs "Unité Radicale"

Lucien REBUFFEL

Vice-Président National de la Confédération Générale des Petites et Moyennes Entreprises
Président de la Fédération des PME de Paris et d'Ile-de-France
Membre du Conseil économique et social

Jean-Louis GIRAL

Chef d'entreprise - Président de la Fédération Nationale des Travaux Publics
Membre du Conseil économique et social

Jean-José CLÉMENT

Conseiller de Paris (12^e arrdt)
Délégué du Maire aux relations avec les Français des DOM-TOM
Conseiller Régional d'Ile-de-France

Marcel HAGGAI

Président de la Chambre des Métiers de Paris
Président de la Chambre syndicale des Maîtres coiffeurs d'Ile-de-France
Vice-Président de la Caisse Nationale des non salariés non agricoles

Roland CARTER

Conseiller de Paris - Premier Adjoint au Maire du 14^e arrdt
Conseiller Régional d'Ile-de-France

Philippe LAFAY

Docteur en médecine - Conseiller de Paris (17^e arrdt)
Vice-Président du Conseil de Paris

Alain BARIL

Représentant de Commerce - Conseiller de Paris (13^e arrdt) - Conseiller Régional d'Ile-de-France
Syndicaliste de l'Encadrement
Vice-Président de la Caisse d'Allocations Familiales de la Région Parisienne

Christine ALBANEL

Agrégée de l'Université

Bernard BERTRY

Secrétaire Général du Mouvement Solidarité Participation (MSP)

Elections Législatives du 16 mars 1986

BULLETIN DE VOTE



LISTE UDF POUR PARIS

1 - Jacques DOMINATI

Maire du 3^e arrondissement.
Député de Paris.
Adjoint au Maire de Paris chargé des Affaires Internationales.
Ancien Ministre.

2 - Georges MESMIN

Maire du 16^e arrondissement.
Député de Paris.
Président de l'Association France-Israel (1984).

3 - Gilbert GANTIER

Député de Paris
Adjoint au Maire de Paris chargé des Transports et de la Voirie.

4 - Paul PERNIN

Député de Paris.
Maire du 12^e arrondissement.

5 - Jean-Pierre PIERRE-BLOCH

Adjoint au Maire de Paris chargé de la Circulation et du Stationnement.
Directeur du développement d'un groupe de presse.

6 - Nicole FONTAINE

Député au Parlement Européen.
Ancien Secrétaire Général Adjoint de l'Enseignement Catholique.

7 - Alain DUMAIT

Maire du 2^e arrondissement.
Journaliste

8 - Alain DESTREM

Premier Adjoint au Maire du 15^e arrondissement.
Cadre supérieur

9 - Annick BOUCHARA

Adjoint au Maire du 19^e arrondissement.
Déléguée de l'Association des Paralysés de France.

EUROPEAN ELECTION FOR SOUTH WEST REGION

CLOSED LIST BALLOT PAPER

7 seats to be filled

Place one cross on the ballot paper

CONSERVATIVE PARTY

☐

Neil Ames
John Barker
John Bennett
Beth Darcey
Chris Gibson
Tony Groom
Brian Jenkins

GREEN PARTY

☐

Sheena Brooks
Bob Brown
Patsy Jones
Michael Lynch
Don Gudgen
Marylyn Rodgers
Rodney Cheuk

LABOUR PARTY

☐

Robert Bell
Wendy Cluskelly
June Francis
Antony Delara
Ric Charlesworth
Brenda Conochie
William Witham

LIBERAL DEMOCRATS

☐

Neil Batt
David Crean
Catherine Cuthbert
Andrew Daniels
Judy Jackson
Charles Touber
Brian Taylor

INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES

☐

John Allen- Anti-whale fishing

☐

Paul Orr- Stop the bypass

☐

David Stevens- Monster Raving Loony

Open List Ballot Papers

Belgian Ballot Paper

Adapted Belgian Ballot Paper

Adapted Finnish Ballot Paper

Luxembourg Ballot Paper

Muster eines (französischsprachigen) Stimmzettels*

MODELE II.

(Modèle visé à l'art. 127, alinéa premier.)
(Moniteur belge du 28 avril 1929, erratum 5 mai 1950.)

Arrondissement
Election de représentants.
Election de sénateurs.
Le 19..

1	2	3	4
SIGLE			
Verbela	Collin	Maenhout	Nicolas
Dubela	Delval, Jan	Ducange	
Amman	Uytendaele	Hermand	
	Mabille	Jacques	
	Nelson	Linsack	Delval, Pieter
	Nice	Delcampé	SUPPLEANT
	Pepin	Niemand	Van Loy
	Gens	SUPPLEANTS	
	SUPPLEANT	Xhoffer	
	Vermen	Tilquin	
		Van Dlenet	Delton
		Robin	SUPPLEANT
			Hommen

* From: A. Delcroix, Recueil des lois électorales belges - Verzameling der belgische kieswetten, Brüssel, 1977, S. 83.

Belgian Ballot Paper

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT BALLOT PAPER

South West Region

ELECTION OF SEVEN MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT

You may vote one of two ways:

<p><i>EITHER</i></p> <p>Put "X" in one of these boxes to indicate the party of your choice</p>	<input style="width: 40px; height: 30px; border: 1px solid black;" type="checkbox"/> Conservative Party	<input style="width: 40px; height: 30px; border: 1px solid black;" type="checkbox"/> Green Party	<input style="width: 40px; height: 30px; border: 1px solid black;" type="checkbox"/> Labour Party	<input style="width: 40px; height: 30px; border: 1px solid black;" type="checkbox"/> Liberal Democrats	
<p><i>OR</i></p> <p>Put "X" in one of these boxes to indicate the candidate of your choice</p>	<p>Conservative Party</p> <input type="checkbox"/> BARKER, Neil <input type="checkbox"/> GIBSON, John <input type="checkbox"/> BENNET, John <input type="checkbox"/> GROOM, Beth <input type="checkbox"/> WALKER, Chris <input type="checkbox"/> DARCEY, Tony <input type="checkbox"/> SMITH, Jane	<p>Green Party</p> <input type="checkbox"/> JACKSON, Robert <input type="checkbox"/> CUSKELLY, Wendy <input type="checkbox"/> FRANCIS, June	<p>Labour Party</p> <input type="checkbox"/> LYNCH, Sheena <input type="checkbox"/> BROWN, Bob <input type="checkbox"/> JONES, Patsy <input type="checkbox"/> BROOKS, Michael <input type="checkbox"/> CREAM, Neil <input type="checkbox"/> BRATT, David	<p>Liberal Democrats</p> <input type="checkbox"/> CUBE, Cathy <input type="checkbox"/> DANIELS, Andrews <input type="checkbox"/> JACKSON, Judy <input type="checkbox"/> TOUBER, Charles <input type="checkbox"/> DELARA, Antony	<p>Others</p> <input type="checkbox"/> JONES, Thomas PRO-LIFE <input type="checkbox"/> TAYLOR, James REFORM <input type="checkbox"/> BROWN, Chris INDEP'NT

Open Regional List Ballot Paper

BALLOT PAPER FOR THE EUROPEAN ELECTION FOR THE SOUTH WEST REGION

7 SEATS TO BE FILLED

DIRECTIONS- Mark your vote on the ballot-paper by placing a single **X** next to the name of the candidate you wish to support.

CANDIDATES

LABOUR PARTY	CONSERVATIVE PARTY	LIBERAL DEMOCRATS	MONSTER RAVING LOONY PARTY	INDEPENDENT
<input type="checkbox"/> WALKER, Neil	<input type="checkbox"/> EVANS, Sheena	<input type="checkbox"/> SMITH, Robert	<input type="checkbox"/> THOMAS, Neil	<input type="checkbox"/> DELARA, Antony
<input type="checkbox"/> JONES, John	<input type="checkbox"/> PARKER, Bob	<input type="checkbox"/> CUSKELLY, Wendy	<input type="checkbox"/> CREAN, David	
<input type="checkbox"/> BENNETT, John	<input type="checkbox"/> JONES, Patsy	<input type="checkbox"/> FRANCIS, June	<input type="checkbox"/> ANDERSON, Catherine	
<input type="checkbox"/> DARCEY, Beth	<input type="checkbox"/> LYNCH, Michael		<input type="checkbox"/> DANIELS, Andrew	
<input type="checkbox"/> GIBSON, Chris			<input type="checkbox"/> JACKSON, Judy	
<input type="checkbox"/> DANIELS, Tony			<input type="checkbox"/> TOUBER, Charles	

Luxembourg voting paper

Election de députés
1^{re}, 2^{me}, 3^{me} ou 4^{me} circonscription électorale
..... (ou
Election de conseillers
dans la commune de le)

1 **2**

[illegible]

Wahl von Abgeordneten
1., 2., 3. oder 4. Wahlbezirk (oder

Wahl von Gemeinderäten

In der Gemeinde von)

3 **4**

[illegible][illegible]

5

6

AMS Ballot Papers

German AMS Ballot Paper

New Zealand AMS Ballot Paper

Adapted AMS Ballot Paper

Open List AMS Ballot Paper

Stimmzettel

für die Wahl zum Deutschen Bundestag im Wahlkreis 63 Bonn am 6. März 1983

Sie haben 2 Stimmen



hier 1 Stimme
für die Wahl
eines Wahlkreisabgeordneten
(Erststimme)

hier 1 Stimme
für die Wahl
einer Landesliste (Partei)
(Zweitstimme)

1	Prof. Dr. Ehmke, Horst Professor für öffentliches Recht Bonn Am Römerlager 4 SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands	<input type="radio"/>
2	Dr. Daniels, Hans Notar Bonn Schmidtbonnstr. 7 CDU Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands	<input type="radio"/>
3	Rentrop, Franz Friedhelm Steuerberater u. Wirtschaftsprüfer Bonn-Bad Godesberg Langenbergsweg 72 F.D.P. Freie Demokratische Partei	<input type="radio"/>
4	Rohde, Volker August Wilhelm Fritz Journalist Bonn-Beuel Stroßstr. 15 DKP Deutsche Kommunistische Partei	<input type="radio"/>
5	Dr. Skupnik, Wilfried Bruno Beamter Bonn Clausstr. 21 GRÜNE DIE GRÜNEN	<input type="radio"/>

<input type="radio"/>	SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands Brand, K. Schneider, Frau Müller, Schmidt, Frau Renner	1
<input type="radio"/>	CDU Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands Dr. Bunde, Dr. Blum, Frau Dr. Wilmis, Vogel, Frau Wulandt	2
<input type="radio"/>	F.D.P. Freie Demokratische Partei Genscher, Dr. Graf-Lambertz, Frau Dr. Adam-Schaeffer, Dr. Hirsch, Mörmann	3
<input type="radio"/>	DKP Deutsche Kommunistische Partei Meier, Frau Neith, Frau Bode, Buntz, Frau B. Schumann	4
<input type="radio"/>	GRÜNE DIE GRÜNEN Vollert, Frau Dr. Vollmer, Stralman, Frau Niekens, Schrey	5
<input type="radio"/>	EAP Europäische Arbeiterpartei Frau Zipp, La Roche, Cramer, Frau Cramer, Schulte-Viel	6
<input type="radio"/>	KPD Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (Marxisten-Leninisten) Brand, Dellen, Frau Schneider, Völz, Frau Lemmer, Poltraka	7
<input type="radio"/>	NPD Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands Schulze, Gerlach, Frau Krüger, Siepmann, Aenschmidt	8
<input type="radio"/>	USD Unabhängige Soziale Demokraten Bonnemann, Vornaggen, Thranhardt, Barz, Stah, Schmidt	9

[Declaration Number]

ELECTORATE VOTE

This vote decides the candidate who will be elected Member of Parliament for the EPSOM ELECTORATE.
Vote by putting a tick in the circle immediately before the candidate you choose.

[illegible]

EPSON 12

23

- 17.

BALLOT PAPER FOR THE ADDITIONAL MEMBER SYSTEM

YOU HAVE 2 VOTES

PARTY VOTE

Explanation

This vote decides the share of seats which each of the parties listed below will have in Parliament. Vote by putting a "X" in the box immediately after the party you choose.

Vote for only one party

THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY	
THE LABOUR PARTY	
THE GREEN PARTY	
THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATS	
THE MONSTER RAVING LOONY PARTY	
THE SCOTTISH NATIONAL PARTY	
THE REFERENDUM PARTY	

ELECTORATE VOTE

Explanation

This vote decides the candidate who will be elected Member of Parliament from the DEWSBURY CONSTITUENCY. Vote by putting a "X" in the box immediately after the candidate you choose.

Vote for only one candidate

WALKER, Neil The Conservative Party	
JONES, John The Labour Party	
ANDERSON, Catherine The Green Party	
JACKSON, Judy The Liberal Democrats	
LYNCH, Michael The Monster Raving Loony Party	
FRANCIS, June The Scottish National Party	
CREAN, David The Referendum Party	

Mock-up of an Open List AMS Ballot Paper for the House of Commons.
Each voter will have two votes, one for the constituency and the other for the region.

Ballot Paper 1

FIRST-PAST-THE-POST BALLOT PAPER FOR THE CONSTITUENCY ELEMENT OF AMS FOR THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

LLANELLI CONSTITUENCY

VOTE FOR ONE CANDIDATE ONLY

WALKER, Chris The Conservative Party	
JONES, Patsy The Labour Party	
ANDERSON, Catherine The Green Party	
JACKSON, Judy Welsh Liberal Democrats	
LYNCH, Michael The Monster Raving Loony Party	
FRANCIS, June Plaid Cymru	
CREAN, David The Referendum Party	

Ballot Paper 2

HOUSE OF COMMONS AMS OPEN LIST BALLOT PAPER FOR WALES

ELECTION OF FOUR REGIONAL MEMBERS

You may vote one of two ways:

EITHER Put "X" in one of these boxes to indicate the party of your choice	<input type="checkbox"/> Conservative Party	<input type="checkbox"/> Plaid Cymru	<input type="checkbox"/> Labour Party	<input type="checkbox"/> Welsh Liberal Democrats	
OR Put "X" in one of these boxes to indicate the candidate of your choice	Conservative Party <input type="checkbox"/> BARKER, Neil <input type="checkbox"/> GIBSON, John <input type="checkbox"/> BENNET, John <input type="checkbox"/> GROOM, Beth <input type="checkbox"/> WALKER, Chris <input type="checkbox"/> DARCEY, Tony <input type="checkbox"/> SMITH, Jane	Plaid Cymru <input type="checkbox"/> JACKSON, Sion <input type="checkbox"/> CUSKELLY, Wendy <input type="checkbox"/> FRANCIS, June	Labour Party <input type="checkbox"/> LYNCH, Sheena <input type="checkbox"/> BROWN, Bob <input type="checkbox"/> JONES, Patsy <input type="checkbox"/> BROOKS, Michael <input type="checkbox"/> CREAN, Neil <input type="checkbox"/> BRATT, David	Welsh Liberal Democrats <input type="checkbox"/> CUBE, Cathy <input type="checkbox"/> DANIELS, Andrews <input type="checkbox"/> JACKSON, Judy <input type="checkbox"/> TOUBER, Charles <input type="checkbox"/> DELARA, Antony	Others <input type="checkbox"/> JONES, Thomas PRO-LIFE <input type="checkbox"/> TAYLOR, James REFORM <input type="checkbox"/> BROWN, Chris INDEPNT

STV Ballot Papers

Irish STV Ballot Paper

Adapted Irish STV Ballot Paper

Adapted Tasmanian STV Ballot Paper

Maltese Ballot Paper

Adapted Maltese Ballot Paper

<p>Marcáil ord do rogha sna spáis seo sfus.</p> <p>Mark order of preference in spaces below.</p>	<p>Marc Oifigiúil</p> <p>Official Mark</p>
4	<p>BARLOW-COMMUNITY (Hannah Barlow-Community, of 67, Shantalla, Beaumont, Dublin. Alderman, Housewife, Midwife.)</p>
	<p>BELTON—FINE GAEI (Paddy Belton, of Ballivor, Howth, Co. Dublin. Director of Family Business.)</p>
	<p>BIRMINGHAM—FINE GAEI (George Birmingham, of "Denville", 498 Howth Road, Raheny, Dublin 5. City Councillor and Barrister-at-Law.)</p>
3	<p>BRADY—FIANNA FÁIL (Vincent Brady, of 138, Kincora Road, Dublin 3. Company Director.)</p>
	<p>BROWNE—SOCIALIST LABOUR PARTY (Noel Browne, of Stepaside, Church Road, Malahide, Dublin. Medical Doctor)</p>
5	<p>BYRNE—FINE GAEI (Mary Byrne, of 177, Seafieid Road, Clontarf, Dublin 3 City Councillor.)</p>
	<p>CURLEY—THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF IRELAND (John Curley, of 44, Greencastle Road, Coolock, Dublin 5. Storeman.)</p>
	<p>DILLON (Andrew Dillon, of Drumnigh, Portmarnock, Co. Dublin. Solicitor.)</p>
	<p>DOHERTY (Vincent Doherty, of 76, Pembroke Road, Dublin. H Blocks Campaigner.)</p>
1	<p>HAUGHEY—FIANNA FÁIL (Charles J. Haughey, of Abbeville, Kinsealy, Malahide, Co. Dublin. Taoiseach.)</p>
	<p>MARTIN—THE LABOUR PARTY (Michael Martin, of 28, Seafieid Road. Insurance Agent.)</p>
	<p>O'HALLORAN—THE LABOUR PARTY (Michael O'Halloran, of 141, Ardlea Road, Artane. Public Representative and Trade Union Official.)</p>
2	<p>TIMMONS—FIANNA FÁIL (Eugene Timmons, of 42, Copeland Avenue, Dublin 3. Public Representative.)</p>

TREORACHA

- I. Féach chuige go bhfuil an marc oifigiúil ar an bpáipéar.
- II. Scriobh an figiúr 1 le hais ainm an chéad iarrthóra is rogha leat, an figiúr 2 le hais do dhara rogha agus mar sin de.
- III. Fill an páipéar ionas nach bhfeicfear do vóta. Taispeáin cúl an pháipéir don oifigeach ceannais agus cuir sa bhosca

INSTRUCTIONS

- I. See that the official mark is on the paper.
- II. Write 1 beside the name of the candidate of your first choice, 2 beside your second choice, and so on.
- III. Fold the paper to conceal your vote. Show the back of the paper to the presiding officer and put it in the ballot

BALLOT PAPER FOR THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE
(This form of STV is used in the Republic of Ireland)

Mark order of preference in spaces below.	Official Mark
	ASHE, SEAMUS - THE LABOUR PARTY
	BRISCOE, BEN- THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY
	BYRNE, ERIC- THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATS
	CLUSKEY, FRANK- THE LABOUR PARTY
	COLLINS, MICHAEL- THE LABOUR PARTY
	PATRICK, TOM- THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY
	HILLERY, BRIAN- THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATS
	MacCARRON, DANIEL- THE LABOUR PARTY
	MITCHELL, GARY- THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATS
	O'BRIEN, FERGUS- THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY
	O'CONNELL, JOHN- THE LABOUR PARTY

INSTRUCTIONS:

- I. See that the official mark is on the paper.
- II. Write 1 beside the name of the candidate of your first choice, 2 beside your second choice, and so on.
- III. Fold the paper to conceal your vote. Show the back of the paper to the presiding officer and put it in the ballot box.

SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE BALLOT PAPER

BALLOT PAPER FOR HOUSE OF COMMONS

DIRECTIONS- Mark your vote on this ballot-paper by placing the numbers 1,2,3,4,5 and so on until you have no preference in the squares immediately to the left of the name of the respective candidates so as to indicate the order of your preference for them.

CANDIDATES

LABOUR PARTY	CONSERVATIVE PARTY	LIBERAL DEMOCRATS	MONSTER RAVING LOONY PARTY	INDEPENDENT
<input type="checkbox"/> WALKER, Neil	<input type="checkbox"/> EVANS, Sheena	<input type="checkbox"/> SMITH, Robert	<input type="checkbox"/> THOMAS, Neil	<input type="checkbox"/> DELARA, Antony
<input type="checkbox"/> JONES, John	<input type="checkbox"/> PARKER, Bob	<input type="checkbox"/> CUSKELLY, Wendy	<input type="checkbox"/> CREAN, David	
<input type="checkbox"/> BENNETT, John	<input type="checkbox"/> JONES, Patsy	<input type="checkbox"/> FRANCIS, June	<input type="checkbox"/> ANDERSON, Catherine	
<input type="checkbox"/> DARCEY, Beth	<input type="checkbox"/> LYNCH, Michael		<input type="checkbox"/> DANIELS, Andrew	
<input type="checkbox"/> GIBSON, Chris			<input type="checkbox"/> JACKSON, Judy	
<input type="checkbox"/> DANIELS, Tony			<input type="checkbox"/> TOUBER, Charles	






POLZA — BALLOT PAPER

Numru ta' Membri li għandhom jingħazlu
Number of Members to be elected





5 Div.20

<p>Remarks Membri ta' kull għandi għajr numru ta' kull Mark order of preference in square below</p>	<p>Isma tal-Kandidati Name of Candidates</p>	<p>Isma tal-Kandidati Name of Candidates</p>
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PARTIT TAL-FJURI

	JONES, (John Jones, 52 Strada Forni, B-Belt, Valletta Negozjant)
	MAGRO (William David Magro, 10 Triq il-Torri, tas-Sliema, Zebbiegh)
	MIFSUD, (Joseph Mifsud, 16 Victoria Avenue, tas-Sliema, Labourer)
	MUSCAT, (Francesco Muscat, 1 Triq San Pawl, HAZ-Zabbar, Xufier)
	VELLA, (James Vella, 5 Triq il-Repubblika, San Ġiljan, Perit)

PARTIT TAL-GHASFUR

	AZZOPARDI, (Spiro Azzopardi, 13 Triq il-Marina, il-Zejtun, Stampatur)
	BORG, (Assuero Borg, 69 Triq Barbara, il-Mellieha, Skrivani)
	CASSAR, (Lela Cassar, 'Dolores', Triq Principali, Bormla, Mara tad-Dar)
	MIZZI, (Clormu Mizzi, 70 Triq il-Zewġ Katbici, il-Lija, Avukat)

PARTIT TAS-SIĠAR

	AZZOPARDI, (Reginald Azzopardi, 165 Triq San Deminku, il-Qormi, Skrivani)
	ZAMMIT, (Lawrence Zammit, 'Jeskor' 188 Triq Bwieraq, il-Hamrun, Spizjar)

KANDIDATI INDIPENDENTI


	BUHAGIAR, (Louis Buhagiar, 55 Triq il-Repubblika, HAZ-Zabbar, Negozjant)
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Malta ballot.

General Election - South Somerset Constituency

Four Candidates To Be Elected

Place a 1 against the candidate of your first choice. Continue numbering (2,3,4 etc until you are indifferent between the candidates. A lower preference cannot affect the chances of a higher preference.

Mark order of preference in spaces below	Party Badge		Candidates Names
CONSERVATIVE PARTY			
		Cambrook	Nicholas Cambrook 11 Smith Street, Yeovil, Somerset
		Davies	David Davies Wych Elms, High Street, London N15
		King	Tom King 123 High Street, Bridgwater, Somerset
		Nicholson	David Nicholson 24 The Avenue, Taunton, Somerset
LABOUR PARTY			
		Ashford	Bob Ashford Little Dell, Stoke sub Hamdon, Somerset
		Conway	Joe Conway 2, Westland Avenue, Street, Somerset
		Lavers	Roger Lavers 24 St Thomas Street, Somerton, Somerset
		Lisgo	Elizabeth Lisgo 124, Broad Street, Taunton, Somerset
LIBERAL DEMOCRATS			
		Ashdown	Jeremy John Durham Ashdown (known as Paddy) Vane Cottage, Norton sub Hamdon, Somerset
		Ballard	Jackie Ballard 14 Somerset View, Taunton, Somerset
		Heath	David Heath 2 Cemetery Road, Frome, Somerset
		Watson	Graham Watson Scotsman Cottage, Bridgwater, Somerset
GREENS			
		Lambert	Jean Lambert 19 Holloway Road, London N1
		Taylor	Dee Taylor 24, The Mall, Yeovil, Somerset
INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES			
		Goldman	Sir John Goldman Referendum Party Goldman Hacienda, Ilkley, Yorks
		Sutch	Lord David Sutch Monster Raving Loony Party Loony Towers, London W16